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ABSTRACT
Botnets are increasingly being held responsible formost of the cyber-
crimes that occur nowadays. They are used to carry outmalicious ac-
tivities like banking credential theft andDistributedDenial of Service
(DDoS) attacks to generate profit for their owner, the botmaster. Tradi-
tional botnets utilized centralized and decentralized Command-and-
Control Servers (C2s). However, recent botnets have been observed to
prefer P2P-based architectures to overcome some of the drawbacks
of the earlier architectures.
A P2P architecture allows botnets to become more resilient and
robust against random node failures and targeted attacks. However,
the distributed nature of such botnets requires the defenders, i.e., re-
searchers and lawenforcementagencies, touse specialized tools such
as crawlers and sensor nodes tomonitor them. In return to suchmon-
itoring, botmasters have introduced various countermeasures to im-
pede botnet monitoring, e.g., automated blacklisting mechanisms.
The presence of anti-monitoring mechanisms not only render any
gatheredmonitoring data to be inaccurate or incomplete, it may also
adversely affect the success rate of botnet takedown attempts that
rely upon such data. Most of the existing monitoring mechanisms
identified fromthe relatedworksonly attempt to tolerate anti-monitoring
mechanisms as much as possible, e.g., crawling bots with lower fre-
quency. However, this might also introduce noise into the gathered
data, e.g., due to the longer delay for crawling the botnet. This in turn
may also reduce the quality of the data.
Thisdissertationaddressesmostof themajor issues associatedwith
monitoring inP2Pbotnets asdescribedabove. Specifically, it analyzes
the anti-monitoring mechanisms of three existing P2P botnets:
1)GameOver Zeus, 2)Sality, and 3) ZeroAccess, and proposes counter-
measures to circumvent some of them. In addition, this dissertation
also proposes several advanced anti-monitoring mechanisms from
the perspective of a botmaster to anticipate future advancement of
thebotnets. This includes a set of lightweight crawler detectionmech-
anisms as well as several novel mechanisms to detect sensor nodes
deployed in P2P botnets. To ensure that the defenders do not loose
this arms race, this dissertation also includes countermeasures to cir-
cumvent theproposed anti-monitoringmechanisms. Finally, this dis-
sertation also investigates if the presence of third party monitoring
mechanisms, e.g., sensors, in botnets influences the overall churn
measurements. In addition, churn models for Sality and ZeroAccess
are also derived using fine-granularity churn measurements.
The works proposed in this dissertation have been evaluated us-
ing either real-world botnet datasets, i.e., that were gathered using
crawlers and sensor nodes, or simulated datasets. Evaluation results
indicate thatmost of the anti-monitoringmechanisms implemented
by existing botnets can either be circumvented or tolerated to ob-
vii
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tain monitoring data with a better quality. However, many crawlers
and sensor nodes in existing botnets are found vulnerable to the anti-
monitoring mechanisms that are proposed from the perspective of
a botmaster in this dissertation. Analysis of the fine-grained churn
measurements for Sality and ZeroAccess indicate that churn in these
botnets are similar to that of regular P2P file-sharing networks like
Gnutella and Bittorent. In addition, the presence of highly respon-
sive sensor nodes in the botnets are found not influencing the over-
all churn measurements. This is mainly due to low number of sen-
sor nodes currently deployed in the botnets. Existing and future bot-
net monitoring mechanisms should apply the findings of this disser-
tation to ensure high quality monitoring data, and to remain unde-
tected from the bots or the botmasters.
viii
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
HeutewerdenBotnetze zunehmen fürdieMehrzahlder verübtenCyber-
Straftaten verantwortlich gemacht. Die Besitzer der Botnetze, soge-
nannte Botmaster, nutzendieNetze umbösartige Aktivitätenwie bei-
spielsweise den Diebstahl von Bankzugangsdaten und Distributed
Denial of Service (DDOS)Angriffedurchzuführen.EinBotmaster kon-
trolliert das eigene Botnetz mit einem Command-and-Control Ser-
ver (C2) und verteilt über diesen Befehle und Aktualisierungen an die
Bots. Traditionelle Botnetze verwendeten zentrale oder verteilte C2s.
Allerdings zeigen Beobachtungen, dass aktuelle Botnetze mehr und
mehr auf P2P-basierte Architekturen setzen und damit die Nachtei-
le einer zentralen Architektur umgehen. P2P-basierte Botnetze sind
widerstandsfähiger und robuster gegenüber zufälligen Ausfällen und
gezielten Angriffen.
Bots in einem P2P Botnetz sind über ein Overlay miteinander ver-
bunden. Dieses Overlay wird kollaborativ und verteilt von den Bots
verwaltet.Diese verteilteVerwaltungerschwertdieÜberwachungund
macht spezialisierte Überwachungslösungen wie Crawler und Sen-
sorknoten nötig. Diese Überwachungslösungen setzen Wissen über
das jeweilige Botnetzprotokoll und dessen Nachrichtenformat vor-
aus um teilnehmendeBots undderenKommunikationsbeziehungen
zu bestimmen. Darüber hinaus setzen Botmaster diverse Gegenmaß-
nahmenein,wiebeispielsweise automatischesBlacklisting.DieseGe-
genmaßnahmen führennichtnurdazu,dassdie gewonnenenErkennt-
nisse unvollständig sind, sondern erschweren auch Angriffe auf das
Botnetz selber (sogenannteTakedown-Angriffe).DerGroßteil der ver-
wandten Arbeiten im Feld der Botnetz-Überwachung versucht diese
von Botnetzen initierten Gegenmaßnahmen beispielsweise über ein
langsameres Crawling zu umgehen. Allerdings führen solche Ansätze
aufgrundder höherenVerzögerungen imCrawling auch zuRauschen
in den gewonnenen Daten, was wiederum deren Qualität reduziert.
Diese Dissertation adressiert diemeisten der oben genanntenHer-
ausforderungen in der Überwachung von Botnetzen. Im Detail wer-
den Gegenmaßnahmen in den folgenden bekannten Botnetzen ana-
lysiert und mittels Verbesserung der Überwachungsmethoden um-
gangen: 1) GameOver Zeus, 2) Sality und 3) ZeroAccess. Darüber hin-
auswerden indieserDissertationmehrere fortschrittlicheGegenmaß-
nahmen aus der Perspektive der Botmaster vorgestellt, um zukünfti-
gen Entwicklungen vorauszugreifen. Zu diesenMaßnahmen zählt ei-
ne leichtgewichtigeCrawler-Erkennung sowieneueMethodenzurEr-
kennung von Sensoren. Um aber solche Botnetze auch noch zukünf-
tig beobachten zukönnen, beschreibt dieseDissertationauchMetho-
den um diese von Botnetzen intiierten Gegenmaßnahmen erneut zu
umgehen. Weiterhin werden in dieser Dissertation auch die Auswir-
kungen von Überwachungsaktivitäten Dritter auf die über Überwa-
ix
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chungsmaßnahmengewonnenenDaten, zumBeispielChurn-Messungen,
betrachtet.
Die in dieser Dissertation vorgeschlagenen Beiträge wurden mit
echten Botnetz-Datensätzen evaluiert. Diese Datensätze wurdenmit
CrawlernundSensoren inBotnetzen sowie durch Simulationen erho-
ben. Die Resultate deuten darauf hin, dass viele Crawler und Senso-
ren in Botnetzen für die vorgeschlagenenGegenmaßnahmen auf Sei-
ten der Botnetze anfällig sind. Daher sollten heutige und zukünftige
Überwachungsmechanismen für Botnetze die Ergebnisse dieser Dis-
sertation berücksichtigen, um weiterhin die Qualität der erhobenen
Daten sicherzustellen und von Botmastern unentdeckt zu bleiben.
x
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1INTRODUCT ION
Cyber-crimes likebanking fraud, spamcampaigns, anddenial-of-service
attacks are a profitable business.Most of these attacks originate from
botnets, a collection of vulnerable machines infected with malware
that arebeingcontrolledbyabotmaster via aCommand-and-Control
Server (C2). Traditional botnets utilize a centralized client-server ar-
chitecture for thecommunicationbetween thebotmaster and itsbots.
Thus, after such a C2 is taken down, the botmaster cannot communi-
cate with its bots anymore. Recent Peer-to-Peer (P2P)-based botnets,
e.g., GameOver Zeus [And+13], Sality [Fal11], or ZeroAccess [Wyk12],
adopt a distributed architecture and establish a communicationover-
lay between participating bots. In fact, all (counter-)attacks against
P2P-based botnets require detailed insights into the nature of these
botnets, inparticular thebotnetpopulationand theconnectivity graph
between the bots [Ros+13]. As a consequence, monitoring such bot-
nets is an important task for analysts.
However, as P2P botnets represent valuable assets to their botmas-
ters, botmasters are expected to impede the performance of moni-
toring mechanisms. This is already evident with the introduction of
an automated blacklistingmechanism inGameOver Zeus and a local
reputation mechanism in Sality. However, some of the deployed and
of theproposed anti-monitoringmechanisms are still in their infancy
and it will just be a matter of time before the botmasters will intro-
ducemore sophisticatedmechanisms to impede or preventmonitor-
ing.
1.1 GOAL AND OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
Thegoal of thisdissertation is toprovide improvedmeasures for coun-
tering P2P botnets, in particular, reverse engineering, vulnerability
analysis, and monitoring based on the challenges that are not suf-
ficiently addressed as of yet, e.g., anti-monitoring mechanisms for
GameOver Zeus or accurate churn characterization of P2P botnets.
Moreover, this dissertation also attempts to "raise the bar" for botnet
research by introducing advanced anti-monitoring countermeasures
that can be implemented by botmasters in the near future. Themain
rationale behind proposing such advanced countermeasures is the
prediction that botmasters will come up with (most of) these mea-
sures sooner or later. The research community that seeks to combat
botnets tries to stay a step ahead, working on approaches for over-
coming these countermeasures again and again.
1
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2 INTRODUCTION
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
The contributions of this dissertation can be categorized based on
the corresponding benefactors : 1) defenders and 2) botmasters.
Defenders
In the context of defenders, e.g., security researchers or law enforce-
ment agencies, this dissertationprovidesnovel solutions and insights
based on real world botnets such as GameOver Zeus, Sality, and Ze-
roAccess. In particular, this dissertation . . . :
1. . . .circumvents the neighborlist restrictionmechanisms of
GameOverZeus:TheXOR-basedneighbor selectionmechanism
that is implemented by GameOver Zeus attempts to prevent all
neighbors of a bot from being completely retrieved by crawlers.
In Section 5.1.1, properties of XOR operations are exploited to
design and propose an algorithm to manipulate the returned
neighbors for a given bot. By strategically spoofing keys which
are included in the request messages sent to the bots, the pro-
posedmechanism is able to systematically andprovably retrieve
all neighbors of a particular bot.
2. . . . introducesanefficientcrawlingalgorithm:Existing crawlers
have been reported to utilize either Breadth-First Search (BFS)
or Depth-First Search (DFS)-based graph traversal strategies in
crawlingP2Pbotnets. In contrast, Section5.1.2 introducesa crawl-
ing algorithm that leverages the observation of the existence of
a botnet backbone in P2P botnets to crawl more efficiently, i.e.,
contacting a smaller number of peers to discover as many bots
as possible. This proposed algorithm prioritizes popular bots,
i.e., bots with high indegree, in its crawling process to discover
new bots quickly. As a result, this algorithm is able to crawls
fewer bots to discover most of the bots in the botnet overlay.
3. . . .presents amore accurate churnmodel for existingP2Pbot-
nets: Althoughmuch work has been done in the field of charac-
terizing churn in regular P2P file sharing networks, very little is
available for P2P botnets. Therefore, an accurate churn model
is derived in Section 7.1 from empirical results of two real world
botnets and they are presentedwith amuchfinermeasurement
granularity than most related work. The results from the two
botnetswereobtainedusinga self-developedhigh-speedcrawler
that efficiently crawls both botnets. Besides the granular mea-
surements, this work also takes into consideration the noise po-
tentially introduced by unknown third party monitoring activi-
ties. Sensor nodes thatmay be present in themeasurements are
detected and removed by applying novel sensor node detection
mechanisms which are proposed in Section 6.1.
In addition to the above-mentioned contributions, this dissertation
also introduces and discusses several strategies to circumvent sensor
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1.3 OUTLINE 3
detection mechanisms proposed in Section 6.1 from the perspective
of a defender. Most of the proposed strategies utilize multiple collud-
ing sensors to deceive the sensor detectionmechanisms in believing
that the colluding sensors are in fact ’regular’ bots.
Botmasters
This dissertation also presents several novel solutions and insights
from the perspective of botmasters. In particular, this dissertation . . . :
1. . . .presentsa lightweightcrawlerdetectionmechanism:By lever-
aging design constraints in existing P2P botnets, a lightweight
crawlerdetectionmechanism isproposed. For instance, assume
that all NL request messages (see Section 3.2) in a botnet are al-
ways preceded by another type of botnet-specific message. If a
crawler deliberately omitted such a message, this behavior can
be flagged as an anomaly that may be caused by a crawler. Be-
sides evaluating the feasibility ofdetectingexisting crawlers, this
work also characterizes the design of the detected crawlers in
existing botnets.
2. . . .presents three novel sensor detection mechanism: To the
best of the knowledge of the author, this dissertation is the first
toprovidea sensordetectionmechanism forP2Pbotnets.Using
graph-theoreticmetrics, three sensordetectionmechanismsare
proposed that can be easily adapted to existing botnets. The de-
tectionmechanisms attempt to discern sensor nodes frombots
based on the observed connectivity among nodes within the
botnet overlay, i.e., the neighborhood relationship.
Besides that, this dissertation also proposes several enhancements
to the original NL restriction mechanism of GameOver Zeus. The en-
hancements emphasize on not allowing theNL requesters to have the
ability to manipulate the returned entries as it was with the original
mechanism of GameOver Zeus.
1.3 OUTLINE
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 intro-
duces the background that is necessary to understand the works pre-
sented in this dissertation. Chapter 3 introduces the requirements
that need to be fulfilled by any botnet monitoring mechanism. In ad-
dition, this chapter also introduces a formal model for P2P botnets,
and discusses the state of the art in both botnet monitoring and anti-
monitoringmechanisms.Chapter 4presents the summarized reverse
engineering analysis of three major P2P botnets that are focused in
this dissertation. This chapter highlights the important details of the
botnets which are useful to understand the different contributions
within this dissertation.
Themajor contributions of this dissertation are presented in Chap-
ter 5–7. Chapter 5 presents work on circumventing the NL restriction
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mechanism of GameOver Zeus. It also introduces an efficient crawl-
ing algorithmthatminimizes thenumberofneeded interactionswith
bots inorder todiscover themostbots. Inaddition, a lightweight crawler
detectionmechanism is alsoproposed in this chapter todetect crawlers
that canbe easily implemented even in existing botnets. Chapter 6 in-
troduces three novel sensor detectionmechanisms that utilize graph
theoretic properties to discern sensors from bots. Besides that, this
chapter also provides a discussion on circumventing the proposed
detectionmechanisms.Thecontribution inChapter 7provides a churn
model study for two real world botnets using fine grained measure-
ments that additionally takes into consideration noise of third party
monitoring activities. Additionally, representative churn models are
also derived and presented for the botnets.
Finally, Chapter 8 presents a summary of this dissertation and de-
tails the future work in the field of advanced P2P botnet monitoring.
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2BACKGROUND
This chapter provides essential background information for this the-
sis. First, Section 2.1 discusses different botnet architectures. Then,
Section 2.2 presents a brief overview of different botnet monitoring
mechanisms. Section 2.3 introduces the key metrics which are often
used incharacterizing churn inP2Pnetworks. Finally, Section2.4 sum-
marizes this section.
2.1 BOTNET ARCHITECTURES
A botnet consists of many thousands of infected machines or bots
that are controlled by a botmaster through the usage of a Command-
and-Control Server (C2). The C2 is used to disseminate new configura-
tions and updates to the bots and sometimes is also used to upload
data fromthe infectedmachines, e.g., stolen credit card credentials or
passwords. Depending on how bots interact with the C2, a botnet can




C2 Server B C2 Server CC2 Server A
(b) Decentralized
(c) Peer-to-Peer
Figure 1: Comparison of botnet architectures.
5
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
6 BACKGROUND
2.1.1 Centralized Botnets
In the early days of botnets, the use of centralized C2s was common.
TheC2sareoftendeployedeitheronself-deployed InternetRelayChat
(IRC) servers or hackedwebservers. Thenetwork topology of suchbot-
nets are depicted in Figure 1a. Centralized C2s are easy to deploy due
to the simplicity of the network design and have low communication
latency. Bots in centralized botnets regularly poll the C2 for newer up-
dates from botmasters and apply them as soon as they are available.
However, centralized C2 poses itself as a single point of failure which
are frequently targeted by law enforcement agencies in botnet take-
downs. The removal of the C2 node or server effectively renders the
entire botnet incapable of retrieving newer commands or contacting
the botmaster. Moreover, defenders are also able to enumerate all in-
fected machines easily if they get access to the connectivity logs of
the C2.
2.1.2 Decentralized Botnets
Theweakness of centralized botnets hasmotivated the botmasters to
design botnets that are not easily taken down. For that, the next gen-
eration of botnets were observed to adopt a decentralized architec-
ture where the simplicity and efficiency of a centralized architecture
is retained as much as possible but with improved resilience against
botnet takedowns by adding redundant C2s as depicted in Figure 1b.
Botmasters were observed to experiment with several strategies in
the past to implement the redundant C2 feature.Most commonly, the
bots have several hard-coded C2 address that are contacted one by
one if an existing C2 is not reachable. More advanced strategies have
also been seenwith the implementation of Domain Generation Algo-
rithm (DGA) or fast-fluxing mechanisms.
A DGA is an algorithm that generates time-sensitive domain names
of C2s using a common seed, e.g., date of the day, across the different
bots. This way, the botmaster is able to register many domain names
in advance that would be contacted by the bots in the future. Even if
some of the C2s are taken down, the botmaster is able to reestablish
communication with the bots through a new C2 that uses future do-
main names. However, since the DGA is often hard-coded in the bot’s
binary, anyone with decent reverse-engineering skills can figure out
future domain names that will be used in the bots. Therefore, defend-
ers are able to find out and register these domain names, albeit tem-
porarily, to hijack the botnet from the botmasters [Sg+09].
Another variant of the strategy to introduce redundancies in C2s
is implemented using Domain Name System (DNS) fast-fluxing net-
works. In such networks, the IP addresses of multiple C2s is cycled
rapidly via the usage of DNS records for a given domain name(s). In
contrast to DGA-based mechanisms, if the botmasters are in control
of the fluctuation of the IPs, defenders are not able to predict which
IP addresswill be used to point bots to a C2 in the future.Moreover, an
advanced variant of fast-fluxing is called double fast-fluxing: it cycles
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a list of name servers which are utilized by the bots to resolve the C2’s
domain name. The following scenario describes the concept of dou-
ble fast-fluxing. Whenever a bot needs to resolve a domain name, it
sends a request to its name server, e.g., ns.botnet.my. However, each
request from the bot may be handled by a different name server that
is resolved using the identical name server domain name but differ-
ent IP addresses. The name servers in turn resolve the requested do-
main nameof the bot into IP addresses using the fast-fluxing concept
described earlier. Therefore, such a design introduces an additional
layer of fluctuation to increase resiliency, and to prevent successful
botnet takedowns.
2.1.3 P2P Botnets
Recently, botnets have seen a paradigm shift through the adaptation
of aP2P-basedarchitecturewhicheliminateshighvulnerabilities that
were present in the centralized and decentralized architectures. Bots
inP2Pbotnets are interconnectedvia anoverlay that consists ofneigh-
borhood relationships between a bot and a subset of other bots as
depicted in Figure 1c. This overlay is maintained using a Member-
ship Maintenance (MM) mechanism that is specific to the botnet in
scrutiny (cf. Section 4). For instance, like traditional P2P networks,
P2P-basedbotnets alsoexperiencenode churn, i.e., nodes joiningand
leaving the network at high frequency. To withstand churn, the MM
mechanism ensures that participating bots remain connected to the
botnet overlay by ensuring that unresponsive bots, e.g., oﬄine bots,
are removed from the Neighborlist (NL) of the bot and replaced by
more responsive ones.
The botnet’s overlay and MM is also leveraged for the botmaster’s
update and command dissemination. A botmaster can use any bot
within thebotnet to inject updateswhichareeventuallydisseminated
to all bots. However, in contrast to the other architectures, P2P bot-
nets experience a delay before all bots are able to successfully receive
a new update. Nevertheless, the ability to inject commands from any
part of thenetwork is advantageousnotonlybecause it allows thebot-
master to have an arbitrary number of entry points but it also cloaks
the source of the command to prevent any traceback attempts.
In addition, P2Pbotnets are alsomore advantageous since they can
only be taken down if all bots are disinfected or taken down simulta-
neously. This is usually done through sinkholing attacks that require
a vulnerability within the botnet’s design or communication proto-
cols. However, such an attack requires enumeration of all bots in the
botnet using some of the monitoring mechanisms presented in the
following section.
2.2 P2P BOTNET MONITORING
Due to the lackof centralized infrastructures inP2Pbotnets, e.g., servers,
it is difficult to obtain the complete representation of the participat-
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ingbots.Hence, theMMmechanismsutilizedbyP2Pbotnets areoften
exploited to monitor botnets by sending request messages yielding
results that disclose information about the participating bots.
Themost commonP2Pbotnetmonitoringmechanismsare thehon-
eypot, crawlers, and sensors. Honeypots are special systems that are
purposely deployed to be infected by the botnet’s binary so that sub-
sequent communication of the honeypot canbe logged and analyzed
(cf. Section 3.3.1). Although honeypots are the easiest to be deployed,
they can only gather limited information about the bots in a botnet.
In contrast, crawlers leverage the botnet’s communication proto-
col to iteratively request neighbors of bots until all bots have been
discovered (cf. Section 3.3.2). However, this monitoring mechanism
requires a complete reverse engineering of the botnet’s binary to un-
derstand and re-implement the botnet’s communication protocols
to send valid requests to bots. The major drawback of this mecha-
nism is the inability to contact bots behind Internet access points
(like routers) that implement the Internet Network Address Transla-
tion (NAT) concept [EF94]; such bots represent the majority segment
of a botnet’s population, i.e., up to 90% [Ros+13].
Sensor nodes are deployed to address the drawbacks of crawlers
(cf. Section 3.3.3). They are usually deployed as routable nodes using
public IP addresses to alowall bots to contact them.Due to thenature
of non-routable nodes in P2P networks that remain connected to the
botnet overlay through routable nodes, these sensor nodes are even-
tually contacted by bots behind NAT devices. Therefore, sensor nodes
aim to be responsive to all bots contacting them to continue to re-
main in the NL of bots as a reliable neighbor, i.e., always online and
responsive to all request messages. In the process of being respon-
sive to incoming request messages, sensors are able to enumerate
both routable and non-routable nodes based on their identities, e.g.,
IP address and/or botnet specific identifiers. However, a major draw-
back with sensors is that they are often not able to reconstruct the
inter-connectivity between bots due to the inability to actively send
requests to bots that are behind NAT-like devices.
However,monitoringof a livebotnet isnot alwayspossibleor straight-
forward, e.g., in the case of botnets being taken down or unexplained
observations that could be caused by the myriad of network config-
urations and implementations in the Internet. Therefore, botnet re-
search is also conducted using simulators to have a complete con-
trol over the investigated scenarios. In order tomake the simulations
more realistic, a churn model is also applied based on the real world
churn measurements as detailed in the following section.
2.3 CHARACTERIZING CHURN IN P2P NETWORKS
The robustness and resilience of a P2P network is mainly influenced
by the MM mechanism of a network as well as the churn behavior
of participating nodes. While the parameters for theMMmechanism
can be configured according to the needs of the system, it is not the
same with the churn behavior of nodes participating in the network.
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Moreover, simulation-based investigations on P2P networks also re-
quire accurate churnmodels toprovidea realistic simulation scenario.
As a consequence, quite a number of works have been done in at-
tempting to characterize the churn phenomenon in regular P2P file
sharingnetworks suchasGnutella andBittorrent [SR06; Yao+06; SRS05].
Most of theseworks reported thepossibility of using theWeibull prob-
ability distribution to represent the observed churn in real world net-
works. To derive the accurate parameters for theWeibull distribution,
several importantmetrics need to bemeasured in the P2Pnetwork as
described in the following.
The metrics to describe churn characteristics of a network can be
classified into (1) group-level, concerning the collective behavior for
all nodes, and in (2) peer-level, which requires unique peers to be
identifiable through different appearances in the network over time
[SR06]. The latter highly depends on the definition of a unique peer,
which could be the user, the machine or simply the IP address itself.
Especially in the application domain of regular (structured) P2P file
sharing networks, identifying peers by their unique identifier is possi-
ble, as peers areusually addressedby their identifiers.However, in the
domainof (unstructured)P2Pbotnets, peers areoftenonly addressed
by the combination of their IP address and port number. Since IPs
can be dynamically allocated using DHCP servers and IPs are shared
using devices such as proxies, peer-level characterization based on
IP address alonemay be distorted as it cannot reliablymap IPs to the
particular bots. As such, this dissertation leaves out peer-level charac-
terization and puts its focus on the group-level metrics as presented
below.
• Inter-Arrival Time: The distribution of inter-arrival times cap-
tures the arrival pattern amongst peers. For that, the individual
arrival of peers needs to be observed and time taken between
two consecutive peers joining the network is measured.
• Session Length: One of the important property to characterize
churn is the session length distribution. For that, the total dura-
tion of a peer being available in a given sessionwhile participat-
ing in the system is measured.
• Age/Uptime: Another important metric that needs to be mea-
sured is the distribution of the age or uptime of peers. For that,
the measurement of the total duration since a peer first joined
the system in the current session is required. This metric is use-
ful in addition to the distribution of session length to character-
ize the possible combination of different session lengths that
could coexist at the same time.
• Remaining Uptime: The final important metric for churn char-
acterization is the distribution of the remaining time of an on-
line peer to predict when a particular peer would go oﬄine. For
that, the remaining time of an online peer before it leaves the
system in the current session is measured and correlated with
the current uptime of the peer.
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2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter presented some background that is necessary for the
readers to understand and follow the remaining parts of this disser-
tation. Three subdivisions have beenmade, first presenting the three
architectures often adopted by botnets, second going into monitor-
ing of P2P-based botnets, before closing with a short description on
characterizing churn in P2P botnets.
1. Botnet Architectures: By comparing the features offered by the
common botnet architectures, i.e., centralized, decentralized,
and P2P, the P2P architecture is motivated as an architecture
that allows great flexibility to a botmaster to manage a botnet.
The self-organizing and self-healing properties of the P2P bot-
netoverlay allow thebots to remainconnectedamongeachother
withminimal involvement fromthebotmaster.Most importantly,
this architecturehasan increased robustness and resiliencyagainst
botnet takedowns and randomnode failures compared to other
architectures. The properties of this architecture seems to be
preferred by botmasters; as seen from the increasing number
of P2P botnets emerging in the wild.
2. P2P BotnetMonitoring: P2P botnets bring new set of challenges
inmonitoring bots participating in thebotnet. Since eachbot in
a P2P botnet only maintain a localized view of the botnet over-
lay, a complete view of the overlay or the participating bots is
not easily obtained. To address these issues, the MM protocols
of botnets are leveraged toperformbotnetmonitoringusing the
mechanismspresented in Section 2.2: honeypots, crawlers, sen-
sor nodes.
Out of the three monitoring mechanisms, crawlers and sensor
nodesoffer greaterflexibility toperformbotnetmonitoringcom-
pared to honeypots. The background information presented on
themonitoringmechanisms areuseful to understand theworks
presented in Chapter 5 and 6.
3. Characterizing Churn: Botnet monitoring data provides valu-
able information to describe a botnet under scrutiny. Specifi-
cally, churn characterization of a botnet is useful to understand
the dynamics that occur within the botnet. The characteriza-
tion are often done based on churn metrics as introduced in
Section 2.3.
These introduced metrics are later used in Chapter 7 to charac-
terize churn in two botnets: Sality and ZeroAccess. Using these
metrics, the dynamic nature of the botnets are studied and rep-
resentative churn models are derived.
In the next chapter, the requirements and related work in the area
of botnet monitoring is presented and thoroughly analyzed.
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Chapter 2provided thenecessarybackgroundonP2Pbotnets and the
different mechanisms that are often utilized to monitor them. This
present chapter provides a detailed discussion on botnetmonitoring
mechanisms as well as the common challenges often faced in moni-
toring. Inmore detail, Section 3.1 presents the requirements of a bot-
net monitoring mechanism with emphasis on P2P botnets that aims
at obtaininghigh-qualitymonitoringdata. Then, Section 3.2 presents
a formal model on P2P botnets that is used throughout this thesis.
In Section 3.3, the related work in botnet monitoring is discussed.
After that, Section 3.4 discusses the challenges commonly faced in
botnetmonitoring. Inparticular, Section3.4.1 introduces issues stem-
ming from the dynamic nature of P2P networks. Section 3.4.2 elabo-
rates on the pollution of monitoring results due to monitoring activi-
ties of unknown third parties. In addition, Section 3.4.3 discusses the
various anti-monitoring mechanisms implemented in botnets and
those proposed by related work. Finally, a thorough discussion sums
up the chapter in Section 3.5.
3.1 REQUIREMENTS OF A BOTNET MONITORING MECHANISM
In the following, the functional and non-functional requirements of
a botnet monitoring mechanism are presented.
3.1.1 Functional Requirements
Abotnetmonitoringmechanismhas to conformto the following func-
tional requirements:
1. Genericity: In order for a monitoring mechanism to be easily
adaptable to different botnets, the mechanism should be de-
signed and developed in a generic manner. Although most of
the recent P2P botnets utilize custom protocols to communi-
cate among thebotsor thebotmaster, the steps tomonitor them
remain fairly similar. Therefore, amonitoringmechanismshould
be able tobe easily adapted to anyP2Pbotnets.Whenever anew
botnet is discovered; only the communication protocol needs
to be implemented and integrated to the monitoring mecha-
nism.Suchadesign significantly reduces the requiredeffort and
time to monitor a new botnet.
2. ProtocolCompliance:Monitoringmechanisms should comply
with the protocols utilized by the botnet under scrutiny. The
communication protocols used by the bots need to be under-
stood and used when communicating with the bots. The pro-
11
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tocol compliance is important as most botnets only respond to
requests or messages that adhere to their botnet protocols, e.g.,
encryptionanddecryption routines. Inmost cases, reverse engi-
neering of the botnet’smalware binary is required for obtaining
a complete understanding of any botnet’s inner workings.
3. Enumeration of Bots: The ability to enumerate infected ma-
chines within a particular botnet during monitoring is an im-
portant aspect of a monitoring mechanism. Based on the enu-
meration effort, it is possible to estimate the population size of
the botnet. Furthermore, this information is also useful tomea-
sure the success of cleanup activities. Bot enumeration is usu-
ally done by leveraging on the botnet-specific request and reply
messages. Every valid response for a sent request message indi-
cates the presence of a bot that is identifiable by either a partic-
ular IP address and port number combination or a botnet spe-
cific identifier at a given point in time.
4. Neutrality: A monitoring mechanism should stay neutral dur-
ing its monitoring activities in order to prevent introducing ar-
tificial noise that might influence the observed behavior of a
botnet. Specifically, a mechanism should avoid executing com-
mand from the botmaster or disseminating them further to le-
gitimatebots. This ensures that themonitoringmechanismdoes
not aid the botnet in itsmalicious activities, e.g., binary updates
or attacks.
Besides that, the mechanism should also avoid to intentionally
introduce noise that may disrupt or hamper the normal activ-
ities of the bots. Disrupting the activity of the bots may intro-
duce bias in the monitoring data of other researchers and may
lead to inaccurate conclusion of the real nature of the botnet.
Therefore, whenever in doubt, the best course of action is not
to respond to any request that is not crucial for the monitoring
activity itself.
5. Logging: All information gathered from a monitoring mecha-
nism should be logged with the associated timestamps for fur-
ther analysis. The logged information should includeadditional
botnet-specific metadata such as the details of the latest com-
mand from the botmaster or unique identifiers of the bots (if
available).
The logged information is particularly useful to informing the
relevant stakeholders, i.e., Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
network administrators, about the infections as well as under-
standing the botnet itself. For instance, the logged information
of a crawler can be used to reconstruct the botnet’s network
topology from the crawler’s point of view. This information can
thenbe further analyzedusinggraphanalysis techniques to iden-
tifymost influential bots in thebotnetoverlay.Moreover, in some
cases, historical monitoring data may also be useful to ensure
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a higher success rate in a botnet takedown attempt, i.e., iden-
tifying stable bots that are reliable in terms of their uptime or
presence in the botnet overlay.
3.1.2 Non-Functional Requirements
The following non-functional requirements are directly related to the
qualityof abotnetmonitoringmechanismaswell as its collecteddata.
1. Scalability: A monitoring mechanism may be defined as scal-
ablewhen itsperformancedoesnotdeterioratewithan increased
number of bots in a botnet. In existing and earlier botnets, the
total population ranged anywhere between several thousand
to a few million bots. Scalability of a monitoring mechanism
is not only about being able to handle the high volume of re-
quest and reply messages of all bots in a botnet, but also sys-
tem resources regarding memory, bandwidth, computational
resources and storage space.
2. Stealthiness: It is important to ensure that a monitoring mech-
anism is not identified by the botmasters or the bots in the pro-
cessofmonitoring thebotnet. Sincemonitoringactivities threaten
the economy and the existence of the botnets themselves, bot-
mastersmay retaliate against suchmonitoringmechanisms. For
instance, botmastersmay launchDDoS attacks or blacklisting of
IP addresses used for monitoring. The retaliation attacks may
cause disruption to an ongoing monitoring activity or renders
the IPaddress completelyunusable for furthermonitoring.Hence,
a monitoring mechanism should circumvent any mechanisms
that may indicate an ongoingmonitoring activity to the bots or
the botmaster.
3. Efficiency: Efficiency is two-fold and can be divided in probing
and resource efficiency. For probing activities, efficiency mani-
fests on the ability ofminimizing noise introduced in the result-
ing data in order to obtain high qualitymonitoring data. Since a
botnet overlay also experiences churn and diurnal effects sim-
ilar to traditional P2P networks(cf. Section 3.4.1), any delay in
probingbotsmay lead tobias in the resultingdata [SRS05]. There-
fore, amonitoringmechanismshouldbedesigned toprobe and
respond to bots as quickly as possible.
The resource efficiency of a monitoring mechanism focuses on
the ability to obtain high quality monitoring results but only
withminimal resources, e.g.,minimumnumber of requestmes-
sages. For instance, botnets could be designed to send a probe
message to verify the responsiveness of a bot before sending a
different message for requesting neighborlists. A crawler could
omit sending the probe messages and utilize the neighborlist
request/replymessage instead to assert the responsiveness of a
bot as well as to obtain the neighbors of the bot.
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4. Accuracy:Accuracy is two-fold and canbedivided into enumer-
ation and connectivity accuracy. For enumeration of bots, accu-
racy manifests in the ability to discover all bots that are online
at a given point in time. This is important because the overall
population of the botnet can inferred from the number of on-
line bots. In addition, information of which bots are oﬄine is
also important to assist any takedown attempts, i.e., ensuring
no bots have been missed.
Besides bot enumeration, the (inter-)connectivity, i.e., overlay
connectivity, among the bots is also important in botnet mon-
itoring. This information is particularly very useful for botnet
takedownoperations that involves strategically invalidating the
inter-connectivity among bots. For that, the connectivity accu-
racy manifests as the ability to capture the overlay topology as
known to the bots participating in the botnet at a given point in
time. Therefore, high accuracy of a monitoring mechanism in
capturing the exact state of a botnet provides high-qualitymon-
itoring data.
Themonitoring activities of unknown third parties may also in-
troduce noise in the resulting monitoring data. For instance, a
sensordeployedbya researchermayyield veryhighuptime com-
pared to regularbots andconsequently affect anymeasurements
that are relying upon the uptime of bots. As such, a monitoring
mechanism should also identify and remove such noise from
the monitoring data to increase the accuracy in capturing and
characterizing only the bots within the botnet.
5. MinimalOverhead/Noise:Amonitoringmechanismensures that
its activities or footprints do not pollute the botnet with artifi-
cial data that could significantly alter the nature or behavior for
both the botnet itself and other monitoring parties. Although
it is evident that existing monitoring activities will introduce
noise, it is crucial to ensure that necessary steps to reduce the
noise are taken into consideration. Moreover, minimizing the
generated overhead and noise also increases the stealthiness of
amonitoring activity frombeing detected by the bots or the bot-
masters.
3.2 FORMAL MODEL FOR P2P BOTNETS
This section introduces a formal model for P2P botnets that will be
very useful to understand the various work presented in Chapter 4–7.
A P2P botnet can be modeled by a directed graphG= (V ,E), which
is a common practice [Dag+07; Dav+08; Ros+13], where V is the set
of bots in the botnet and E is the set of edges or inter-connectivity be-
tween the bots, i.e., the neighborhood relationship. BotsV in a botnet
can be further classified into two different categories of bots, i.e., V =
Vs ∪ Vn, : superpeers Vs are bots that are directly routable and non-
superpeers Vn for those that are not directly routable, e.g., behind
stateful firewalls, proxies, and network devices that use NAT. Please
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
3.2 FORMAL MODEL FOR P2P BOTNETS 15
note that in the remainder of this thesis, the terms bot, peer, andnode
are used synonymously.
All bots use a MM mechanism (cf. Chapter 2.1.3) that establishes
andmaintains neighborhood relationships, i.e., a neighborlist, to en-
sure a connected botnet overlay. Hence, bots have connections to
a subset of other bots, i.e., neighbors, in the overlay. These connec-
tions or edges E ⊆ V × V , are represented as a set of directed edges
(u,v) with u,v ∈ V . The neighborlist NL of a bot v ∈ V is defined as
NLv = {u ∈ V |∀u ∈ V : (v,u) ∈ E}. Hence, the outdegree of a bot v can
be defined as the number of outgoing edges or neighborsmaintained
by the bot as: deg+(v) = |NLv|. The maximum outdegree is governed
by the global botnet-specific value of maximum entries NLMAX that
can be stored at any given point in time, i.e., |NLv| 6 NLMAX 6 |V |.
Moreover, the popularity or indegree of a bot v in the botnet can be
measuredbased on thenumber of bots that have v as an entry in their
NLs: deg−(v) = |(u,v)∈ E|
Bots in a botnet use a MM mechanism to maintain their NLs reg-
ularly following a botnet-specific interval that is often referred to as
MM-cycle. In each cycle, a bot probes for the responsiveness of all of its
neighbors by sending a probe message to each of them. The respon-
siveness of all neighbors can be verified based on a valid response
to the sent messages. In this proposed model, this probe message is
referred to as the probeMsg.
In addition, if the bot has low neighbors or many of the existing
neighbors are not responsive, additional neighbors can be requested
to fill up theNL. For this purpose, a peer v can request its neighbor u
to select a subset of u’s neighbors L⊆NLu and share themwith v via
a neighborlist requestmethod that is referred to as the requestL in this
proposed model. The decision on which exact entries are picked in
the returned response message L depends on the neighbor selection
criteria employed by the botnet.
Bots (re)joining the overlay oftenannounce their existence to a sub-
set of existing superpeersusingamessage that is referred toas announceMsg
in this proposed formal model. The information of these superpeers
can originate from a hard-coded list within the malware binary for
newbots or fromprevious bot communications for bots rejoining the
overlay. Superpeers receiving such a message will check if the new
bot is a potential superpeer by sending a message to the port that
is used by the sender for receiving incoming requests. This informa-
tion about which port is often transmitted along with the initial mes-
sage to the superpeer. A valid response to the message indicates the
direct reachability of the new bot. Hence, it is a potential superpeer
candidate as well. Therefore, the information of the new superpeer
can be stored within the existing superpeer’s NL and further propa-
gated when additional neighbors are requested by other bots in need
of new neighbors.
Non-superpeers would usually fail to receive the probe messages
sent by the superpeers due to the presence of NAT-like devices that
dropunsolicitedmessages, i.e.,messages initiated remotely. Suchbots
are often not included in the neighborlists of the superpeers. These
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
16 REQUIREMENTS AND STATE OF THE ART
bots rely upon existing superpeers to relay any update to or from the
botmaster.
3.3 RELATED WORK ON BOTNET MONITORING
The open nature of P2P botnets allows anyone with knowledge of the
botnet communication protocols to participate within the network
andcommunicatewithanybots as explained inSection2.2. Thisopen-
ness is often leveraged to conduct monitoring on the P2P botnets
by disguising as yet another bot. Monitoring in P2P botnets is often
done with the aim of identifying and enumerating all infected ma-
chines. Besides using the monitoring data to perform cleanup activi-
ties, the data can also provide valuable information in understanding
and tackling P2P botnets.
In addition, monitoring also enables the possibility of understand-
ing themalicious operations of the botnets themselves. For instance,
by analyzing the commands that are regularly injected in the botnet,
it is also possible to identify the operators or botmasters. All of this
valuable information is also particularly useful and important in the
event of a botnet takedown attempt, to ensure a higher success rate
[Ros+13] .
In the following, the state of the art of three commonly used botnet
monitoring mechanisms: honeypots, crawlers, and sensor nodes, are
presented with respect to the requirements presented in Section 3.1.
3.3.1 Honeypots
In the early days of botnetmonitoring, researchers used honeypots to
monitor centralized botnets. Honeypots or honeynets are machines
or a network of machines designed to appear as lucrative targets in
the eyes ofmalware and attackers. Suchmachines or networks aim at
being infected tomonitor any subsequentmalicious activities [Spi03].
Using honeypots is easy and straightforward as no prior knowledge
of the malware or its communication protocol is needed to conduct
monitoring.
Malware that infected a honeypot would contact its C2, e.g., IRC, to
report back to the botmaster. By monitoring the network traffic gen-
erated by the honeypot, it is possible to discover the details of the
C2, e.g., IRC server, that is being used. Moreover, the information of
other infectedmachines that are reporting back to the C2 can also be
obtained by inspecting the C2 communication logs. For instance,Mc-
Carty presented results of their deployed honeypot being recruited
by a botnet that uses an IRC server to control its bots [McC03].
The main drawback of this approach is the fact that the user has
minimal control over the actions that are taken by the bots within
the honeypot environment, e.g., participating in an ongoing attack.
In [McC03], McCarty reported his efforts to rate-limit the generated
network traffic andmanual blocking of certain ports tominimize the
damage that may be done by the malware. These efforts are taken
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mainly because it may be illegal if a user knowingly volunteers to be
part of the botnet activities or participate in an ongoing attack.More-
over, if the traffic generated by the infected machines is encrypted,
users can only obtain communication metadata.
The limitations associated with using honeypots for botnet mon-
itoring have led to the development of more advanced monitoring
mechanisms like crawlers and sensor nodes. These advanced moni-
toring mechanisms allow the user to have a full control over all mon-
itoring activities. For instance, a monitoring mechanism can selec-
tively refuse to respond or forward certain messages like new com-
mand dissemination to other bots. Furthermore, these mechanisms
can communicate with any bots and increase their coverage accord-
ing to the purpose of monitoring. Therefore, in the remainder part
of this thesis, the focus is only on the usage of these two advanced
mechanisms in the context of monitoring P2P botnets.
3.3.2 Crawlers
Due to the self-organizing nature of P2P botnets, bots can actively
request additional neighbors when the number of responsive neigh-
bors in their NL is low. This observation is leveraged by the crawler
which is a computer program that is implemented to mimic the be-
havior of a bot that is low on neighbors and to request neighbors.
However, since bots in a botnet only respond to communication that
conforms to their protocol, a crawler needs to implement parts of the
botnet protocol for sending requestL request messages and parsing
the replies accordingly (Functional Requirement 2 and 4).
Startingwith a list of seed nodes, i.e., superpeers, that is retrievedby
reverse engineering themalware binary, a crawler requests the neigh-
bors of this node and iteratively sends requestL to all newly discovered
bots to obtain entries from their NL. The goal of crawling is to ob-
tain an accurate snapshot of the botnet by obtaining information of
all infected bots as well as the inter-connectivity among them. Each
snapshot consists of a directed graph that represents each discovered
bot along with its neighborhood relationship as described in the for-
mal model presented in Section 3.2 (cf. Functional Requirement 3
and Non-Functional Requirement 4). A visual representation of such
a snapshot is presented in Figure 2.
The steps of requesting the NL of all bots can be implemented us-
ing graph traversal techniques such as DFS or BFS. These techniques
can be easily implementedwithin the crawlers by using either a stack
or aqueue-based implementationas thenode selection/crawling strat-
egy respectively. Finally, the information ofwho knows whom can be
stored for further analysis (Functional Requirement 5). Takenote that
it is important for a crawler to request the NL of bots in quick suc-
cessions to reduce the network bias, e.g., address aliasing, churn ef-
fects introduced in the resulting botnet snapshot [Kar+14; Wan+09]
(cf. Section 3.4.1). Accurate snapshots are particularly important to
conduct an effective botnet take-down attempt or to analyze the re-
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silience of the botnet against potential attacks (Non-Functional Re-
quirement 3 and 4).
Figure 2: GameOver Zeus network connectivity graph between 23,196
nodes reconstructedvia crawling. Thebluedots indicate thenodes
(systems infected with GameOver ZeuS) and the green lines indi-
cate the edges between nodes. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)
However, crawling fails to enumerate all bots in the botnet. De-
pendingon theMMmechanismof the respectivebotnets, crawlers are
only able to contact the superpeers, i.e., bots that are directly reach-
able. Bots that are behind network and security devices such as NAT,
proxies, and firewalls, i.e., non-superpeers, are not directly reachable
by crawlers, butmake up themajority of the entire botnet population
(according to [Ros+13] 60− 90%). These bots often rely on the super-
peers to remain connected to the botnet overlay and to receive new
updates from the botmasters.
One of the first P2P botnets that have caught the attention of the
public andmedia was Storm [Hol+08]. This botnet initially coexisted
together with theOVERNET P2P file sharing network, and eventually
moved on to a bot-only network which is referred to as Stormnet. Fol-
lowing the discovery of the botnet, many researchers attempted to
monitor Storm and presented their analysis [Hol+08; KLE08; Enr+08;
Wan+09]. The results presented by the researchers were interesting
due todiscrepancies stemming fromdifferingapproachesandassump-
tions in monitoring the botnet [Yan+14a; Ros+13].
SinceStorm initially coexistedwithOVERNET, oneof themainchal-
lengeswas todistinguishbots frombenignclientsofOVERNET.Wang
et al. presented amethodology to identify bots based on the observa-
tion that the DHT IDs of the Storm bots are not persistent over re-
boots and, therefore, change frequently compared to benign users
[Wan+09].
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One of the earliest work on monitoring Storm was performed by
Holz et al. using a BFS-based crawler called StormCrawler [Hol+08].
This crawler iteratively queries each bot starting from a seedlist and
sends 16route requestmessages consistingof carefully selectedDHT
IDs, i.e., evenly spacedaround theDHTspace, to increase thechances
of retrieving undiscovered peers. Mainly contributed by the open na-
tureofP2Pbotnets,many researchers startedactivelymonitoringStorm
andexperimentedwith it. Kanichet al. reported thepresenceofmany
unknown third parties that monitor the botnet in parallel by using
a built-in heuristic on their Stormdrain crawler to identify non-bots.
This heuristic is based on a design flaw of theOVERNET ID generator
within the binary that is capable of only generating a small range of
IDs [KLE08]. However, the authors admitted that they were not able
to identify researchers that could have chosen IDs that fall within the
range that is used by bots in Storm.
Most crawlers on Storm have been reported to conduct crawling
by randomly searching for IDs around the DHT space in the hope of
eventually discovering all participating bots. However, as reported by
Salah and Strufe [SS13], a more accurate snapshot can be obtained
using their KAD Crawler that crawls the entire KAD network in a dis-
tributed manner by leveraging the design of KAD itself, which is also
thedesignadoptedbyOVERNET. Their distributedcrawlingapproach
is not dependent on online nodes, unlike existing Storm crawlers, in-
stead splits theKADIDspace intomultiple zonesandassigningcrawlers
to dedicated zone to retrieve the routing tables of all nodes within
each zone. The results from the different zones can then be aggre-
gated as the snapshot of the botnet.
Other P2P botnets have also attracted the attention of researchers
in monitoring them. For instance, Dittrich and Dietrich deployed a
DFS-based crawler to crawl Nugache [DD08]. Their crawler conducts
pre-crawls and utilizes that information as an input for their priority-
queue based implementation that prioritizes nodeswhich have been
observedmoreoftenavailable and responsive in thepre-crawls.More
recently, Rossowet al. presented their analysis on the resiliencyofP2P
botnets, namely GameOver Zeus, ZeroAccess, and Sality, using their
BFS-based crawler that starts crawling from a seednode and appends
newly discovered nodes from previously crawled bots at the end of
a queue. In 2014, Yan et al. introduced SPTracker to crawl the three
botnets mentioned above [Yan+14b; Yan+14a]. Instead of using only
conventional crawling, SPTracker includesnode injection (cf. Section
3.3.3) as a complementary mechanism to obtain better crawl results.
FromthedomainofunstructuredP2Pfile sharingnetwork, Stutzbach
et al. presentedCruiser to crawlGnutella [SRS05]. This crawler priori-
tizes ultrapeers from the two-tier design of theGnutella network and
can capture an accurate representation of the P2P network through
quick crawling. The authors also report of an observed connectivity
bias amongpeerswhicharemost likely connected topeerswithhigher
uptime. Similar observations in unstructured P2P botnets have also
been reported by other researchers [Yan+14b; Ros+13].
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Althoughmost of the proposed botnet crawlersmeet all functional
requirements presented in Section 3.1.1, not much focus have been
given on the non-functional requirements such as stealthiness, accu-
racy and the amount of noise being introduced within the footprint
of the botnet (cf. Table 2). These unmet requirements will become
more apparent upon discussing the challenges often encountered in
monitoring P2Pbotnets in Section 3.4where the challenges affect the
accuracy of the crawl data (cf. Non-Functional Requirement 4).
3.3.3 Sensor Nodes
Due to the presence of network devices that allow sharing of IP ad-
dresses acrossmanymachines, e.g., NAT, botmasters, too, experience
the same problem of regular P2P networks which often have two dis-
tinct classes of devices: superpeers and non-superpeers. As peers be-
hindNATarenotdirectly reachable, botnets followa two-tier network
structure to enable all bots participating in the overlay management
remain connected among themselves. Thenon-superpeers rely upon
the superpeers to remain connected to the botnet and to receive new
updates or commands from the botmaster. Commands from the bot-
master is retrieved by polling the superpeers for newer updates. The
superpeers can relay any information from thebotmasters to request-
ing bots, and therefore circumventing the NAT traversal issues.
Fortunately, this two-tiered network design can also be exploited
to monitor the botnets. Kang et al. were the first to propose a mecha-
nism called sensors to enumerate structured P2P botnets [KCTL09],
e.g., Storm. The sensors are directly routable and are deployed us-
ing strategic DHT IDs intended to intercept route requests of other
bots. Since the requests were initiated by the bots themselves, the
sensors can identify the non-superpeers based on the intercepted re-
questmessages. In contrast to crawling, sensor nodes are able to enu-
merate both superpeers and non-superpeers (cf. Section 3.3.2). This
idea has also been extended and applied for monitoring other exist-
ing unstructured P2P botnets [Ros+13].
By exploiting the node announcementmechanism that is required
in each P2P botnet, a sensor node can be announced to existing su-
perpeer bots (cf. Section 3.2) using the announceMsg method. When
a non-superpeer requests additional neighbors from a superpeer, in-
formation about the sensor node may also be returned. Eventually,
non-superpeerswill insert the sensor into theirNL and from there on
will regularly probe the sensor for its responsiveness. Therefore, sen-
sors can identify and enumerate bots that are not directly routable
and thus cannot be discovered by crawling.
As explained inSection2.1.3, entrieswithinanNLareonly removed
or replaced if the associated bot has (consistently) remained unre-
sponsive when being probed. To avoid being removed from the NL
of the bots, sensors must always be responsive when being probed
by other bots. Moreover, the high availability of a sensor also directly
influences its popularity [Kar+14], i.e., the number of bots that have
the sensor in theirNL. Themore superpeers canverify the responsive-
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ness of a sensor at all time, the more bots will propagate the sensor’s
information to other bots. Hence, this improves the coverage of the
sensor.
A variation of a sensor node is also often used in sinkholing attacks
onP2Pbotnets. Such an attack requires a vulnerabilitywithin the bot-
net protocol that is exploitable to overwrite information in a bot’s NL.
By invalidating all entries of a bot, except those of the sensor(s), bots
will only be able to communicate to and through the sensor(s). As
such, all requests for newer commands to or from the botmaster can
bedropped and thus the communicationbetween thebotmaster and
its bots is disrupted.
However, although sensors can enumerate bots that are not discov-
ered by crawlers, they are not able to retrieve the connectivity infor-
mation of the bots. It is usually not possible to actively request theNL
of the non-superpeers, except in rare cases in which a botnet design
allows UDP hole punching techniques [Ros+13].
Although both, crawlers and sensors, have their set of advantages
anddisadvantages, inmost cases theycomplement eachother. Acom-
bination of both mechanisms provides a better monitoring results.
For instance, some researchers have augmented their sensors with
crawlingcapabilities in theirmonitoringactivities [Yan+14a; Yan+14b].
Now that the state of the art in botnet monitoring is discussed, the
following section looks at the challenges associated with monitoring
activities.
3.4 CHALLENGES IN BOTNET MONITORING
Although botnetmonitoring can be easily conducted by anyone with
sufficient knowledgeof the respectivebotnetprotocol, somechallenges
need to be taken into consideration while monitoring to ensure the
reliability and the quality of the collected data. These challenges, if
not addressed carefully, can result in distorted or impartial monitor-
ing results thatmayconsequently lead towrong interpretationsof the
data in comparison to the real botnet (Non-Functional Requirement
3–5).
These challenges aredescribed in the following sectionandaremainly
due to the dynamic nature of P2P (bot)networks itself (Section 3.4.1),
noise resulting from monitoring activities by unknown third parties
(Section3.4.2), andanti-monitoringcountermeasures that aredeployed
by the botnets (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 The Dynamic Nature of P2P Botnets
Thedynamicnatureof theoverlayof aP2Pbotnetwhich is similar to a
regular P2P file-sharing networks, poses several challenges to botnet
monitoring mechanisms. These challenges are discussed in detail in
the following:
1. Churn and Diurnal Effects : A botnet overlay experiences high
churn rate of nodes joining and leaving the network at high fre-
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quency [SRS05]. Therefore, crawlers that crawl bots with either
a low frequencyor takinga longerperiod tocomplete a full crawl
may introduce a significant network bias, i.e., in considering
bots to be online that have already went oﬄine, within the pro-
duced snapshot. In addition, newly arrived peers might also be
missed from being captured by the crawler [SRS05].
Moreover, bots within the overlay also experience diurnal ef-
fects where significant portions of bots go oﬄine and come on-
line based on geographical timezones [SRS05], e.g., computers
that are turned on/off during or after working hours. This ob-
servation suggests that any short-term measurement of a bot-
net, i.e., less than a week, would be heavily influenced by such
diurnal effects.
2. IP Address Aliasing : In addition to the dynamic nature of the
overlay, IPaddressaliasing occurs inP2Pbotnets. Primarily con-
tributed due to the shortage of IPv4 addresses and security con-
cerns, ISPs and organizations use various network devices such
as NAT and proxies to share the limited number of IP addresses
that are available for their network(s). As such, from the Inter-
net viewpoint, any network traffic generated by machines be-
hind such devices seems to be originated from only a single IP
address. Thus,measurements that rely upon IP addresses alone
may underestimate the total number of infected machines.
In contrast, ISPs or organizations that run a DHCP service for a
dynamic allocation of IP addresses to their users may also in-
fluence ongoing measurements. For instance, traffic originat-
ing from a single infected machine can be observed from sev-
eral IP addresses due to different addresses (re)allocated to ex-
isting bots by the DHCP servers, e.g., after reboots or the expiry
of a lease period. This address aliasing issue, may lead to over-
estimation of the number of infected machines.
The issue of IP address aliasing can also occur due to the pres-
enceof load-balancing infrastructures thatmaybeusedby local
network administrators or ISPs. In such cases, network traffic
from an infected machines may seem to originate from differ-
ent IP addresses (in the viewpoint of a sensor node).
One way to overcome the IP address aliasing issue is to use per-
sistent and unique botnet-specific identifiers (UID), if applica-
ble, to enumerate andassociate the infectionsaccurately [Ros+13].
As depicted in Table 1, although many botnets use some kind
of UIDs, not all of them can be used to uniquely distinguish the
bots. For instance, theUIDof Sality is not reboot-persistent and
as suchunreliable to beused todistinguishbots uniquely.More-
over in some extreme cases like the Miner botnet, there is no
UID at all, hence rendering a more accurate estimation of the
botnet population difficult or even impossible. Therefore, bots
shouldbe at least distinguishedbyusing the combinationof the
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IP address and port number used by them in the absence of a
reliable UID.
Botnet UID
Kelihos V1 16 bytes
Kelihos V2 16 bytes
Kelihos V3 16 bytes
Miner None
Nugache (not shared)
Sality V3 4 bytes (non-persistent)
Sality V4 4 bytes (non-persistent)
Storm 16 bytes
Waledac 20 bytes
ZeroAccess V1 (not shared)
ZeroAccess V2 4 bytes (not shared)
GameOver Zeus 20 bytes
Table 1: UIDs of existing P2P botnets that are retrievable from crawling
[Ros+13].
3.4.2 Noise from Unknown Third Party Monitoring Activities
To address the dynamic nature of P2P networks, mediation steps or
new measurement techniques can be designed that take them into
account and to obtain a more realistic and accurate measurements.
However, the second challenging aspect of botnet monitoring is the
presence of unknown third party monitoring activities. As explained
in Section 3.3, botnet monitoring activities generate a considerable
amount of noise that is inserted into the botnet’s footprint. However,
when the third party is unknown, footprints of their monitoring ac-
tivitieswill, unfortunately, be attributed as those originating from the
bots [KLE08]. For instance, consider the scenarioof a thirdparty inter-
ested in conducting a churn measurement in a particular botnet. As
discussed in Section 3.3.3, sensors deployed aim to be highly respon-
sive for a prolonged period to ensure high popularity. However, the
presence of sensor nodes with longer session lengths may skew the
churn measurements as most benign bots have significantly shorter
session lengths. Hence, any derived churn model may not be repre-
sentative of the real churn in the botnet.
Kanich et al. monitored the Storm botnet and took the active pol-
lution into account by leveraging upon a flaw within the botnet’s ID
generator [KLE08] (cf. Section 3.3.2). In addition, the authors classi-
fied the different type of sensors that were deployed based on their
responses to sent request messages [Enr+08]. Besides that, they also
described how they had to stop relying on the nature of the botnet’s
participants and carefully handle all received request and response
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messages. Their crawler often crashed within the first fewminutes of
crawling the network due to the presence of many malformed pack-
ets and the ongoing pollution attackwithin the botnet which uses bo-
gon source IP addresses. Therefore, theyhad toput inmuch engineer-
ing effort, to enable their crawler to be fault-tolerant and crawl suc-
cessfully. However, they also argue future monitoring mechanisms
may become more stealthy and indistinguishable from benign bots.
As a consequence, stealthy monitoring mechanisms will influence
the botnet’s footprint and skew themonitoring results one way or an-
other.
3.4.3 Anti-Monitoring Mechanisms
The third challenge inmonitoring P2P botnets is themost interesting
aspect of themall: anti-monitoringmechanismsdeployedbybotmas-
ters. Botnets are an important asset to their botmasters due to the
high profit that can be generated by them. Consequently, their mali-
cious activities also attract the attention ofmany researchers and law
enforcement agencies.
In the past, botnet monitoring activities have resulted in several
botnets to be successfully taken down [Ros+13; Naz07]. For these rea-
sons, botmasters are awareof themonitoringactivities andhaveequipped
recent botnets with anti-monitoring mechanisms. At the same time,
further research contributed additional countermeasures to impede
crawling and deployment of sensor nodes. However, to the best of
knowledge, none of these proposals have been seen to be adopted
by existing botnets (as at time of writing).
Anti-monitoring mechanisms from the perspective of a botmaster
canbeclassifiedas follows: 1)Prevention, 2)Detection and3)Response.
The first category of anti-monitoring mechanisms can be deployed
in advance to impede or prevent monitoring activities. The second
category focuses on detecting ongoing monitoring activities and the
last category addresses response actions to detected monitoring ac-
tivities.
3.4.3.1 Prevention
Anti-monitoringmechanismswithin this categoryaimto impedemon-
itoring activities by design of the botnets themselves. Mechanisms of
this category are commonly implemented in many of recent botnets.
However, a majority of them are focused on impeding performance
of botnet crawlers. In the following, mechanisms targeting crawlers
will be first discussed, and followed by those targeting the sensors.
Amajority of anti-monitoringmechanismsagainst crawlers arepri-
marily focused on the neighborlist return mechanism of the botnets
(cf. Section 2.1.3) as detailed in the following:
1. Restricted neighborlist replies :Many P2P botnets restrict the
size of the returned NL when being requested, by handing out
only a small fraction of their overall neighbors.In addition, bot-
nets alsohaveaneighbor selection strategy todecidewhichneigh-
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bors are to be picked and returned upon request. For instance,
bots in Sality returns only one random (but active) neighbor
[Fal11] andZeroAccess [Wyk12] return the 16most-recentlyprobed
neighborswhen requested.Meanwhile, botnets suchas theGameOver
Zeus [CER13;And+13] comewithamechanismthat returnsonly
ten neighbors that are "close" to a botnet-specific ID specified
within the requestL message and the ID of the neighbors. This
restrictionmechanismutilizes theKademlia-like XOR-distance
metric [MM02] to calculate thenotionof closenessbetween two
bots.
However, despite the presence of such restriction mechanisms,
crawling is still possible. InSality andZeroAccess, a crawlerneeds
to send requestL messages continuously to all discovered bots
until the results converge, i.e., nonewlydiscoveredbots [Yan+14a;
Yan+14b;Kle15]. Similarly for theGameOverZeus, a crawlerneeds
to repeatedly query bots in GameOver Zeus for their neighbor
lists by spoofing different IDs chosen randomly as reported by
Rossowet al. [Ros+13].Nevertheless, the restrictionmechanisms
of all these botnets implies that crawlers can only achieve a lim-
ited accuracy and are not able to provably retrieve or discover
the complete neighborlist of a bot. As a consequence, the accu-
racy of the obtained monitoring data may be low or poor.
2. Ratbot : A theoretical and DHT-based structured P2P botnet
called RatBot was proposed by Yan et al. that returns spoofed
non-existing IP addresses when requested to hinder attempts
to enumerate the botnet [YCE11]. This mechanism makes the
crawlingprocessdifficult and inefficientdue toadditionalnodes
that do not respond. This idea of Ratbot can also lead to an over-
estimation of the botnet size, which may be a preferred feature
forbotmasters, e.g., publicity amongpotential clients. Although
crawlers may still work in RatBot, the introduction of excessive
noise to the monitoring data may adversely affect botnet take-
down attempts.
3. Overbot : Starnberger et al. [SKK08] proposed a botnet called
Overbot, which does not disclose the information of other bots
or the botmaster if compromised by security researchers. The
idea of Overbot is to let the infectedmachines to communicate
to the botmaster using DHT keys that are generated by encrypt-
ing a sequence number with the public key of the botmaster. For
this, bots in Overbot utilize the DHT space within an existing
P2P file sharing network like Overnet to publish intentions to
communicate with the botmaster.
By deploying several sensor nodes that listen for and decrypt
search requestsor intentions, abotmaster can identifybot-originated
requests and communicate to the infected machines individ-
ually. However, since the sensors are assumed to have a copy
of the botmasters private key, they pose themselves as a single
point of failure if the sensors are compromised.Moreover, since
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bots continuously search for keys that could be found by the
botmaster, such apattern andnoise or overhead can easily raise
suspicions.
4. Rambot :
Focusing on unstructured P2P botnets, Hund et al. proposed
Rambot whichuses a credit-point system tobuild bilateral trust
amongst bots and to use it as a proof-of-work scheme to protect
against exploitationof itsneighborlist exchangemechanism[HHH08].
For that, they request all nodes including crawlers to complete
some computationally intensive tasks like crypto-puzzles be-
fore returning their neighborlists. However, with the advance-
mentof computing resources that are available today, thisproof-
of-work mechanism can be easily circumvented.
5. Manualneighborlistupdate :Another interestingapproachwas
proposed byWang et al. in [WSZ10] to allow botmasters toman-
ually update the neighborlist of all bots from time to time.How-
ever, thedesignof thebotnet requires frequent interactions from
botmasters to instruct bots to report to a specific node with the
information of their respective neighborlists and IDs. Consider-
ing that this couldpose as a single point of failure if themachine
being used for aggregating the information is being monitored,
the authors also provided several suggestions to overcome this
issue.
Nevertheless, the design of the proposed botnet requires the
botmaster to participate actively in themanagement of the bot-
net. This design not only increases the risk of the botmaster be-
ing exposed but also do not scale in the long run.
Very little work has been seen in the context of anti-monitoring
mechanisms targeting sensors. Andriesse et al. reported that is often
difficult to identify sensors in comparison to crawlers that are in na-
ture more aggressive in monitoring [ARB15]. The authors also men-
tioned that due to the passive characteristics of sensor nodes and the
difficulity in distinguishing them frombots, sensors often remain un-
detected. However, aggressive sensor popularization strategies such
as Popularity Boosting [Yan+14b] can be easily detected by mecha-
nisms to detect crawlers (cf. Section 3.4.3.2).
It is worthmentioning that there aremechanisms deployed within
existing botnets that are presumably aimed at preventing potential
sinkholing or takeover attacks. Sinkholing attacks often require the
entire neighborlist of existing bots to be invalidated or filled up with
only sinkhole servers. Since the sinkhole servers can also be gener-
alized as sensor nodes, those mechanisms aimed at preventing such
attacks are listed in the following for completeness.
1. IP-based filtering :Most botnets, including Sality and ZeroAc-
cess, have IP filtering mechanisms that prevent multiple sen-
sors sharinga single IP to infiltrate abotnet. Therefore, thismech-
anism prevents an organization that does not have a large pool
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of unique IP addresses, e.g., IPv4 addresses, from carrying out
sinkholing attacks on the botnet. GameOver Zeus implements
amore strict filteringmechanism that ensures that there is only
a single entry within any /20 subnet [And+13].
2. Local reputationmechanism : Bots in Sality use a local reputa-
tionmechanism that keeps track of the behavior of their neigh-
borsbasedon thenumberof valid replies receivedwhenprobed
(cf. Section 4.2.2). This mechanism slows down the rate of de-
ployment of sensor nodes throughout the botnet as bots in Sal-
ity prefer existing and responsive neighbors over new bots.
3. High-frequency swapping of neighborlist entries : ZeroAccess
uses a very small MM-cycle interval (cf. Section 4.3.2) to ensure
that all entries in its primary neighborlist are probed and cycled
at a high rate. As a consequence, on the onehand, a sensor node
loses its popularity unless it continuously announces itself to
other bots in ZeroAccess [Yan+14b]. On the other, sensor that
continuously announce itself would incur a high overhead in
terms of the amount ofmessages that need to be generated and
processed by the sensor.
3.4.3.2 Detection
Anti-monitoring mechanisms does make it more difficult to moni-
tor botnets. However, since this field is an arms race between the re-
searchers andbotmasters, it is only amatterof timebeforeworkarounds
to circumvent or tolerate such mechanisms are available [Kar+15].
Therefore, it is important that a detectionmechanism is also in place
to detect ongoing monitoring activities.
In the following, detectionmechanisms for crawlers are presented:
1. Rate-limitation of requesting neighborlists : GameOver Zeus
introduced a simple rate-limitationmechanism to detect crawl-
ing activities locally [And+13]. For that, a bot keeps track of the
number of connections or messages from each observed IP ad-
dress within a sliding window of 60 seconds. If any IP address
contacts abotmore than six timeswithin anobservationperiod,
the IP address is flagged as a crawler and remediation actions
like blacklisting (cf. Section 3.4.3.3) are taken immediately. It is
believed that the threshold value is set high enough, i.e., 6, to
take into account possible false positives due to multiple bots
sharing the same IP, e.g., as a result of NAT.
Crawling is still possible although it requires more effort and
longer delays in between successive crawls of the same node.
However, significantnetworknoise andbias is introduced in the
resultingbotnet snapshot asmore time is required for obtaining
it. To circumvent this detectionmechanism, adistributed crawl-
ing fromapool of unique IP addresses is required. The available
IP addresses canbe rotated among the crawlers to allowparallel
crawling of bots without triggering the detection mechanism.
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2. Collaborativedetectionmechanism:Andriesse et al. proposed
a crawler detectionmechanism thatdetects protocol anomalies
thatmay result from improper protocol (re)implementations of
existing P2P botnets [ARB15]. However, this can be easily cir-
cumvented by strictly following the botnet protocol.
In addition, the authors also proposed a crawler detection ap-
proach that uses multiple colluding sensors to detect a crawler.
This approachcorrelates thenumberof sensornodesbeingcon-
tacted by a node and classifies one as crawler if the number of
contacted sensors exceeds a certain threshold, e.g., maximum
neighborlist size. The authors evaluated this mechanism with
a deployment of up to 256 sensors in existing P2P botnets like
GameOver Zeus and Sality. Hence, this detection mechanism
can be easily implemented by botmasters on a large scale in the
whole botnet to detect crawlers.
Andriesse et al. reported that sensors are a more stealthy monitor-
ingmechanismthancrawlersdue to their indistinguishableness from
benignbots [ARB15]. Althoughmanysensors areobserved tobehighly
popular, i.e., known by many bots and highly reliable in the botnet
[Böc+15], this behavior is indistinguishable from popular bots. Due
to this reason, not much work has been done previously in the scope
of detecting sensors that are deployed in botnets. In contrast, as one
of themajor contribution of this dissertation, Section 6will introduce
three mechanisms to detect sensor nodes.
3.4.3.3 Response
After the detection of monitoring activities a response can be initi-
ated. There are several possible actions to be implemented in bot-
nets:
1. Staticblacklisting :Manybotnets, e.g.,GameOverZeus, are shipped
with a list of entries which consists of IP addresses of organi-
zations known to monitor botnets. Based on this list, bots will
refuse to communicate to any requests originating from those
blacklisted IPs.
2. Automated blacklisting :GameOver Zeus also deploys an addi-
tional variation of the blacklisting mechanism. It does not rely
upon the botmaster to pro-actively update the list of IPs to be
blacklisted. The botnet uses a rate-limitingmechanism (cf. Sec-
tion3.4.3.2) instead to identify crawler activities andsubsequently
blacklist that IPs automatically [And+13]. Takenote that theblack-
listed entries are only maintained locally and not propagated
further to other bots or the botmaster.
3. DDoSattack :Amoreaggressive response is thedenial-of-service
attacks on the IP address or network of detected monitoring
node. This has been observedwith theGameOver Zeus botmas-
ters who retaliated in response to the sinkholing attempts of
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their botnet [CER13]. Similar observations have also been re-
ported by researchers on the Storm botnet [Ste07].
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has introduced requirements to botnet monitoring and
presented a formalmodel for botnets that is used throughout this dis-
sertation, i.e., Chapter 4–7. In addition, this chapter thoroughly ana-
lyzed the state of the art in existing botnet monitoring mechanisms
(cf. Section 3.3); namely honeypots, crawlers, and sensors. From the
analysis, it canbeconcluded that althoughhoneypots canbedeployed
quickly tomonitorbotnets and requireonlyminimal effort, theirmon-
itoring coverage are limited compared to the other mechanisms. In
particular, crawlers are able toenumerate andcapture the inter-connectivity
information of many bots but with a drawback of missing out some
portion of bots, e.g., those behind NAT.Meanwhile, sensors aremore
effective in enumerating bots compared to crawlers but often fail in
capturing the inter-connectivity among bots. In order to obtain best
results, both crawlers and sensors can be deployed to complement
each other.
However,manyof thepreviouslyproposedmonitoringmechanisms
were found to be not compliant with most of the non-functional re-
quirements proposed in Section 3.1.2. Table 2 provides a summary of
the existing monitoring mechanisms with respect to the compliance
of the proposed requirements (cf. Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.2).
This chapter has also presented a thorough discussion in Section
3.4on the threemajor challenges thatneed tobeconsidered inbotnet
monitoring. These challenges, if left unaddressed, could impede the
effectiveness of a monitoring mechanism. This would also not com-
ply to the non-functional requirements proposed in Section 3.1.2.
Firstly, the dynamic nature of P2P botnets introduces significant
amount of noise which may skew measurement results due to the
presenceof churn,diurnal effects, and IPaddress aliasing issues. State
of the art reported that the usage of high-frequency crawling in com-
bination with a long-term crawling canminimize bias introduced by
churn and diurnal effects in P2P botnets. In addition, bias from IP ad-
dress aliasing can be further reduced (or eliminated) using UIDs of
botnets; if the UIDs are persistent and unique.
Secondly, thenoise introducedbyunknown thirdpartymonitoring
activities (cf. Section 3.4.2) could also distort the resulting monitor-
ing data. This particular challenge has seen very little attention from
the research community in the context of P2P botnets. Analysis of the
state of the art indicated that most of the existing botnet monitoring
mechanisms were implemented only on a best-effort basis, and, as
such, may have had their measurements tainted by noise originating
fromunknownmonitoring activities, e.g., abnormally high uptime of
sensor nodes.
Thirdly, anti-monitoringmechanismswhich impede theperformance
of the monitoring mechanisms (cf. Section 3.4.3) also pose itself as a
major hurdle for botnet monitoring. Fortunately, most of the exist-
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l Generic 7 φ φ φ φ 3 3 φ 3 3
Protocol Compliance 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Enumerator φ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Neutrality 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3







l Scalability 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Stealthiness 3 - - - - 3 3 - 3 3
Efficiency 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accuracy 7 φ φ 3 3 φ φ φ 7 7
Min. Overhead/Noise 3 3 7 3 3 φ φ 3 3 3
Table 2: Summary of P2P botnet monitoring mechanisms regarding their
compliance with the requirements specified in Section 3.1. Check-
mark symbols 3 indicate the fulfillment of these requirements,
crossing symbols 7 indicate their non-fulfillment, average symbols
φ indicate a partial fulfillment, and dash symbols - indicate not ap-
plicable.
ing anti-monitoring mechanisms observed deployed in the wild are
still in their infancy in terms of their effectiveness. Although some of
them can be circumvented or tolerated by the existing monitoring
mechanisms, it may just be a matter of time before more advanced
countermeasures are implemented by botmasters to raise the stakes.
Along that line, this dissertation will propose advanced countermea-
sures from the perspective of a botmaster in Section 5.2 and 6.1 to
anticipate the retaliation of the botmasters against botnet monitor-
ing .
Concluding, crawlers and sensors seemed to be the only viable so-
lution to monitor P2P botnets in an effective and efficient manner.
However, more effort has to be taken to ensure the stealthiness, ef-
ficiency, and accuracy of the monitoring mechanisms is improved
to obtain high quality monitoring data. Therefore, futuremonitoring
mechanisms need to also carefully consider and address the various
challenges discussed in Section 3.4 to ensure an effective botnetmon-
itoring that can be useful for further steps such as botnet takedown
attempts or malware cleanup campaigns.
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MostP2P-basedbotnets implement similarMembershipMaintenance
(MM) mechanisms to ensure bots remain connected among one an-
other in a distributed manner. MM mechanisms differ mainly in the
parameters initialized for eachof thebotnets.Nevertheless, themech-
anisms themselves are often implemented within the botnet’s mal-
ware binary using custom encryption and encoding. Due to nature
of existing botnets in using highly customized communication pro-
tocols and designs, the botnets need to be reverse engineered in or-
der to understand theirMMmechanism and the utilized communica-
tion protocols. The reverse engineering information is later utilized
by botnet monitoring mechanisms to interact with bots in a botnet.
Although therearemanyavailable resourcesdescribing theanatomy
of existingP2Pbotnets, theyareonlydescribedonavery coarse-grained
level. However, a detailed understanding of a botnet is often required
to perform botnet monitoring activities. Therefore, own reverse engi-
neering work is also often required to complement the existing liter-
ature for a better understanding of the inner-workings of a botnet.
For the purpose of this dissertation, three botnets were picked as
case studies: GameOver Zeus, Sality, and ZeroAccess. These botnets
are selected not only because they are some of the most prevalent
P2P botnets but also because they deployed anti-monitoring strate-
gies as discussed in Section 3.4.3 to impede botnet monitoring. The
first three sections of this chapter (Section 4.1–4.3) describes theMM
mechanism of GameOver Zeus, Sality, and ZeroAccess using the for-
mal model presented in Section 3.2. In addition, botnet-specific de-
tails that are useful for discussion in the later part of this dissertation
are also highlighted based on own reverse engineering results. The re-
sults not onlymanaged to validate thefindings of otherwork on these
botnets, but also provided new insights that were important founda-
tion for the works presented in this dissertation. The parts on Sality
andZeroAccessdraw fromaMaster thesis supervisedby theauthorof
this work [Haa15]; the part on GameOver Zeus draws from a collab-
oration with Dr. Christian Rossow at Saarland University, Germany
[Kar+15]. Finally, Section 4.4 summarizes this chapter.
4.1 DISSECTING GAMEOVER ZEUS
GameOver Zeus or also known as P2P Zeus is a variant of the infa-
mous banking trojan Zeus first observed in the wild around Septem-
ber 2011 [And+13]. GameOver Zeus has also been dubbed as one of
the most sophisticated P2P botnets that have been seen in the wild
[Abu11]. Detailed technical descriptions of this botnet are available
aspublished technical reports andscientificarticles in [CER13;Ros+13;
And+13; Abu11].
31
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
32 THE ANATOMY OF P2P BOTNETS
In the following, Section 4.1.1 describes the bootstrapping process
of bots in GameOver Zeus. Section 4.1.2 discusses in depth themem-
bershipmanagementmechanismof this botnet. Finally, Section 4.1.3
introduces the blacklisting mechanism used by this botnet.
4.1.1 Bootstrapping Process
Upon infecting a newmachine, the malware of GameOver Zeus gen-
erates a 160-bits unique identifier (UID) based on the hash value of
the concatenated strings of the operating system’s ComputerName
and theVolumeID of thefirsthard-drive in the infectedmachine. Since
the same UID is always reproducible as long as the mentioned vari-
ables do not change, the UID is persistent through reboots as well.
This UID is stored and heavily used throughout the communication
between other bots in GameOver Zeus as described in Section 4.1.2
and can be represented also as a 40-hexadecimal characters string.
No IP Address Port UID
1 123.100.12.201 25235 45d5f530d28f49...<truncated>
2 214.86.57.2 15687 c89d3abf771315...<truncated>
... ... ... ...
50 150.80.86.87 29001 d1649c62b94280...<truncated>
Table 3: Example of a GameOver Zeus bootstrap/neighborlist
Thebots are suppliedwith abootstraplist embedded in their binary
which consists of 50 entries of other existing infected machines or
bots. The information in this list consists of a tuple of IP Address, Port
number and aUID for each entry. After successfully infect amachine,
a bot utilizes this list to bootstrap itself into the botnet overlay as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.2.3.This list also effectively becomes the initial
NL of the bot as depicted as an example in Table 3 with a maximum
of 50 entries, i.e., NLMAX = 50. Next, the mechanism to maintain this
list is detailed.
4.1.2 Membership Maintenance Mechanism
Bots in GameOver Zeus carry out their maintenance activities peri-
odically every 30minutes.Within eachmembershipmaintenance cy-
cle, i.e., MM-cycle, a bot probes for the responsiveness of its neigh-
bors for up to five times using the probeMsg as introduced in the for-
mal model (see Section 3.2). This message is used by a bot to probe
the responsiveness or availability of its neighbors. Take note that the
probeMsgmessage is also commonly referred to as theVersionRequest
message in other literature [Ros+13; CER13] as the message is also
used to query and exchange the latest botmaster update(s) from the
neighbors.
A valid response that is received to a sent probeMsg indicates that
a particular neighbor is responsive, i.e., being online. If a neighbor
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remained unresponsive for five consecutive attempts, it is discarded
from theNL and the probing process is continuedwith the next neigh-
bor in theNL. If a bot has less than 50 responsive neighbors at the end
of theMM-cycle, it looks into aqueue that contains information about
all senders of unsolicited requestmessages, i.e., requestmessages ini-
tiated by other bots during theirMM-cycle, that were successfully pro-
cessed by the bot. Then, the bot sends a probemessage to each of the
candidate that is not already in the NL of the bot. If a valid response
is received and the NL is not full, i.e., |NLv| NLMAX, the probed bot is
added into the bot’s NL.
In addition, another mechanism to refresh the NL kicks in after ev-
ery sixth MM-cycle or 180 minutes once if the NL is low on entries,
i.e., |NLv| 25. After considering all the senders of unsolicited requests
as potential neighbors, the bot actively requests for new neighbors
from its responsive neighbors using the message requestL (see Sec-
tion 3.2). Bots in GameOver Zeus include their UID or key s in every
sent requestL message. Upon receiving such a request, a bot replies
themessageby returning ten entries from theirNL, which are selected
based on a neighbor selection criteria as described in the following.
4.1.2.1 Neighbor Selection Criteria
Algorithm 1 : processRequestL(s)
1 for i= 0; i l&& i |NL|; i++ do
2 L[i]←NL[i]
3 for i= l; i |NL|; i++ do
4 for j= 0; j l; j++ do




Parts of thedetails presented in the followinghasappeared in [Kar+15].
Bots that need information about other bots in the network use the
requestL(s) method to ask their neighbors, where s is the key of the
requesting bot. However, it is important to note that s can also be
generated or spoofed, as long as it is a valid key, i.e., a 160-bit key.
On receiving a valid NL request, a bot returns a subset of its NL of
size l, in GameOver Zeus usually l = 10, which are closer to key s of
the query with regards to the Kademlia-like XOR-distance using the
method processRequestL(s) [Kar+15]. More precisely, as detailed in Al-
gorithm 1, the queried node replies as follows: it first constructs a list
L containing up to the first ten elements listed in its NL NL (Line 2).
Then, it iterates over all remaining elements in L (Line 3). The key of
each element L[i] is compared to the elements ofNL under consider-
ation (Line 5). As soon as the algorithm finds an element L[i] with a
smaller XOR-distance to s thanNL[j],NL[j] is replaced with L[i] (Line
6).
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In this fashion, entries or keys with closer XOR-distance are more
likely to be returned (Line 5), but only the entry with the closest key
to s is guaranteed. The algorithm may not return the second-closest
key if it is the first element in the initial list NL (cf. Line 2); in this
case, if the closest key is stored at an index larger than 9, it will be def-
initely compared to the second largest key at index 0 and, used as a
replacement for the second largest key at index 0, and not considered
further. Obviously, other constellations may exist which may lead to
some of the closest-ten nodes to be discarded. In summary, the algo-
rithm will return close-by nodes but not necessarily the closest ten.
Please take note that the order of the entries stored in a bot’s NL is
non-deterministic, e.g., they canbe sortedby theXOR-distance of the
neighbor to the bot or by the timestamp an entry was last updated.
This particular neighbor selection criterion introduces bias in the
entries within a bot’s NL towards a bot’s key. Although this selection
criterion is similar to theDHT implementation inKademlia,GameOver
Zeus remains anunstructuredP2Pbotnet.Next, themechanism to fa-
cilitate insertion of new entries within a bot’s NL is elaborated further.
4.1.2.2 Inserting New Entries
Whenever a bot decides to add new neighbors, from either the queue
consisting of senders of unsolicitedmessages as explained in Section
4.1.2 or by actively requesting new neighbors as described in Section
4.1.2.1, each new neighbor candidate goes through a two-step saniti-
zation phase (for the newest variant of GameOver Zeus). The candi-
dates need to satisfy the following conditions:
1. Port Range: A candidate’s source port is required to be within
the range 10,000− 30,000.
2. Sub-network Range: Only one IP entry is allowed in the NL for
every /20 sub-network.
The algorithm discards candidates that failed to fulfil any of the con-
ditions and appends the rest in the NL.
4.1.2.3 Node Announcement and Update of Existing Entries
Since abotnet needs to includenew infectionswithin thebotnet over-
lay, the botnet MM uses the announceMsg to announce the arrival of
the new bots to others in the overlay (see Section 3.2). In the case of
GameOver Zeus, the purpose of a announceMsg is incorporatedwithin
the probeMsg sent by bots. A bot that receives a valid probeMsgwill con-
sider the sender of themessage to be added directly into the NL if the
sender is unknown and the NL is not full. Alternatively, if the NL is full,
the bot adds the sender to a queue which consists of potential can-
didates that can be considered as neighbors if the size of the NL falls
below a threshold value of |NL| 25. Therefore, when a newly infected
machine attempts to probe entries in the bootstraplist (see Section
4.1.1), the bot possibly also inserts itself as a potential candidate for
future consideration. If a bot inserts this newly infected machine in
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itsNL, informationabout thenew infectionwill bepropagated further
when other bots request for new neighbors.
Toaddress the IPaddress aliasing issue (seeSection3.4.1),GameOver
Zeus uses a reboot-persistentUID to uniquely identify bots. ThisUID
is transmitted as a field within all communication messages of bots
in GameOver Zeus. Whenever a bot receives a probeMsg that consists
of a UID already known to the bot (in the NL) but with a different IP
address and/or port number, the bot updates the entry with the new
information. This update mechanism ensures that a bot eventually
gets to update the entries of neighbors that rejoin the network with
new IP addresses or port numbers.
4.1.3 Blacklisting Mechanism
GameOver Zeus implements a two-fold blacklisting mechanism in
thebots todeter aggressive crawlingactivitiesof knownandunknown
researchers. Firstly, all bots have a static list of IP addresses that they
refuse to communicate to, e.g., security organizations known to per-
form botnet monitoring [CER13]. Secondly, bots also implement a
simple local rate-limiting mechanism to detect and blacklist aggres-
sive crawlers [CER13]. For this, a bot that receives more than six re-
questmessages froma single IP addresswithin a slidingwindowof 60
seconds, automatically adds the IP address into a list of blacklisted IP
addresses andwill permanently refuse to communicate further [And+13].
This list is maintained locally and not exchanged with other bots.
4.2 DISSECTING SALITY
Sality is a botnet family that propagates through file-infection. It has
been around since mid-2003 [Fal11]. This botnet family has evolved
throughout the years from traditionally communicating to the bot-
master via emails, to a complete P2P-based communication in early
2008 [Fal11]. Based on the initial reporting on the P2P variant of Sal-
ity, there couldhavebeenup to four versions of this P2Pbotnet.Many
researchers distinguish different variants of Sality by the specific ver-
sionnumbers in transmittedcommunicationmessages.However, none
have reported the existence of any Version 1 of Sality.
The first version of P2P Sality observed in thewild transmitted "Ver-
sion 2" in its communicationmessages. Around early 2009, Sality ver-
sion 3 has been first seen and said to be the largest variant of the
P2P Sality [Fal11]. This variant still remains active at the time of writ-
ing. Falliere reported that differences between the protocols imple-
mented in version 2 and 3 are minimal [Fal11]. Around late 2010, ver-
sion 4 of this botnet was first seen. This variant introduces new fea-
tures, leading to improved security and robustness, byaddressing some
of the weaknesses found in the earlier versions of the botnet. Never-
theless, most of the communication protocols of the botnets as men-
tioned earlier remain the same, except for the transmitted version
number.
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Since the information that isneeded tounderstand thevariouswork
within the scope of this dissertation is common across these differ-
ent botnets, i.e., communication protocols, all variants of P2P Sality
are henceforth referred to as Sality in the remainder part of this dis-
sertation, unless mentioned otherwise. Other detailed technical de-
scriptionof this botnet for interested readers is available as published
technical reports and scientific publications in [Fal11; Kle15].
In the following, Section 4.2.1 describes the bootstrapping process
ofbots inSality.Meanwhile, Section4.2.2discusses indepth themem-
bership management mechanism of this botnet.
4.2.1 Bootstrapping Process
Upon infecting a new machine, a Sality malware first starts to listen
on a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) socket for incoming request mes-
sages following the node announcement procedure explained in Sec-
tion 4.2.2.1. This socket or port number is derived based on the oper-
ating system’s ComputerName using a simple built-in algorithm. Also,
bots in Sality utilize UIDs for some of the inter-bot communication
messages. However, theUIDs are not persistent over reboots. Instead
of generating the UIDs themselves, bots in Sality obtain their UID
through aprocess that involves an existing superpeer assigning it one
(explained later in Section 4.2.2). The assigned UIDs are integer val-
ues between 0− 2.0× 107. In the bootstrap phase, this UID is initial-
ized to a default value of 0.
No IP Address Port UID GoodCount LastOnline
1 123.100.12.201 25235 1.8× 107 65 0
2 214.86.57.2 15687 1.9× 107 45 2356
... ... ... ... ... ...
1000 150.80.86.87 29001 1.1× 107 21 5561
Table 4: Example of a Sality bot’s NL
Next, the bootstraplist which is passed on from the previous file
infector, i.e., bot, is used to initialize the NL of the new bot. This list
typically consists of up to 1,000 entries. A bot executes this initializ-
ing step only if there is no existing NL present within the machine’s
registry file. The bot’s NL can hold up to a maximum of 1,000 entries,
i.e., NLMAX = 1,000, and has a structure as depicted in an example
in Table 4. Initially, the values for all fields in this list is set to a default
value of 0. Then, the bot copies the IP Address and Port Number of en-
tries from the bootstraplist into the NL. After initialization of the NL,
the bot executes the bootstrapping process by directly invoking the
first membership maintenance cycle. The following section details
the membership maintenance mechanism, as well as the purpose of
the different fields within the NL of a bot.
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4.2.2 Membership Maintenance Mechanism
Each bot in Sality utilizes a membership maintenance mechanism
to ensure connectivity amongst bots with an interval of 40 minutes.
Within each MM-cycle, a bot v probes all neighbors in its NLv, one
after another, in a sequentialmanner by executing three different but
related processes.
Firstly, the bot probes the responsiveness of a neighbor using the
probeMsgmethod (cf. Section 3.2)whichutilizes a Sality-specificHello
message. When a bot receives a valid response to the sentHellomes-
sage, the corresponding neighbor’s LastOnline value is set to the cur-
rent timestamp. Otherwise, the value is set to zero if an invalid reply
is received or the request timed out, before the next entry in the NL
is probed. The LastOnline is widely used within Sality as a flag to in-
dicate that a particular neighbor was responsive within the previous
MM-cycle. Also, for each successful verificationof aneighbor’s respon-
siveness, the GoodCount of the corresponding entry is incremented
by one. Similarly, when a timeout occurred, or an invalid reply is re-
ceived, the bot decrements the neighbor’s GoodCount accordingly.
Over time, neighbors that are more often responsive have a higher
GoodCount value compared to those that are not.
The Hello message exchange is also leveraged to ensure the latest
command from the botmaster is disseminated to all bots, i.e., from
bot-to-bot. An update command from the botmaster comes in the
form of a digitally signed and encrypted file which is also known as
aURLPack [Fal11]. AURLPack consists of a list of Uniform Resource
Locators (URLs) which usually host additionalmalicious binaries that
needs to be downloaded and executed frequently by the bots in their
local machine, i.e., approximately twice in each hour. Within each
Hellomessage, the newest sequence number of the URLPack known
to a bot is always transmitted.
By comparing the sequence number transmitted in the received
messages, bots in Sality can update themselveswith the latest update
from the botmaster. Consider the following scenarios where Botx is
sending aHellomessage to Boty:
1. Botx has an olderURLPack than Boty: Upon inspecting the se-
quence number of the received message, Boty will notice that
Botx has an older URLPack installed. Therefore, Boty responds
to the receivedmessage by attaching the latestURLPack which
would be applied by Botx upon receiving the reply.
2. Botx has a newerURLPack than Boty : Upon inspecting the se-
quence number of the received message, Boty will notice that
Botx has a newer URLPack installed. Therefore, Boty responds
with a message by stating the sequence number of its currently
installed URLPack. Upon receiving the message and noticing
that Boty has an olderURLPack, Botx sends an additionalHello
message toBoty that attaches the latestURLPack.Boty can then
apply the newer update accordingly.
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3. Both bots have the sameURLPack : No steps are taken if both
bots have the sameURLPack.
After verifying the responsiveness of a neighbor, the bot checks if
it has a status of either a superpeer or non-superpeer (see Section
4.2.2.1). Bots in Sality use the default UID value of UID = 0 as an in-
dicator that a bot’s status has not been tested. Similarly, a non-zero
value indicates that abot’s capability is testedand this secondprocess
within an MM-cycle is omitted. Section 4.2.2.1 elaborates this testing
process in detail.
Finally, if the number of entries in the NL is low, i.e., |NLv| 980, at
the beginning of themaintenance cycle, a Sality-specificNeighborlist
Request message (NLReq) is sent to the responsive neighbor using the
method requestL (cf. Section 3.2). Bots receiving anNLReq will respond
with aNeighborlist Reply (NLRep) message containing information on
one randomly picked bot froma list of only responsive neighbors. For
this, a temporary list is first constructed from themainNLbut consist-
ing of only entries that havenon-zeroLastSeen values, i.e., responsive
neighbors.Upon receivinganNLRep replymessage, the returnedentry
can be considered as a potential candidate for the bot’s NL as elabo-
rated in Section 4.2.2.2. It is also worth noting that all entries within a
Sality’s NL are only superpeers. After completing the three processes
for the picked neighbor, the next neighbor is probed until all neigh-
bors within the NL have been probed.
After all neighbors are probed, a bot conducts an additional clean-
up step on theNL if the size of the list was at least 500 at the beginning
of that particularMM-cycle. This clean-up process discards all entries
that have low GoodCount values, i.e., GoodCount −30, or UIDs that
are not within a superpeer’s assigned range, i.e., UID 1.6× 107 (see
Section 4.2.2.1). Finally, the responsible thread for the maintenance
sleeps for the next 40minutes before invoking a newMM-cycle.
Also take note that Sality utilizes a newOS-allocated socket or port
for each request that is sent out. This design could have been chosen
to prevent any potential replay attack against Sality.
4.2.2.1 Testing Superpeer Capability and Node Announcement
Since there is no centralized infrastructure in Sality, the testing of su-
perpeer capability is done with the help of other existing superpeers
within the overlay. For that,Botx first sends a botnet-specificNodeAn-
nouncement Request message via the announceMsg method (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2) to Boty, i.e., a responsive neighbor. Within the sent message,
Botx includes information of which UDP port it listens for unsolicited
requests (cf. Section 4.2.1). Upon receiving this requestmessage,Boty
sends a Hellomessage to the IP address of Botx using the port speci-
fied within the received request message.
The premise of this decision is; if Botx is publicly reachable from
the Internet, it should be able to respond successfully to the received
Hello message. Hence, a valid response to the probe message indi-
catesBotx’s superpeer capability and the failure to respond, e.g., time-
out occurred, signifies its incapability. Based on the verification, Boty
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responds to the initialNode Announcement Request with a reply that
includes a value: a random value between [0− 1.6× 107)when Botx is
not contactable on the listening socket, i.e., non-superpeer, or [1.6×
107 − 2.0× 107] otherwise. If Botx is identified as a superpeer candi-
date,Boty additionally addsBotx into itsNL aswell (cf. Section 4.2.2.2).
Thisway, to further propagate the information about itself being a po-
tential superpeer to other bots that may need additional neighbors,
Botx relies only upon Boty.
Finally, upon receiving theNodeAnnouncementReplymessage from
Boty, Botx uses the returned value as its ownUID and omits to repeat
this process in subsequentMM-cycles until the next reboot. However,
in case a reply was not received from Boty, i.e., a timeout occurred,
Botx sets its UID to zero and repeats this testing procedure with the
next responsive neighbor.
4.2.2.2 Inserting New Entries
There are two different scenarios where a bot attempts to add a new
neighbor: 1) throughNLexchangewhenhavinga lownumberofneigh-
bors (cf. Section 4.2.2) and 2) when testing a bot for superpeer capa-
bility (cf. Section4.2.2.1). Algorithm2describes themethod insertNeighbor()
for both scenarios with an input parameter entry, i.e., IP address and
port number. To distinguish the different scenarios, Sality uses a flag
parameter isTested to indicate if the entry is being considered after
being tested for its superpeer capability or not.
First, the bot checks if the current NL is already full (Line 1) and
returns if the method was invoked within Scenario 1. Otherwise, the
algorithm proceeds and checks if the IP address of entry is already
present within theNL (Line 3). In case the IP address is present, it is
checked whether the corresponding port in the reply matches with
the existing entry in the NL (Line 4). If the ports do not match, the
bot additionally checks (Line 5) if the entry in the NL was marked
oﬄine, i.e., LastSeen= 0, during the lastMM-cycle or if themethodwas
invoked within Scenario 2. If either one of the conditions is satisfied,
the old port of the entry is replacedwith that in the entry (Line 6) and
the method returns. This entry updating feature allows an existing
bot that reappeared on a different port to be updated by existing bots
by retaining the old entry along with its corresponding GoodCount
value as well.
However, if the address is unknown and the method was invoked
from within Scenario 2 when having a full NL, the bot additionally
removes one entry from its NL that has the lowest GoodCount value
to make room for this new candidate (Line 10). Finally, entry is ap-
pended to the end ofNL (Line 11).
4.3 DISSECTING ZEROACCESS
ZeroAccess is a malware dropper family that is used to distribute ad-
ditionalmalware. It primarily focuses on financial fraud through pay-
per-click (PPC)advertising [NG13]. Thebotnetutilizesplugins asdropped
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Algorithm 2 : insertNeighbor(entry, isTested)
1 if NL.isFull() && isTested 6= True then
2 return // NL is full
3 if entry.IP ∈NL.getAllIPs() then
4 if NL[entry.IP].Port 6= entry.Port then
5 if NL[entry.IP].Status 6=Online || isTested then
6 NL[entry.IP].Port= entry.Port // Update Port
7 return // Nothing else to do
8 if NL.isFull() && isTested then
9 // Make room for a new entry
10 NL.popEntryWithLowestGoodCount()
// Append entry at the end
11 NL.append(entry)
modules to enable bots conducting the above-mentioned malicious
activities. As of the time of writing, researchers have reported the dis-
coveryof twoversionsofZeroAccess [Ros+13;NG13]:Version 1 inMay
2011 and Version 2 in April 2012. In contrast to the former that uses
TCP protocol for communications between bots, the latter version
adopts UDP protocol instead. In the newer version, the set of com-
mands utilized for inter-communication has also been reduced. This
includes the removal of a command that can be exploited to launch
sinkholing attack on the botnet. The removal of the command en-
hanced the efficiency and resiliencyof thebotnet [NG13]. Since itwas
difficult to find active bots to bootstrap in the Version 1 of this botnet,
the remainder part of this dissertation focuses only on the Version 2
[Ros+13].
ZeroAccess Version 2 primarily performs two types ofmalicious ac-
tivities: Bitcoin mining and Click-Fraud. For each activity, there exist
two separate networks of bots distinguished by the OS architecture
of the infected machines, i.e., 32-bit or 64-bit. As such, there are four
distinct networks of ZeroAccess Version 2 as detailed in Table 5. Each
of the networks distinguishes itself by the usage of distinct UDP hard-
coded ports for communications.
Ports for 32-bit Ports for 64-bit
Bitcoin Mining 16464 16465
Click-Fraud 16471 16470
Table 5: Distinct botnets distinguished by ports in ZeroAccess Version 2
Around mid-2013, the botmaster issued an update to the Bitcoin
miningnetworks that addressedaweaknesshighlightedby researchers
whichcouldbeexploited toconduct a sinkholingattack [Ros+13].Con-
sidering that thenewupdatewasnot completelydisseminatedwithin
the Click-Fraud networks, Symantec initiated a sinkholing attempt
on both 32-bit and 64-bit networks in July 2013 and liberated about
500,000 bots from their botmaster [Sym13]. However, as at time of
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writing, all four networks were observed to have received the new up-
date and there are still bots unaffectedby the sinkholing attack. These
bots, which are still interconnected and operational in all four net-
works, survived like GameOver Zeus and Sality due to the resiliency
and robustness of thoroughly designed P2P botnets.
Since the information that isneeded tounderstand thevariouswork
within the scope of this dissertation requires only the understanding
of the communication protocols that is common across these differ-
ent networks, all networks of ZeroAccess Version 2 are henceforth re-
ferred to simply as ZeroAccess in the remainder part of this disserta-
tion unless mentioned otherwise. Detailed technical description of
this botnet is available as published technical reports and scientific
publications in [NG13; Sym13; Wyk12; Ros+13].
In the following, Section 4.3.1 describes the bootstrapping process
of bots in ZeroAccess. Section 4.3.2 discusses in depth the member-
ship management mechanism of this botnet. Finally, Section 4.3.2
elaborates on a particular design (flaw) of this botnet that enables
UDP-hole punching to be conducted to contact non-superpeers.
4.3.1 Bootstrapping Process
Upon infecting a new machine, a ZeroAccess malware first starts to
listen on a fixed UDP socket for incoming request messages as de-
picted in Table 5. In addition, the malware also uses a dedicated OS-
allocated UDP socket to send out requests. Bots in ZeroAccess also
generate a UID upon initialization that is not persistent over reboots.
Next, the bots download all available plugins that enable add-on fea-
tures as intendedby thebotmasters, e.g., Click-fraudandBitcoinmin-
ing, and store them on the infected machine [NG13].





Table 6: Example of a ZeroAccess Primary NL
According to the reverse-engineering results of recentmalware vari-
ants1, thebotshave three typesofNLs:primary, secondary andbackup
list. Thebot’sprimary NL canholdup toamaximumof 256entries, i.e.,
NLMAX = 256, and has a structure as depicted in an example in Table
6. The primary NL only maintains the IP address of a neighbor as all
bots listen on a dedicated port that is unique to the network they re-
side in. The bootstraplist of the malware that typically has up to 256
entries is used to initialize the primary NL of the newbot. The remain-
ing lists which have a significantly larger length, i.e., 16× 106 entries,
are initialized empty during infection and information of all respon-
1 md5 = ea039a854d20d7734c5add48f1a51c34
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sive and known bots throughout the lifetime of the particular bot is
continuously added/updated in both of the lists. However, only the
backup list is persistent over reboots. The presence of this list can al-
low a bot to recover from any potential sinkhole attempts using bots
that were responsive in the past (cf. Section 4.3.2).
After initialization of the NLs, the bot executes the bootstrapping
process by directly invoking the first membership maintenance cy-
cle. The details of themembershipmaintenancemechanism, as well
as the purpose of the LastOnline field in the primary NL of a bot, is
detailed next.
4.3.2 Membership Maintenance Mechanism
Each bot in ZeroAccess utilizes a membership maintenance mecha-
nism to ensure connectivity amongst bots with an interval of 256 sec-
onds. Within each MM-cycle, a bot v sequentially probes each neigh-
bor in its primary NLv and optionally an additional two bots from
the secondary and backup lists, every one second using the probeMsg
method (cf. Section 3.2). In other words, a bot starts probing entries
from index 0 up to 255 with an increment of one every one second.
Upon reaching the final entry, i.e., index= 255, the iteration process
wraps up to start again from index= 0.
Maintenance of the NL in the bots relies only on the exchange of
two ZeroAccess-specificmessages between bots: getL and retL. As ex-
plained above in Section 4.3.1, each bot listens on the botnet-specific
port for unsolicited requests, the so-called server port and sends such
requests from anOS-allocated but fixed UDP port or a so-called client
port. As such, all probingmessages originate only from the client port.
Figure 3 depicts such a probing process between two bots: BotX and
BotY .





Figure 3: Message exchange for BotX probing BotY in ZeroAccess.
Let’s assume BotX probes BotY for its responsiveness. Upon receiv-
ing a getL message, BotY responds with a retL message that consists
of a subset of its own primary NL and a list of all plugins available for
download from itself, i.e., using TCP connections. Section 4.3.2.2 dis-
cusses the details on the neighbor selection criteria utilized to pick
the neighbors to be included in a reply. In addition to the reply, a
probe message is sent to the server port of BotX, i.e., lower part in
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Figure 3. This process which serves as a method to verify if BotX is
a superpeer requires BotX responding to the probe message of BotY
using the server port as the source port in the reply. A successful re-
sponse indicates that BotX is publicly reachable on the Internet, i.e.,
superpeer.
Algorithm 3 : processGetL(sender,msg)
1 // Reply to all received requests
2 rep← createRetL(msg.getFlag())
3 send(sender, rep) // Send a retL to sender
4 if msg.getFlag() == 0 then
5 // Send a getL+
6 send(sender,createGetL(flag= 1))
To avoid the exchange of messages to be continuously looped, a
flag in the messages is set when being probed to indicate no further
probing is needed as depicted in Algorithm 3. Such messages are dif-
ferentiated by using getL+ and retL+when referring to the set of mes-
sages that do not require additional probing.
Upon receiving either a retL or retL+, bots process the message by
performing the following steps:
1. Inserts the sender in the primary NL as described in Section
4.3.2.1.
2. Inserts the sender and the returned neighbors (if any) in the sec-
ondary NL.
3. If there is, at least, one plugin information in the reply, inserts
the sender in the backup NL.
Although the sender is added into all three NLs, for the remainder
part of this dissertation, we only focus on the primary NL, which is
used to select neighbors to be returned in retL and retL+ messages.
Take note that due to the communication design adopted by this bot-
net, researchers have reported that they were able to leverage them
to conductUDPhole-punching to communicate continuously to non-
superpeers that first reached out to a sensor node [Ros+13].
4.3.2.1 Inserting New Entries
Upon receiving a valid response, a sender’s IP is added or updated
within the primary NL of each bot. For that, the IP is used as a pa-
rameter to invoke Algorithm 4 that is responsible for handling this
process. Firstly, bots check if the sender’s IP exists in their primary
NL (Line 2). If the IP exists, this entry is removed from the NL (Line 4).
After removing this entry, all subsequent entries are shifted up one
position to bridge the gap originating from the deletion process. Fi-
nally, the sender’s IP is used to create an entry at the beginning of the
NL, i.e., index= 0. Afterward, the LastSeen value is set to the value of
the current timestamp.
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Algorithm 4 : insertInPrimaryList(sender)
1 // Check if sender known
2 if sender∈NL.getAllIPs() then
3 // Remove existing entry and close the gap
4 NL.pop(sender)
5 // Push entry at the beginning of list
6 NL.push(sender)
7 // Set sender’s LastSeen to now
8 NL[sender].LastSeen= getCurrentTimestamp()
Thanks to the nature of the process of inserting neighbors, the pri-
mary NLofZeroAccessbots is sortedbymost-recently responsiveneigh-
bors. Moreover, if the NL is full and a new (but non-existing) entry
needs to be added, the last entry, i.e., index= 255, is discarded when
the new entry is pushed at the beginning of the NL.
4.3.2.2 Neighbor Selection Criteria
Bots need to respond to each of received probe messages, i.e., getL
and getL+ messages, with a retL message that includes a subset of
neighbors that have their responsiveness most recently verified. Ac-
cording to the protocol of ZeroAccess, a bot can include up to 16 en-
tries in a resulting reply but an empty reply is also valid. Since the
primary NL of the bots is always sorted bymost responsive neighbors
first, a bot only needs to return the first-16 entries from the NL in the
reply message.
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter described the anatomy of three P2P botnets: GameOver
Zeus, Sality, and ZeroAccess, based on the work of malware reverse
engineering. Particularly, the bootstrapping and membership main-
tenance mechanism of each botnet was thoroughly analyzed, and
the differences among them were outlined. From the analysis, exist-
ing P2P botnets are found to share similarities in terms of the com-
mon MM designs and anti-monitoring mechanisms aimed at imped-
ing botnet monitoring.
However, someof theparametersusedby thebotnetsdifferedgreatly
among one another, e.g.,MM-interval or the size of theNL used by the
botnets, as described in the following:
• MM-interval : The MM-interval of a botnet directly influences
the rate of stale information in the NL of bots, and also the com-
municationoverheadgeneratedby thebots. For instance, a very
long interval may cause a bot to be isolated from the botnet
overlay due tomany of its neighbors being non-responsive, e.g.,
bots goneoﬄine.However, the communicationoverheadcaused
by such long intervals are lesser and may be helpful to stay be-
low the radar of the network administratorsmonitoring the net-
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work traffic of the network the bot is in. Sality and GameOver
Zeus utilized such long intervals with 40 and 30minutes respec-
tively.
In contrast, a very short interval may ensure non-responsive
neighbors are quickly replacedwith responsive ones. Therefore,
chances of a bot with short interval to be isolated from the bot-
net overlay is much less than those with higher intervals. How-
ever, a short interval also implies thathighcommunicationover-
head is generated in the process of frequently probing the re-
sponsiveness of the neighbors of a bot. This in turn may easily
raise suspicions to thenetwork administrators. ZeroAccess is an
example of such botnet with a shorter interval, i.e., 256 seconds.
• SizeofNL :Ensuring abot remains connected to thebotnet over-
lay is also often influenced by the availability of sufficient num-
ber of responsive neighbors to communicate with. Moreover,
the size of theNLutilized by botnets also influences howquickly
a command issued by a botmaster is disseminated throughout
the botnet. In the context of the analyzed botnets, GameOver
Zeus utilized the smallest size for its NL, i.e., |NL| = 50. This is
followed by ZeroAccess with a size of |NL|= 256 and Sality with
the biggest NL size, i.e., |NL|= 1,000.
• Anti-monitoringmechanisms :Eachof theanti-monitoringmech-
anisms implemented by the analyzed botnets are unique and
has its special purpose in protecting the botnet either from be-
ingmonitored or takendown.GameOver Zeus is by far themost
advancedbotnet among the threebotnets analyzed in this chap-
ter. It utilized an NL restriction mechanism that returns only a
subset of its NL following a special node selection criteria as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.2.1. In addition, the botnet also uses IP
address-based filtering to ensure sensors or sinkhole server en-
tries arenot able toeasilyfill up theNLof abot. Finally,GameOver
Zeus also utilizes blacklisting mechanisms to refuse communi-
cating to known or aggressive crawlers.
Sality also introduced anNL restrictionmechanism that returns
one random entry out of the 1,000 entries for each received NL
request.Moreover, it also implementeda local reputationmech-
anismwhereby older neighbors are preferred to new neighbors.
This reputationmechanismprevents sinkholingattacks that aim
to invalidate all entries easily within the NL of a bot.
Finally, ZeroAccess utilizes the shortMM-interval to make it dif-
ficult for sinkholing attacks by cycling entrieswithin theNLwith
a high frequency. Since most sinkholing attack requires the ex-
isting entries in the NL of a bot to be invalidated, this mecha-
nism quickly flushes away the invalidated entries. As a conse-
quence, a successful sinkholingattack requires a lot of resources
to continuously invalidate the entries in the NL of all bots in the
botnet. In addition to this design, the botnet alsomaintains two
additional NLs on top of the main NL used for regularMM activi-
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ties. These two NLs keep track of all responsive bots ever discov-
ered since the last reboot of an infectedmachine. Entrieswithin
these NLs are also contacted from time to time to allow the bot-
net to recover even from a powerful ongoing sinkholing attack.
Many of the detailed analysis presented in this chapter serve as a
foundation to other work presented in this dissertation. For instance,
the neighbor selection criteria of GameOver Zeus that is presented in
Section 4.3.2.2, is important to understand the work on circumvent-
ing this particularmechanism (see Section 5.1.1). In addition, theMM
design of Sality and ZeroAccess as presented in this chapter is lever-
aged in the work on autonomously detecting crawlers in P2P botnets
(seeSection5.2.2).Moreover, the communicationandMMdesignsuti-
lized by both Sality and ZeroAccess are also leveraged to present sev-
eral novel sensor detection mechanisms in Chapter 6.
Thenext chapterpresentsworkoncircumventing theanti-crawling
countermeasuresofGameOverZeusand further introducesadvanced
anti-crawling countermeasures that can be expected in the near fu-
ture.
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Crawlers are widely used in botnet monitoring (see Section 3.3.2) to
enumerate all bots and todiscover the interconnectivity among them.
Such information is vital to law enforcement agencies in botnet take-
downattempts. In response, botmasters introduced several anti-crawling
mechanisms within existing botnets to impedemonitoring activities.
In particular, GameOver Zeus can be considered as the most sophis-
ticated P2P botnet seen to date [Ros+13] due to the significant efforts
that are taken to prevent monitoring activities. As discussed in Sec-
tion3.4.3, suchanti-crawlingmechanismscan introducea significant
amount of noise and distortion to the data gathered by monitoring.
Hence, it is important to circumvent existing anti-crawling mecha-
nisms effectively to obtain monitoring data of better quality and to
anticipate future botnet advancements.
Section5.1presentsworkoncircumventing theNL restrictionmech-
anismand the automatedblacklistingmechanismofGameOver Zeus
from an attacker perspective, i.e., researchers and legal enforcement
agencies. Section5.2 introducesadvancedanti-crawlingmechanisms
that aim at impeding crawling activities and on the detection of on-
going crawling activities from the perspective of botmasters. Section
5.3 presents the evaluation results of the proposed mechanisms on
the newly introduced countermeasures and the advanced crawling
mechanisms. Finally, Section 5.4 provides a brief discussion and sum-
marizes this chapter. Please takenote that somepassages in this chap-
ter arequotedverbatim fromthe followingpublications [Kar+14;Kar+15;
Kar+16a].
5.1 CIRCUMVENTING ANTI-CRAWLING MECHANISMS
In this section, the anti-crawling mechanism of GameOver Zeus (see
Section 4.3.2.2) are thoroughly analyzed, andmethods to circumvent
themarepresented.Theanti-crawlingmechanismofGameOverZeus
is of special interest due to the fact that this mechanism is more ad-
vanced than the mechanisms of Sality and ZeroAccess.
The remainder part of this section is organized as follows: First, an
algorithm to exploit and circumvent the botnet’s NL restrictionmech-
anism is presented in Section 5.1.1. This algorithm aims to retrieve
thecompleteNLof agivenbotdeterministically. Second, Section5.1.2
presents anovel crawlingalgorithmthatheuristically attempts toenu-
merate all bots in a botnet by contacting only aminimumnumber of
bots.
47
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5.1.1 Restricted NL Reply Mechanism of GameOver Zeus
GameOver Zeus is one of the most sophisticated botnet known to
date, due to the effective mechanisms adopted by the botnet to im-
pedemonitoring activities and to recover in a case of a potential take-
down [Ros+13; Kar+15]. One particularly interesting aspect among
the botnet defensemechanisms is the NL restrictionmechanism that
deterministically picks and returns a subset of neighbors, specific to
the requester, when being requested (see Section 4.1.2.1). This sub-
section will introduce a novel algorithm called ZEUSMILKER that cir-
cumvents this restrictionmechanism. For that, background informa-
tion on the restriction mechanism is detailed in Section 5.1.1.1. Sec-
tion5.1.1.2 introducesZEUSMILKERalgorithm.Finally, Section5.1.1.3
provides an in-depthanalysis on thecorrectness andcomplexity anal-
ysis of ZEUSMILKER.
5.1.1.1 Background
Each bot in GameOver Zeus maintains an NL that contains a subset
of other active bots in the network (see Section 4.1.2). Bots regularly
exchange subsets of these lists on a request basis to maintain and
improve the connectivity of the botnet. The exchanged subsets are
selected based on an XOR-distance metric between the unique keys
of the requesting bots that are included in request messages and the
neighbors in the NL (see Section 4.1.2). Hence, two legitimate bots
with two different keys that request anNL from a botmay receive a to-
tally different set of entries. Thus, a botnet crawler has to query each
nodemultiple times using distinct spoofed keys, which decreases the
performance of a crawler considerably [Kar+14].
Rossow et al. first proposed a method to circumvent this mecha-
nism by spoofing the querying keys randomly and to hope to obtain
all neighbors eventually [Ros+13]. In the following, a reliablemethod
to provably obtain all neighbors from a bot by strategically spoofing
requester UIDs or keys is presented. This method is the only work
known to provide a working solution in successfully circumventing
the restriction mechanism of GameOver Zeus.
5.1.1.2 ZeusMilker Algorithm
The ZEUSMILKER algorithm that is presented in Algorithm 5 lever-
ages the design of the GameOver Zeus restriction mechanism itself
(see Section 4.1.2.1). Before elaborating the algorithm, important no-
tations to understand the algorithm is introduced in the following.
NOTATIONS Each bot in GameOver Zeus is assigned a unique key
in the form of a b-bit string. 1(i) is used to denote a bit string of i
1s and analogously 0(i) denotes a string of i 0s. Furthermore, |s| de-
notes the length of a string s, and || is the concatenation operator.
For two b-bit keys x and y, the function cp(x,y) returns their com-
mon prefix. An order on the set of b-bit keys is defined by associating
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the key’s bits bb−1 . . .b0 with an integer value
∑b−1
i=0 2
bi . In particu-
lar, a key y is defined bigger, smaller or equal than a key x by com-
paring the integer values. The operators + and − are then defined
as the respective operators in Z, the set of all integers. In particular,
two keys x and y are called consecutive if y = x+ 1 mod 2b. Finally,
I(x,y) = {x+ 1, . . . ,y− 1} is used to denote the set of all possible keys
’between’ x and y. Note that the set is empty if y6 x.
ZEUSMILKER aims on retrieving the complete NLNL of a bot using
themethod requestL(s) as described in the formal model (see Section
3.2). Algorithm5 achieves this goal by subsequently discovering pairs
of keys (x,y) such that the NL is guaranteed not to contain any keys
in I(x,y) and thusNL∩ I(x,y) = ∅. The algorithm terminates if no sets
of I(x,y) can contain additional and yet unknown keys, guaranteeing
that the list of returned keys L is identical with NL. The NL of bots is
assumed to remain static during crawling. This assumption is valid
because the periodic MM cycle during which NLs stay constant is 30
minutes in GameOver Zeus (see Section 4.1.2). As GameOver Zeus
has a rate-limiting mechanism (see Section 4.1.3) in place, several
unique IP addresses are assumed to be utilized to circumvent this
mechanism, i.e., crawling bots in a distributed manner using multi-
ple unique IP addresses.
Theneighbor selectionmechanismofGameOver Zeus (see Section
4.1.2.1) returns ten entries that are close to the supplied key s through
the method requestL(s). The selection of the returned neighbors is
based on a well-known XOR-distance metric that was introduced in
Kademlia [MM02]. However, the design of the GameOver Zeusmech-
anism is such that only the closest key is always guaranteed to be re-
turned. This observation along with the nature of an XOR operation
is leveraged by ZEUSMILKER to circumvent the GameOver Zeus re-
strictionmechanism. Before discussing Algorithm 5 in detail, a short
explanation is provided on how spoofing with two consecutive keys
s1,s2 ∈ I(x,y) results in a set I(x,y), such that all keys in I(x,y) are not
contained inNL. Consider the left-hand side of Figure 4:Here, all pos-
sible b-bit keys are represented in the form of a ring. Note that all the
keys in the right half of the ring are closer to 0(b) than 1(b)with regard
to the XOR-distance, whereas all keys on the left half are closer to 1(b).
Similarly, when considering only the keys on the right half, the keys
in the upper right quarter are closer to 00||1(b− 2) than to 01||0(b− 2),
whereas the keys in the lower right quarter are closer to 01||0(b− 2).
In this manner, one can successively divide keys into sets according
to their closeness in their XOR-distances to the supplied or spoofed
keys. This division is leveraged to identify keys not contained in the
NLNL and the keys possibly contained inNL as follows. Let
s1 = c||0||1(i), s2 = s1 + 1= c||1||0(i) (1)
for some common prefix c and i > 0, i.e., s1 is a key ending with a
string of 1s, and s2 is the next higher key, thus ending with a string of
0s. First note that for any keys id1 and id2, XOR(id1, id2) starts with
a string of 0s of the length of their common prefix. So, if id1 shares
a longer common prefix with id2 than with a key id3, id1 is closer to
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id2 than to id3 with regard to the XORdistance. Now, assume that the
NL contains keys k1 and k2 starting with c||0 and c||1, respectively. As
a consequence, x and y, the closest keys in NL to s1 and s2 with re-
spect to the XOR distance, have to start with c||0 or c||1, respectively.
So, requestL(s2) returns a list containing a key y= c||1||ry = s2 + ry for
some i-bit string ry. Similarly, requestL(s1) returns a list containing
a key x = c||0||rx = s1 − 1(i) + rx for some rx. Therefore, it is shown
that indeed x and y are such that NL ∩ I(x,y) = ∅. By the definition
of I(x,y), I(x,y) = I(x,s2)∪ I(s1,y). The claim thatNL∩ I(x,y) = ∅ fol-
lows from showing that all zx ∈ I(x,s2) and zy ∈ I(s1,y) have a lower
XOR distance to s1 or s2 than x or y, respectively, and hence cannot
be contained in NL. Note that all z ∈ I(x,y) share the prefix c. Con-
sider zy = c||1||q ∈ I(s1,y) for an i-bit string q, so that XOR(z,s2) =
q= z− s2. As a consequence, XOR(zy,s2) XOR(y,s2) for all keys zy ∈
I(s1,y), so that zy NL if y is the closest key to s2 inNL. Similarly, for
any zx = c||0||q ∈ I(x,s2), rx q 6 1(i), so that XOR(zx,s1) = 1(i) − q
and hence XOR(zx,s1) XOR(x,s1). Hence, zx NL if x is the closest re-
turned key to s1. In summary, all keys in I(x,y) are not contained in
NL, and thus a method to reliably identify sets of keys that are guar-
anteed not to be contained inNL is found. However, without further
queries, it is not possible to say which keys in I(k1,x) and I(y,k2) are
contained inNL.
Example 5.1.1. As an example consider the neighborlist
NLex = {00000,00100,01010,01100,10010,11000} and assume for sim-
plicity that each query via requestL() only returns l = 1 key. Assume
it is already discovered that k1 = 00000 and k2 = 01100 with com-
mon prefix c= 0. The next step is to query with s1 = 0||0||111= 00111
and s2 = 01000. requestL(s1) is guaranteed to return x = 00100 and
requestL(s2) returns y= 01010. However, the reply does not tell if any
keys in I(k1,x) = {00001,00010,00011}or I(y,k2) = {01011}are contained
inNLex.
Algorithm 5 now subsequently identifies sets of keys which can-
not be contained in NL, while at the same time finding new keys k1
and k2 that are used for determining the keys s1 and s2. Initially, the
list of discovered keys L is empty (Line 1). Then s1 = 0(b) and s2 =
1(b) are used as keys for the first two queries with the returned list
requestL(s1)and requestL(s2)added to the set of discoveredkeys (Lines
2 -7). In particular, requestL(s1) has to contain the smallest key kfirst
and largest klast in NL, i.e., the closest keys to 0(b) and 1(b). Hence,
the set I(klast,kfirst) is the first detected set of keys that are not con-
tained inNL. However, I(kfirst,klast) potentially contains undiscov-
ered keys, given that it is non-empty, i.e., the two keys are not equal or
consecutive. So, the pair (kfirst,klast) is the first element in R (Line
9), which is implemented as a queue. Hence, R contains pairs (k1,k2)
whose common prefix defines the spoofed keys in future iterations.
In each iteration of the while loop (Lines 10 - 26), such a pair (k1,k2)
from the front of the queue is considered. The common prefix c of k1
and k2, determines the two spoofed keys s1 and s2, such that s1 =
c||0||1(b − length(c) − 1), which consists of the common prefix c, 0,
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
52 CRAWLING BOTNETS
Algorithm 5 : ZeusMilker()
// Initialization
1 L←∅ // Crawled keys








8 if kfirst 6= klast&&kfirst 6= klast − 1 then
9 R.push((kfirst,klast)) // Push undiscovered range
// While not fully discovered
10 while not R= ∅ do
// Get keys for spoofing
11 (k1,k2)← R.pop()
12 c← getCommonPrefix(k1,k2)
13 s1← c||0||1(b− length(c) − 1)
14 s2← c||1||0(b− length(c) − 1)
// Execute queries and add new sets
15 if k1 s1 then
16 M← requestL(s1) // query with s1
17 L← L∪M
18 x← getClosestKey(M,s1)
19 if x 6= k1 then
20 R.push((k1,x))
21 if k2 s2 then
22 M← requestL(s2) // query with s2
23 L← L∪M
24 y← getClosestKey(M,s2)
25 if y 6= k2 then
26 R.push((y,k2))
27 return L
and a string of 1s achieving a total length of b, is the largest key closer
to k1 than to k2 (in terms of the XOR-distance). Analogously, s2 =
c||1||0(b− length(c) − 1) = s1 + 1 is the smallest key closer to k2 than
k1 (Lines 12-14). If s1 is not bigger than k1, I(k1,s1) is empty, hence
it is not necessary to query with s1. Analogously, if s2 is not smaller
than k2, I(s2,k2) is empty. If s1 is bigger than k1, the method call
requestL(s1) is executed, the returned listM added to L, and the key
x is chosen as the closest key to s1 inM (Lines 16-18). Similar, if s2 is
smaller than k2, y is chosen as the closest key to s2 in the set returned
by requestL(s2) (Lines 22-24). As discussed above, keys in I(x,y) are
guaranteed to benot contained inNL, hence only the sets I(k1,x) and
I(y,k2) can contain undiscovered keys if they are non-empty. Hence,
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the pairs (k1,x) and (y,k2) are added to the end of R (Line 20 and 26,
respectively).
Example 5.1.2. The exemplary neighborlist
NLex = {00000,00100,01010,01100,10010,11000} fromExample 5.1.1 is
used, which is sorted for simplicity and indexed by idj =NLex[j], for
j= 0. . .5. The ring on the left of Figure 4 depicts how these keys map
onto the whole key space. For simplicity, it is assumed that only l= 1
keys are returned per query. However, for larger l |NLex|, the same
number of steps is required to guarantee that all keys in NLex are
returned, though individual keys might be discovered much earlier.
Initially, two queries are conducted, one with key 11111 (Line 5, Al-
gorithm 5) and one with key 00000 (Line 2, Algorithm 5), which will
return two entries from NL, namely kfirst = id0 = 00000 (Line 4, Al-
gorithm 5) and klast = id5 = 11000 (Line 7, Algorithm 5), respectively.
Hence, it can be deduced that there are no keys in I(id5, id0). Then,
as described in the following and as can be seen on the right of Figure
4, five iterations of the loop are executed as follows:
1) The pair of keys k1 = id0 = 00000, and k2 = id5 = 11000 is retrieved
from R. They do not share a common prefix, so spoofing with s1 =
01111 and s2 = 10000 discovers x = id3 = 01100 and y = id4 = 10010.
Thepairs (id0, id3) and (id4, id5) are added to the setR. After this step,
it can be guaranteed that NLex does not contain keys in I(id3, id4)
since they would have been returned when spoofing IDs s1 or s2.
2) The pair (id4, id5) = (10010,11000) is retrieved, sharing common
prefix 1. The spoofed keys are thus s1 = 10111 and s2 = 11000. Be-
cause s2 is identical to id5 and hence there are no keys in I(s2, id5),
it is not necessary to spoof with s2. Spoofing with s1 does not result
in any closer key to s1 than id4. No new pairs are added to R, and it is
guaranteed thatNLex does not contain keys in I(id4, id5).
3) The pair (id0, id3) = (00000,01100) is retrieved. Spoofing with s1 =
00111 and s2 = 01000 leads to the discovery of id1 = 00100 and id2 =
01010. Therefore, the pairs (id0, id1) and (id2, id3) are added toR. As a
consequence, it is known thatNLex doesnot containkeys in I(id1, id2).
4) The pair (id2, id3) = (01010,01100) is retrieved, but spoofing with
s1 = 01011 (spoofing s2 = 01100 not required) reveals thatNLex does
not contain keys in I(id2, id3).
5) The pair (id0, id1) = (00000,00100) is retrieved, but spoofing with
s1 = 00011 (spoofing s2 = 00100 not required) reveals thatNLex does
not contain keys in I(id0, id1).
The example indicates that in each step, Algorithm 5 discovers a
pair of keys x and y, such that it is guaranteed that the NL NL does
not contain keys in I(x,y). In the following, an analysis is presented
to show that the observation holds for all steps and utilize it to derive
the complexity of Algorithm 5.
5.1.1.3 Correctness and Complexity Analysis of ZeusMilker
In the following, it is first shown that at least 2n queries are needed to
guarantee that ann-elementalNL is retrieved, regardless of the choice
of spoofed keys. Second, Algorithm 5 is analyzed, and it is shown that
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
54 CRAWLING BOTNETS
the algorithm indeed terminates in at most 2n steps. The results pre-
sented here aremainly concernedwith theworst-case complexity, de-
fined as themaximal cost, i.e., the number of queries, required by any
input, i.e., NLs, for the algorithm to terminate.
More precisely, the optimality of the proposed algorithm is shown
in the following:
1. The complexity of the problem to obtain a provable complete
NL is 2n, i.e., there exist someNLs for which at least 2n keys need
tobe spoofed regardlessof thealgorithmfor choosing thesekeys.
2. Theproposedalgorithmneeds atmost 2n steps to obtain aprov-
able complete NL and is hence optimal with regard to the worst-
case complexity.
As a result, the algorithm achieves optimal performance with regard
to the worst-case complexity, which is not necessarily optimal for all
inputs.However, it is later shown thatwhile there are lists that require
fewer steps, most NLs require at least 2n spoofed keys, regardless of
how these keys are chosen. Hence, the performance bound is indeed
of practical relevance. To present a more general result, b-bit keys
are considered rather than the concrete value of b = 160 as used in
GameOver Zeus.
Proposition 5.1.3. There exist NLsNL with n distinct keys, such that
the number of queries needed to guarantee the complete retrieval of
NL is, at least, 2n for any choice of spoofed keys.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1 for interested readers. The
idea of the proof is to divide the set I(idj, id((j+1) modn)), idj being
the j-th smallest key in NL, into two sets Fj− and Fj+, such that keys
in Fj− are closer to idj and keys in Fj+ closer to idj+1. Then it is shown
that each non-empty Fj− or Fj+ requires, at least, one query, adding
up to a total of 2n queries.
It is shown that NLs exist such that 2n spoofed keys are needed by
any algorithm. However, as indicated by Example 5.1.2, it is possible
that a NL can be discovered using less than 2n queries. The existence
of such examples raises the question if the worst-case complexity is
a suitable measure, or if it is only relevant for few constructed exam-
ples.
In addition, an edge-case exists where all entries in NLs might be
empty or shorter than the minimum reply size, i.e., |NL| l. For these,
it requires exactly one query to retrieve the full list.
Proposition 5.1.4 and the subsequent calculation of Eq. 2 for real-
istic botnet sizesm show that the vast majority of NLs require at least
2n spoofed keys for crawling, such that the algorithm is not only op-
timal with regard to the worst-case complexity, but also for nearly all
inputs.
Proposition 5.1.4. The probability that the guaranteed retrieval of
an n-elemental NL in a GameOver Zeus botnet withm bots and b-bit
keys requires less than 2n spoofed keys is at most
m(m− 1)
2b+1
(3+ 4(b− 1) ln2) . (2)
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The proof is provided in the Appendix A.3 for interested readers.
The proof idea is to provide a bound on the probability that any Fj−
or Fj+, as defined in theproof of Proposition5.1.3, is empty. The result
is obtained using basic probability theory.
In GameOver Zeus, typically, b = 160-bit keys are used, while the
size of most of such botnets is usually not bigger than several ten
thousand. For such parameters, Eq. 2 is negligible, being less than
1033, so that indeed the vastmajority of NLs require 2n crawl requests
to reveal all entries. A more detailed discussion of Eq. 2 can be found
in Appendix A.2.
Now, Algorithm 5 is analyzed and later shown that its complexity is
indeed 2n.
Proposition 5.1.5. Algorithm 5 guarantees the complete retrieval of
any n-elemental NLNL and requires at most 2n queries.
Proof. Denote thekeys inNLby id0, . . . , idn−1, sorted inascendingor-
der. In the first step of Algorithm 5 (Lines 2 - 7), two keys are spoofed
to guarantee that the NL does not contain keys in I(idn−1, id0). In
each iteration of the loop, Algorithm 5 requires at most two queries
with spoofed keys s1 and s2 = s1 + 1 to guarantee that NL does not
contain keys in I(idj, idj+1) for some 0 6 j 6 n− 2 (Lines 10-26), idj
being the closest key to s1 and idj+1 being the closest key to s2. So,
n − 1 iterations of the loop are required to provably retrieve the NL
NL, since each pair (idj, idj+1) is only considered once. Hence, the
two initial queries in addition to themaximumof 2(n− 1) queries ex-
ecutedduring the loop results inanupperboundof 2non thenumber
of queries.
It is nowshown thatAlgorithm5achieves the lowest possibleworst-
case complexity.Note that thenumberof required steps can–inprinciple–
bemuch lower in some rare cases: If the keys contained in the list are
consecutive, i.e., idj+1 = idj + 1 , the algorithm terminates in n steps.
Furthermore, there are some NLs, for which the lowest possible num-
ber of steps cannot be achieved, e.g., for an NL consisting of only 0(b)
and 1(b), Algorithm 5 requires four steps, but a variant of Algorithm
5 that starts using 0||1(b− 1) and 1||0(b− 1) for spoofing terminates
within two steps. The example clearly shows that for any choice of ini-
tially spoofed keys and hence for any algorithm, there is some NL for
which theminimal number of steps is not achieved. However, Propo-
sition 5.1.4 shows that the algorithm is optimal for the vast majority
of cases.
Take note that although ZEUSMILKER is specifically designed for
GameOver Zeus, the algorithm can be easily generalized and also ap-
plied to other P2P botnets like Storm, and/or Kademlia-based P2P
file-sharing networks. As long as the XOR-metric is utilized as a no-
tion of distance between two values, e.g., node IDs, in a particular
domain, ZEUSMILKER could be used to manipulate a mechanism to
return entries to deduce additional information, e.g., all neighbors
known to a particular node. However, it is required that the domain
allows a user or client to pick values or keys arbitrarily. ZEUSMILKER
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requires this feature in order to be able to manipulate the input pa-
rameters of the mechanism that calculates the XOR-distance.
5.1.2 Less Invasive Crawling Algorithm (LICA)
Crawling introduces a significant amount of network activity that is
easily observable and may disclose a crawler to the botmasters. Al-
though the simplest solution in crawling a botnet is to request NLs
from all known nodes iteratively, this is neither stealthy nor efficient
(cf. Section 3.4). For example, current BFS andDFS-based crawling al-
gorithmsneed to crawl all possiblenodes toprovide a snapshot at any
particular time. Theunnecessary activity of frequently requestingNLs
may not only raise suspicions to the botmasters but also introduce
bias to thefinal view if the crawl is not carriedout fast enough [SRS05].
This argument is especially true if the reason for crawling is only to
perform bot enumerations, i.e., identifying infected machines, and
not to discover the full interconnectivity between bots. In the case of
the former, it is desirable to minimize the necessary amount of inter-
action between crawler and the botnet.
The idea behind is only to crawl a subset of all nodes to obtain a
minimum vertex cover, which is a problem known from graph theory.
A vertex cover is a set of vertices of a graph that has all edges in the
graph incident to at least one vertex of the set. Theminimum vertex
cover in a botnet is then defined as a set of minimum nodes, Vmin,
that has all other nodes in the network reachable from one or more
nodes in the set according to our formal botnetmodel (cf. Section 3.2)
as follows:






However, this problem is proven to be NP-hard, and all known ap-
proximation algorithms require a global view of the graph, e.g., the
algorithm of Bar-Yehuda [BYE85].
For this reason, this particular work intends to approximate the
minimum vertex cover during the crawl of a botnet. For that, this
work tries to identify the stable core of a botnet and to crawl those
bots first, which is inspired by the work of Stutzbach et al. [SRS05] on
theGnutella P2Pnetwork. Unstructured P2Pnetworks, like other bot-
nets presented in Section 4, maintain their overlay connectivity via a
membershipmanagementmechanism. Thismechanismensures the
robustness of the overlay by exchanging fresh information about ac-
tive peers in the network. Consequently, the entry of a stable or an
important peer is frequently sharedbybots andwill stay longer in the
NL of many others. To exploit this observation, an iterative crawling
algorithmnamed Less Invasive Crawling Algorithm (LICA) is proposed
that employs a heuristic to plan the next crawling steps iteratively
and to establish a vertex cover in the botnet that operates with such
sparse graph information. This crawling algorithm attempts to opti-
mize the coverage of subsequent crawling steps and thus decreases
the requiredoverall numberof steps for crawlingabotnet.Hence, this
algorithm intends not to discover the full botnet interconnectivity,
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but to extend the monitoring coverage to have the best, i.e., largest,
snapshot of a botnet overlay along with the superpeers in it. It is as-
sumed that bots in the botnet are all online at the same time; hence,
diurnal patterns and churn effects are ignored in this work. Further-
more, it is also assumed that theNLsof other bots canbe requested, so
that either all neighbors are retrievable, e.g., GameOver Zeus (cf. Sec-
tion 5.1.1), or subsets of the neighbors of a particular peer, e.g., Sality
and ZeroAccess.




// Maximum allowed requests (per node)
3 for i= 0, i r, i= i+ 1 do




// Reset gain if necessary
7 if ccrawl mod w= 0 then
8 gain← 0




∀y∈Vknown |NLy|− |NLy − v|
// Crawl + get neighborlist of u
10 NLu← crawl(u)
// Update list of visited nodes
11 Vvisited← Vvisited ∪ {u}
// Update list of nodes to crawl
12 Vcrawl← (Vcrawl ∪NLu) − Vvisited
13 ccrawl← ccrawl + 1
// Calculate gain
14 gain← gain+ |NLu|− |Vknown ∩NLu|
// Update visited nodes
15 Vknown← Vknown ∪NLu
16 while Vcrawl 6= ∅ & (ccrawl mod w 6= 0 || gain÷w t);
LICA which is described in Algorithm 6, not only aims at crawling
efficiency but is also configurable for an adaption to a specific envi-
ronment or a specific botnet via parameters seedpeer, r,w, and t.
The seedpeer is the start node of the crawl. Parameter r is the max-
imum number of requests allowed to be sent, i.e., subsequent crawl-
ing iterations, to anynode in thenetworkwithinaparticular full crawl.
A full crawl endswhenall contactablenodes in thenetworkhavebeen
discovered.
The window parameter w determines the number of subsequent
requests, for which a gain, e.g.,> 0, is calculated. The gainmeasures
the number of new nodes learned during a crawlingwindoww. Thus,
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the gain divided by w requests gives the learning curve during the
crawl which terminates the algorithm execution when dropping be-
low a threshold t,> 0.
LICAutilizes the initial seedpeer forbootstrapping itself into thebot-
net overlay. Then, starting with the seedpeer, the algorithm obtains
the NL NLu from u (line 10) and further extends its knowledge by it-
eratively requesting NLs from the discovered peers. For each request
sent by LICA, the counter ccrawl is incremented by one.
Upon receiving an NL from u, it is immediately added to Vvisited
(line 11) and the undiscovered peers in the received entries are added
to Vcrawl (line 15) as potential candidates for the crawl.
Line 9 in the algorithm selects the next candidate for the crawl. The
algorithm goes through all receivedNLs of peers inVknown and ranks
all remaining peers in Vcrawl based on their popularity, i.e., their in-
degree. Since the exact in-degree is not known, an approximation is
obtained by counting the number of the occurrences a candidate or
peer is seenamong theNLsofother crawledpeers. The function argmax
returns themost-popular peer, i.e., highest ranked, as the next candi-
date tobe crawled. In the event of equally rankedpeers, the algorithm
randomly chooses one among them.
At everywindow interval, i.e., afterw requests, thealgorithmchecks
the accumulated gain (line 14) within the past window and termi-
nates the current crawl iteration if the ratioof theobservedgaindrops
below threshold t (line 16). Depending on the value of r, LICAmay re-
peat another iteration of the crawl; however, this time, LICA utilizes
the information of previously crawled peers Vknown instead of the
seedpeer. The algorithm terminates when there are nomore peers to
be crawled, the number of maximum allowed iterations is exceeded,
or gain is below t.
5.2 ADVANCED ANTI-CRAWLING COUNTERMEASURES
ZEUSMILKER and LICA as presented in Section 5.1 circumvents exist-
ing anti-crawlingmechanisms.However, as usual in the racebetween
a botmaster and researchers, it can be expected that botmasters will
introducenewer countermeasures to send the researchers back at try-
ing to circumvent them yet again . Therefore in this section, by as-
suming the role of a botmaster, some advanced anti-crawling coun-
termeasures that can be expected in the near future are proposed. Al-
though mechanisms presented here can be utilized to fortify or im-
prove futurebotnets, the introductionof theseadvancedcountermea-
sures is necessary to allow researchers to anticipate and be prepared
before such mechanisms are seen in the wild.
In the following, two advanced anti-crawling countermeasures are
proposed toundermine someof thenon-functional requirementspro-
posed inSection3.1.2. First, improvedNL restrictionmechanismsover
theGameOverZeus’mechanism(cf. Section4.1.2.1) as a crawlingpre-
vention mechanism are presented. Second, a lightweight crawler de-
tection mechanism that is easily deployable in existing P2P botnets
is presented.
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5.2.1 Enhancing GameOver Zeus’ NL Restriction Mechanism
TheNL restrictionmechanismofGameOverZeushadonemajorweak-
ness: the requester canmanipulate the returned entries. The existing
mechanism accepts any input, i.e., key, from the sender’s message
(cf. Section 4.1.2.1) without validating the input or key. This feature
allowed ZEUSMILKER to manipulate the mechanism by deterministi-
cally spoofing keys to retrieve the bot’s entire NL. Hence, it is impor-
tant that any future mechanism that aims to prevent crawling activi-
ties (cf. Section 3.4.3.1) also ensures that the requester is not able to
manipulate the selection of returned neighbors. As such, a crawler
can be prevented from obtaining an accurate representation of the
overlay topology (Non-Functional Requirement #4).
Take note that one important aspect of anMM is to ensure a robust
botnet overlay. Therefore, all NL restriction mechanisms need to en-
sure that the botnet’s overlay connectivity is not adversely affected by
the restriction techniques. In the following, two countermeasures to
improve the existing GameOver Zeus NL restriction mechanism are
presented along with another countermeasure that simply returns
randomnodes from theNL. The evaluation results of the countermea-
sures along with a discussion will be presented in Section 5.3.1.5.
5.2.1.1 RandomNode Return
In Sality [Fal11], bots return exactly one entry that is randomly cho-
sen from their respective NLs to the requesting bot (cf. Section 4.2.2).
Hence, the requesting bot has no influence on the returned entries
at all. However, all entries have an equal likelihood to be returned to
any requesting bots. This approach from Sality is considered as one
of the potential countermeasures in this work.
5.2.1.2 Bit-XOR+
This countermeasure adds additional randomness at the side of the
recipient of anNL request. The recipient, i.e., bot, generates a random
keyuniformly for each IP address it receives a request fromand stores
it. This key is then XOR-ed with the key of the requesting node, and
the resulting key is then used as an input for Algorithm 1 to return
the neighbor entries. Hence, the set of keys that is returned is now bi-
ased towards the new XOR-ed key, and an attacker loses its ability to
strategically spoof keys. By including a randomly generated key into
the selection process, each entry in the NL has the equal likelihood to
be returned, such that Bit-XOR+ is expected not to affect the connec-
tivity between the bots negatively.
5.2.1.3 Bit-AND
Bit-AND is a variation of the Bit-XOR+ countermeasure that executes
a bit-wiseAND operation between the stored key and the requesters
key before using the resulting key to return NL entries. However, due
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to the nature of theAND operation whereupon each bit of the result-
ing key has a tendency to be 0 with a probability 3/4, the set of re-
turned keys for Bit-AND is likely to be biased towards keys starting
with 0s. On the one hand, such a bias can considerably decrease the
performance of all crawlers because the returned sets are expected
to have a larger overlap in contrast to uniformly selected sets. On the
other hand, keys starting with 1s are expected to be present in fewer
NLs, potentially damaging the connectivity and thus the resilience of
the botnet. Therefore, while Bit-AND is expected to achieve the best
performanceoutof the three countermeasures, its disadvantages likely
outweigh its benefits.
5.2.2 BoobyTrap: Detecting Persistent Crawlers
This section focuses on detecting crawlers thatmay still be able to tol-
erate the proposed NL restriction mechanisms in Section 5.2.1 from
the perspective of a botmaster. From the observations of crawlers de-
ployed in existing P2P botnets [Kar+16a],most of the crawlers exhibit
similar characteristics, i.e., greedyandaggressive in contactingall bots,
compared to bots. Moreover, since researchers are required to man-
ually re-implement some the botnet’s protocol to crawl the botnet,
it is also observed that many crawlers have incomplete or simplified
(re)implementations of the botnet protocols. Such characteristics of
a crawler can be leveraged to detect them within the botnets.
For that, Section 5.2.2.1 introduces a set of lightweight crawler de-
tection techniques called BoobyTrap (BT), which identify crawlers ex-
hibiting such characteristics compared to bots. Section 5.2.2.2 and
5.2.2.3presents theadaptationofBT toSality andZeroAccess. Although
similar adaptations of BT are possible for GameOver Zeus, they were
not focused in this work as it was not possible to evaluate the mech-
anisms on a real world scenario compared to the other two botnets,
i.e., GameOver Zeus is being sinkholed since 2014.
5.2.2.1 BoobyTrap (BT)
A BT node can be a regular bot or a sensor node (cf. Section 3.3.3)
that is enriched with detection mechanisms or ’traps’ to identify au-
tonomously misbehaving nodes that are contacting it. As a proof-of-
concept, a sensor is utilized through the remainder part of this work.
All communicationwith the BTnode is logged in a relational database
for future reference along with additional metadata: timestamp, pay-
load, source IP, and source port. Compared to conventional sensors,
BT nodes can have additional functionalities such as responding to
NL requests with valid replies and (re)sending valid probe messages
to the sender of a request message. In addition, BT nodes can also lis-
ten for incoming connections ormessages on a secondary port (if ap-
plicable), as it is needed for one of the traps (described later). Take
note that in this work, the deployed BT nodes only return non-bot
entries, i.e., other sensor nodes, to avoid participating in the regular
botnetmaintenance activities due to legal constraints. Therefore, the
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BT-enhanced sensor nodes deployed in this work do not participate
in any activities that may, directly or indirectly, aid the botnet in any
manner.
The BTdetectionmechanism leverages upon the following assump-
tions of crawlers that are derived from the observations in real-world
botnets.
1. Crawlers greedily attempt to discover/contact all online bots as
much as possible by aggressively abusing the botnet’s protocol
to requestNL.
2. Crawlers are not able to distinguish BT nodes from normal bot,
without first interacting with them.
Themain ideaofBT is to identify "misbehaving"nodes, i.e., crawlers,
bydistinguishing their behavior frombotson thebasis of violationsof
the respective botnet’s MM protocol. These behaviors can be catego-
rized according to the following classes: Defiance, Abuse, and Avoid-
ance, that are adaptable to any P2P botnets.
DEFIANCE Bots that defy the botnet-specified MM protocols can
be classified as crawlers. An example of such defiance includes omit-
ting certain prerequisite actions or mandatory message exchange(s)
before requestinganNL.Moreover, in somecases, it is alsopossible to
identify a crawler based on its behavior of contacting all discovered
entries, evenwhen the botnet protocol applies some restriction to en-
tries that can be chosen as potential neighbors. For example, new en-
tries that have amatching /20 subnetwith existing entries are ignored
by GameOver Zeus (cf. Section 4.1.2.2). As such, if a BT node returns
an entry of another BT node that is from the same /20 subnet, and if
both BT nodeswere contacted by an identical node, this behavior can
be classified as a crawler.
ABUSE In P2Pbotnets, botsmay request theNLs of their neighbors
to add additional neighbors to their NL. The ability to request new
neighbors is necessary to prevent getting isolated from the botnet
overlay. However, crawlers can make use of this NL exchange mech-
anism to reconstruct the network topology of the botnet (cf. Section
3.3.2). Therefore, bots in most recent P2P botnets return only a small
subset of their NL to prevent a crawler from retrieving the entire NL
easily (cf. Section 3.4.3.1). Moreover, the presence of churn also en-
courages crawlers to obtain snapshots of the botnet as fast as pos-
sible to avoid introducing bias in the monitoring results (cf. Section
3.4.1). Therefore, crawlers typically crawl bots with higher frequen-
cies [Kar+15]. In contrast, botsusuallyprobe theirneighborsonlyonce
per MM cycle, i.e., between 1 sec and 40 minutes, depending on the
botnet. Thus, a frequency-baseddetectionmechanismcanbeutilized
to detect crawlers that abuse the NL exchange mechanism. In fact,
such a countermeasure was already implemented by the GameOver
Zeus botnet (cf. Section 4.1.3).
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AVOIDANCE TheMMof a botnet specifies the sequenceofmessage
exchange as well as the structure of the messages. Hence, nodes that
do not respond to messages (periodically) or return non-consistent
responses, e.g., empty or invalid, might be crawlers too. This premise
is reasonable as the designs of most monitoring nodes are oftenmin-
imalistic and does not aim at aiding the botnet in its day-to-day op-
erations such as command dissemination, attack execution, or man-
agement of the overlay. This is usually enforced by the need to adhere
to research ethics or cyber laws in many countries. As such, crawlers
tend to avoid providing information or responding to requests that
mayaid thebotnet inapositivemanner.Bydeliberately sendingbotnet-
specific requests thatwouldoftengenerate a verifiable reply, bots that
are refusing to respond (or ignore the requests) can be classified as
crawlers.
5.2.2.2 Adaptation of BoobyTrap for Sality
In the following, three crawlerdetectionmechanismsor traps areadapted
for Sality, adhering to two out of the three misbehavior classes pre-
sented in Section 5.2.2. Each trap’s name for Sality is prefixed with
an S, and the abbreviation of the respective detection class. There
are two traps for Sality in the class of Defiance, i.e., SD1-IgnoreTrap
and SD2-BaitTrap, and one trap from the class of Abuse, i.e., SAB-
BurstTrap. Take note that a trap can also be setup from the class of
Avoidance basedon theappendedURLPack, i.e., newerupdate,within
theHellomessage exchangeprocess.However, such a trap for Sality is
omitted in thiswork as itmay induceDDoSon the BTnode itself due to
continuously requestingURLPack responses thatwill generate heavy
network traffic towards the node itself [Ros14].
SD1-IGNORETRAP The MM protocol of Sality dictates that a bot
utilizes aHellomessage to probe the responsiveness of its neighbors
(cf. Section 4.2.2). If the neighbors are responsive, and the probing
bot requires additional neighbors, only then, it sends an additional
NLReq message. As such, anNLReq is always preceded by aHellomes-
sage. Crawlers, that want to simplify this process to reduce the com-
munication overhead for crawling, may decide to ignore the Hello
message and send onlyNLReq messages to the bots. In addition, sim-
plifying the process also reduces the amount of time needed for the
crawler to produce a snapshot. For each received NL request, the BT
nodechecks if therehasbeenaprecedingHellomessage logged in the
database. If the database contains no records for the Hello message,
the respective node is flagged as a crawler.
SD2-BAITTRAP The MM protocol of Sality also ensures that an IP
address can only be present once in a bot’s NL (Line 3, Algorithm 2).
When a bot discovers a potential neighbor with the same IP but dif-
ferent port (Line 5, Algorithm 2), it prefers an existing and responsive
entry, i.e., IP address. This trap exploits this behavior by deliberately
responding to all receivedNLReq with an entry that points back to the
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BT node’s secondary port. Legitimate bots would ignore such a reply,
since the initial entry, i.e., the entry with the primary port, is still re-
sponsive in the NL from the previous MM cycle. Since crawlers are
often greedy in obtaining information on the botnet topology, the
crawlers would also probe the secondary port of BT and trigger the
crawler detection mechanism. Take note that this particular baiting
mechanism can also be executed using two (or more) colluding BT
nodes.
SAB-BURSTTRAP Bots in Sality probe the responsiveness of their
neighbors once every 40minutes (cf. Section 4.2.2). In addition, bots
can (optionally) request neighbors of their neighbor by sending an
NLReq. As such, this trapkeeps trackof abot’sNL requesting frequency,
i.e., based on the IP address of the requester. If a bot sends severalNL
requests within a short interval, i.e., 40 minutes, this behavior trig-
gers the detection mechanism.
5.2.2.3 Adaptation of BoobyTrap for ZeroAccess
In the following, three crawlerdetectionmechanismsor traps areadapted
for ZeroAccess from the different misbehavior classes presented in
Section 5.2.2. Each trap’s name is prefixed by an abbreviation of the
botnet’s name and the respective detection class.
ZD-NONCOMPLIANCETRAP TheMMprotocol of ZeroAccess asde-
scribed in Algorithm 3 allows bots to identify if a getLmessagewas re-
ceived. This is done by checking the flag value of the received request
message (Line 4), i.e., flag== 0. In reply, legitimate bots always send
a getL+ message that has its flag set to 1. However, it would still be
protocol-compliant if a bot sends a getL+ message with the flag set
to any non-zero integers, i.e., flag 6= 0. This trap deliberately sends
a getL+ with a modified flag-value, e.g., flag = 3, for every received
getL message. A legitimate bot will answer all received requests with
retL or retL+ messages that have the flag values copied from the re-
ceived request messages (Line 2). In addition, due to the possibility
of UDP hole punching in ZeroAccess [Ros+13], all legitimate bots (in-
cluding those behind NAT-like devices) should respond to any getL+
message received.Hence, the BTnode examineswhether the received
replies contain inconsistent or modified flags. Any crawlers that are
non-compliant to theMM protocol by not copying the exact flag that
has been received in the reply will be detected.
ZAB-BURSTTRAP TheMMmechanismofZeroAccess indicates that
a bot would only contact a particular neighbor at most three times
within a duration of 256 seconds (cf. Section 4.3.2). This observation
is exploited in this trap that triggerswhen anybot attempts to contact
the BTnode aggressively in quick successions, i.e.,more than three re-
quests within 256 seconds. The maximum number of getL messages
that can be expected from a bot with a full NL, i.e., 256 neighbors, is
three messages within a maximum interval of 256 seconds (probed
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once from each of the three NLs). Similar to SAB-BurstTrap, if more
than three requests are received from a single bot within a short in-
terval, i.e., 256 seconds, our detection mechanism is triggered.
ZAV-IGNORETRAP This trap works in combination with the ZD-
NonComplianceTrap. Crawlers that received the BT node’s getL+ re-
quests with modified flag values may (intentionally or unintention-
ally) decide not to respond to the message. Considering the fact that
UDP hole punching is exploited, all bots including those behindNAT
are expected to respond to the received requests. Therefore, any node
deliberately refusing to reply can be flagged as a crawler.
5.3 EVALUATION
This section presents the evaluation results and analysis of themech-
anisms proposed in Section 5.1 and 5.2 in three parts. In the first part
(Section5.3.1), a thoroughanalysis of ZEUSMILKER is presented in the
context of circumventing theNL restrictionmechanism of GameOver
Zeus as described in Section 5.1.1. In addition, the evaluation of the
enhanced restriction mechanisms as introduced in Section 5.2.1 is
also presented.
The second part of this section (Section 5.3.2) presents the eval-
uation results of the Less Invasive Crawling Algorithm (LICA) as de-
scribed inSection5.1.2. Thefinalpart (Section5.3.3) provides ananal-
ysis of the ability to detect crawlers in existing botnets through the
mechanisms introduced in Section 5.2.2.
5.3.1 Evaluation of ZeusMilker
The evaluation of ZEUSMILKER is outlined below and has also been
published in [Kar+15]. First, thedatasetutilized for evaluatingZEUSMILKER
is discussed in Section 5.3.1.1. Then, Section 5.3.1.2 elaborates on the
setup for the experiments and Section 5.3.1.3 introduces the metrics
used in the evaluations. After that, the investigated research ques-
tions are listed alongwith the expectations of the outcome in Section
5.3.1.4. Finally, the results of the experiments arepresented in Section
5.3.1.5.
5.3.1.1 Dataset
A real-world GameOver Zeus dataset is used in the evaluation that
consists of crawled information collected for a duration of approxi-
mately five hours from the botnet on 25th April 2013. The sanitized
dataset contains information of 900 bots that have between 10 to 70
entries in their respective NL. The median of the dataset is 34 entries
with a standard deviation of 18.37.
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5.3.1.2 Experimental Setup
The membership management protocols of GameOver Zeus was im-
plemented in OMNeT++1 by making use of OverSim2[BHK07] as the
simulation framework.OMNeT++ is adiscrete event simulator that al-
lows simulation of networks. Meanwhile, OverSim adds the required
functionality for overlays that is leveraged in implementing themem-
bership management mechanism of the botnets. For ZEUSMILKER,
the implementation includes theNL restrictionmechanismasdescribed
in Algorithm 1. As for the generation of random keys withinOverSim,
the OverlayKey class is utilized to generate keys following a uniform
distribution to investigate the effects of key distribution within the
NLs.
For each iteration of the experiment, data for each bot in the sim-
ulation is uniformly selected at random from the dataset described
in Section 5.3.1.1 depending on the investigated NL size. The bots are
then assigned the selected key and have their NL filled with the as-
sociated NL entries. Since the order of entries in a bot’s NL is non-
deterministic, a random permutation is applied to the contained en-
tries before storing them as the NL.
The following monitoring approaches were also implemented in
the simulation framework, to evaluate not only the effectiveness of
theNL restrictionmechanism inGameOverZeusbut also theefficiency
of ZEUSMILKER in comparison to other approaches:
• ZeusMilker is the proposed approach for strategically spoofing
keys to milk all entries from a bot’s NL implemented as per Al-
gorithm 5.
• Random is the only other known monitoring approach than
ZEUSMILKERused formonitoringGameOverZeus [Ros+13] that
is known within the research community. The spoofed keys are
160-bit in length and generated uniformly at random for each
request.
• BinaryHalving spoofs keys by halving the ID space in theman-
ner of a binary search algorithm. For each iteration of the al-
gorithm, two keys are derived between two previously crawled
keys. This halving process is repeated until themaximumnum-
ber of permitted requests is reached. For that, BinaryHalving
initially spoofs with 0(b) and 1(b), and adds the pair (0(b),1(b))
to a FIFO queue Q. Then it executes the following statement T
times:
1. Remove thehead (K1,K2)ofQanddetermine thekeysh1 =
bK1+K22 c and h2 = h1 + 1,
2. Crawl using spoofed keys h1 and h2, and
3. Add (K1,h1) and (h2,K2) toQ.
1 http://www.omnetpp.org
2 http://www.oversim.org
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Please note that, to the best of knowledge, this approachhas not been
utilized in any real botnet monitoring system. It is introduced in this
work to investigate and evaluate the case where keys are distributed
evenly throughout an ID space.
For each experiment, the results were averaged over 50 indepen-
dent trials with confidence intervals of 95%. Furthermore, for each
iteration of the experiments, a unique seed value has been used to
initialize the simulation models and to choose a random node from
the dataset. In all of the experiments, the maximum number of re-
quests is limited to 2n requests, where n = |NL|, in agreement with
the worst-case complexity for retrieving a complete NL (see Proposi-
tion 5.1.3).
5.3.1.3 Evaluation Metric
The success of anti-crawling countermeasures and the performance
of ZEUSMILKER are measured by the discovery ratio. It is defined as
the unique fraction of an NL that is retrieved during crawling. Hence,
thediscovery ratio is anassessment of both the efficiencyof the crawl-
ing algorithm as well as the effectiveness of the botnet’s countermea-
sures, allowing thecomparisonofdifferent crawlingandanti-monitoring
strategies.
5.3.1.4 Research Questions and Expectations
One of the countermeasures to hinder successful botnet monitoring
is to restrict the number of entries that are returned after receivingNL
request (cf. Section 3.4.3.1). Hence, the following research question
needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• What is the influence on different NL sizes n and NL return sizes
l?
In this investigation to answer the research question, ZEUSMILKER is
expected to obtain all entries successfully with at most 2n requests
in every scenario as shown in Proposition 5.1.5. Meanwhile, Random
and BinaryHalving are expected to miss some entries. The Random
crawling strategy retrieves a randomized set of entries and has a high
probability of missing one or more keys. BinaryHalving, in contrast,
divides the search space strategically, but doesnotmakeuseof knowl-
edge gained in previous steps and as such may continue to query re-
gions with few or no keys intensively. Furthermore, the performance
of all algorithms is expected to increase with increasing l, because
more keys are discovered in each step. The increase should be par-
ticularly strong for Random as the probability to be successful when
spoofing randomly is highly dependent on the number of trials.
Thedistributionof keyswithin a realworldGameOverZeusbot’sNL
is observed biased to the key of the bot itself [Ros+13]. However, due
to the botnet’sNL returnmechanism (cf. Section 4.1.2.1), different key
distributionsmay influence thenumberof requestsneeded tobeable
to retrieve the entire NL. Examples of other distributions that could
occur in a bot’s NL are:
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1. RandomDistribution: A node’sNL contains only randomly gen-
erated keys.
2. ConsecutiveEntries: Anode’sNL containsonly consecutive keys,
e.g., kj+1 = kj + 1 mod 2160.
Therefore, the following research question needs to be answered in
the evaluation:
• How do the different distributions of keys within a bot’s NL influ-
ence the performance of the spoofing algorithms?
ZEUSMILKER is expected to retrieve all entries within a bot’s NL in-
dependent of the chosen distribution. However, in the case of Con-
secutive Entries, it is expected to retrieve all unique entries in only n
requests instead of 2n, as it is not necessary to check for additional
keys between twoneighboring keys. In contrast,Random andBinary-
Halving are expected to requiremore crawling requests in this setting.
Especially, BinaryHalving is expected to perform worst, as it spoofs
many keys that yieldnonewknowledge in theConsecutive Entries set-
ting. However, in the RandomDistribution setting, both are expected
tobecloser, but still inferior to thecrawlingperformanceof ZEUSMILKER,
as a result of the uniform key distribution.
TheexistingNL restrictionmechanismofGameOverZeus is exploitable
as the requesting bot can manipulate the choice of returned entries
based on the supplied key. Newer countermeasures presented in Sec-
tion 5.2.1 attempt to either deny the possibility of manipulating the
entries at all or allow restricteddegreeofmanipulationon the returned
entries. As such, the following researchquestionneeds tobeanswered
in the evaluation:
• Howdoes the crawlingalgorithmsperform in thepresenceof coun-
termeasures likeRandomNodeReturn, Bit-XOR+, andBit-AND?
For Random Node Return, both Random and BinaryHalving algo-
rithms are expected to be comparable in performance since the re-
turnedentries arenot influencedby their key spoofingalgorithm.How-
ever, ZeusMilker is expected to perform poorly if the choice of keys
returned by the bot mislead the algorithm into believing that there
are no more keys left undiscovered.
For Bit-XOR+, Random is expected to perform best compared to
the other two algorithms as it produces higher entropy of keys used
in selecting neighbors to be returned. Finally, for Bit-AND, all algo-
rithms are expected to perform poorly since the bits of the returned
entries are highly biased to 0with a probability of 3/4.
5.3.1.5 Results
In the following, the evaluation findings are summarized on the im-
pact of parameters l, n, the assumed key distribution, and effective-
ness against advanced countermeasures on the three different crawl-
ing algorithms.
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(a) Milking Analysis (n = 50, l = 10)
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(b) Milking Analysis (n = 50, l = 1)
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(c) Milking Analysis (n = 50)
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(d) Milking Analysis (l = 10)
Figure 5: Performance analysis of ZEUSMILKER, Random, and BinaryHalv-
ing onGameOver Zeus for various NL sizesn and returned NL sizes
l
IMPACT OF THE SIZE OF THE RETURNED NEIGHBORLISTS l First,
the impact of the size of the returned NL l is discussed. Figure 5a
summarizes the discovery ratio for a default parameter setting of a
GameOver Zeus botnet with n = 50 and l = 10 in dependence on
the number of requests for all three crawling strategies. As can be ob-
served, ZEUSMILKER can successfully retrieve all entries in a bot’s NL
within 100 requests as guaranteed by Proposition 5.1.5. At the same
time,Random discovers only 92% and BinaryHalving even only 53%
of all entries in a bot’s NL. Thus, the results confirm the expectation
that BinaryHalving is not suitable for such biased NLs. BinaryHalv-
ing performs poorly because of retrieving many duplicate entries as
a result of spoofing keys within a range of the key space that provides
no additional new information. For all algorithms, the number of ini-
tially retrieved entries increases fast with only a few queries. Later on,
when only a few keys are left undiscovered, the slope of the perfor-
mance curve decreases. Note that during the first few queries, the
Random crawling algorithm evenmanages to discovermore number
of unique keys than ZEUSMILKER. A potential reason for the initially
weaker performance of ZEUSMILKER is the choice of the two spoofed
keys s1 , s2 (see Eq. 1), which are potentially very close and hence can
result in returned sets with a high overlap. However, ZEUSMILKER is
clearly superior to Random and BinaryHalving in discovering larger
portions or even the complete NL.
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Figure 5b shows the discovery ratio in dependence on the num-
ber of crawling requests for n = 50 and l = 1. ZEUSMILKER still re-
trieves all entries within the predicted 100 requests, though at a lower
speed than for l= 10. As only one entry per request can be obtained,
the number of retrieved keys initially increases linearly and then con-
verges slowly to a discovery ratio of 1. The decrease in performance
is more apparent for Random and BinaryHalving : The discovery ra-
tio for both approaches decreases drastically compared to l = 10, to
19% for BinaryHalving and 37% for Random at 100 requests. A more
detailed analysis of the impact of l is given in Figure 5c showing the
discovery ratio in dependence on l for n = 50. ZEUSMILKER success-
fully obtains all neighbor entries within 2n = 100 queries indepen-
dent of l, whereas the discovery ratios after 2n queries of the other
two strategies are significantly affected by l. Since both algorithms
are unable to strategically spoof keys, the fraction of retrieved keys
drastically decreases when the number of returned keys l is reduced.
Hence, the results of this analysis match the initial expectation that
smaller values of l restrict the amount of new knowledge the crawl-
ing algorithms could obtain. However, since ZEUSMILKER can strate-
gically spoof keys to discover all entries in a NL, its ability to retrieve
the complete list remains unaffected by different values of l.
IMPACT OF THE SIZE OF THE NEIGHBORLISTS n Next, the im-
pact of the size of the NL n on the crawling performance is analyzed.
Figure 5d shows the discovery ratio of the different algorithms in de-
pendence on n for l = 10. Independent of n, ZEUSMILKER success-
fully discovers all nodes in anNL. In contrast, theperformanceofRan-
dom slowly decreases with increasing n, because it is harder to dis-
cover large sets simply by random trials than on smaller sets. The
slight decrease in performance of BinaryHalving is not significant.
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(a) GameOver Zeus Milking Analy-
sis for RandomDistribution
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(b) GameOver Zeus Milking Analy-
sis for Consecutive Entries
Figure 6: Performance analysis of ZEUSMILKER, Random, and BinaryHalv-
ing for different key distributions in NLs (n = 50, l = 1)
INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT KEY DISTRIBUTIONS Apart from n
and l, different key distributions in NLsmay also influence the perfor-
mance of crawling algorithms. Figure 6a shows the discovery ratio in
dependence on the number of requests for all three crawling strate-
gies in the Random Distribution setting. As expected, ZEUSMILKER
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Figure 7: Performance analysis of ZEUSMILKER, Random, and BinaryHalv-
ing on the presence of different advanced countermeasures
(n = 50)
can obtain all entries with at most 2n = 100 requests whereas Ran-
dom andBinaryHalving only discover about 80% and 90%of allNL en-
tries, respectively. Both strategies perform considerably better than
the results for the real-world data set, increasing their discovery ratio
by more than a factor of 2 and 4, respectively. This improved perfor-
mance is contributed by the well-distributed keys, resulting in fewer
duplicates during successive crawling attempts. As expected, Binary-
Halving also performs much better than Random when the uniform
key distribution assumed by BinaryHalving is indeed given.
The inability of BinaryHalving to deal with non-uniform key distri-
butionsbecomesevidentwhenconsideringConsecutiveEntries.Most
of the time, BinaryHalving discovers only two keys, i.e., discovery ra-
tio is about 4%. A potential reason is the repeated spoofing of keys at
distances away from all keys in the NL. As a result, the same two keys
are returned repetitively. ZEUSMILKER, in contrast, can successfully
discover all entrieswith onlyn requests insteadof 2nbecause the sets
I(Kj,Kj+1) are empty so that no additional n keys need to be spoofed
to verify that I(Kj,Kj+1)∩NL= ∅. In contrast, the performance of the
Random crawling is similar to its performancewhen considering ran-
domly distributed keys.
ENHANCED RESTRICTION MECHANISMS The evaluation results
of theproposedanti-crawling countermeasures in Section5.2.1 as de-
picted in Figure 7 is presented in the following. The Random Node
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Return analysis in Figure 7a indicates the inefficiency of this counter-
measure in restricting the information gained by a crawler. BothRan-
dom andBinaryHalving were able to retrievemore than 80%of abot’s
NL in all parameter settings after 100 requests. However, ZEUSMILKER
performed poorly as expected due to the inherent incorrect assump-
tions made on the returned keys that led the algorithm to falsely as-
sume there are no more keys left undiscovered.
The results for theBit-XOR+ countermeasure indicate thatRandom
performs best with an average of about 80% of nodes discovered for
l> 4, as displayed in Figure 7b.Hence, the performance ofRandom is
largely not influencedbybits flipping, as canbe seen fromcomparing
Figure 7b and Figure 5c, showing the performance of the crawling for
the unaltered GameOver Zeus. Although BinaryHalving initially per-
forms better than ZEUSMILKER for l 6 7, its performance degrades
for l 7, as a result of spoofing keys that yield more duplicate entries.
However, ZEUSMILKER’s strategy of deriving keys based on previous
knowledge provides more randomness, i.e., a variety of key prefixes,
in the spoofed keys, hence obtains a slight improvement than Bina-
ryHalving towards the end.
Bit-AND, asdisplayed inFigure7c, presents abetter restrictionmech-
anism than Random Node Return and Bit-XOR+ as the discovery ra-
tio of all crawling algorithms is kept below 50% for l 6 10. The dis-
covery ratio increases with the size of the returned NLs l in a close
to linearly manner. Although the poor performance of all strategies
in terms of discovery ratio indicates the effectiveness of this counter-
measure, the bias resulting from this strategy may negatively affect
the robustness of the resulting overlay.
5.3.2 Evaluation of The Less Invasive Crawling Algorithm (LICA)
The evaluation of LICA is outlined below and the results have been
published in [Kar+14]. First, the dataset utilized for evaluating LICA
is discussed in Section 5.3.2.1. Then, Section 5.3.2.2 elaborates the
setup for the experiments and Section 5.3.2.3 introduces the evalua-
tion metric. After that, the investigated research questions are listed
along with the expectations of the outcome in Section 5.3.2.4. Finally,
the results of the experiments are presented in Section 5.3.2.5.
5.3.2.1 Dataset
Two different real-world unstructured P2P network datasets in the
formof directed graphs, i.e., GameOver Zeus andGnutella, were used
to evaluate the performance of crawling algorithms.
TheGameOverZeusdatasetused in this evaluationconsists of crawl-
ing informationcollected inapproximatelyfivehours fromtheGameOver
Zeus botnet on 25th April 2013. It has been obtained from previous
work inanalyzingGameOverZeus [Ros+13]. Fromthe initial 1,061,402
edge entries in the database, 667,704 edge entries were removed that
consist of biases that were made known by the authors: sinkholed
nodes (identified by an out-degree 10), sensor nodes (identified by
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an in-degree 500), and duplicated edges. Take note that, since the
crawl data consists of multiple continuous crawls over a longer pe-
riod, some bots may have reported a lot of neighbors than usual, i.e.,
50. This is mainly due to churn dynamics within the botnet (cf. Sec-
tion 3.4.1).
The second dataset is the crawl data of the unstructured P2P file-
sharing networkGnutella, in August 2002 that was obtained from the
SNAP repository3. This dataset was used as it is for the evaluation,
i.e., without any sanitization. A summary of the dataset properties is
provided in Table 7. Please note that properties listed for GameOver
Zeus in the table are the post-sanitize properties of the dataset.
Dataset Name GameOver Zeus Gnutella
Nodes 82,471 62,586
Nodes (out-degree 10) 10,794 16,387
Avg. NL Size 4.6 2.4
Highest NL Size 97 78
Edges 379,088 147,892
Avg. Clustering Coefficient 0.01934 0.00047
Diameter 11 31
Avg. Path Length 5.2 9.2
Table 7: Graph properties of the datasets.
5.3.2.2 Experimental Setup
The analysis was conducted using Python and theNetworkX module
[HSC08], with all crawling algorithms discussed in Section 5.1.2, i.e.,
Less Invasive Crawling Algorithm (LICA), Breadth-First Search (BFS),
and Depth-First Search (DFS), implemented as Python scripts. To ad-
dress the issue of some nodes having NL size of more than 50, all en-
tries of a bot are shuﬄed and split into a sequence of chunks, i.e., 50
entries in each chunk. This value is chosen to resemble closely the
GameOver Zeus’ implementation of the NL size.
For every received NL request from the implemented crawling al-
gorithms, a node will return a single chunk from its sequence and re-
peats the sequence after returning the last chunk (if queried further).
In the experiments, a full crawl ends when there are no more new
peers to crawl. In addition, LICA also ends its crawl when the maxi-
mum allowed iterations have exceeded (cf. Section 5.1.2).
Fifty (50) independent experiments were executed on each of the
experiments and the final results were averaged over them. For each
iteration of the experiment, the simulation uniformly chooses a com-
mon seed peer to begin crawling for all the algorithms. Furthermore,
for theclarityof the resultingplots, all algorithms terminate their crawl-
ing as soon as 95% (indicatedby the horizontal dashed lines) of nodes
3 SNAP: http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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in thedatasets havebeendiscoveredunless statedotherwise. The rea-
son behind this is that all crawling algorithms produce very minimal
additional observations towards the end of the crawl, i.e., 95%. As
such, they shrink the overall resulting plot and, therefore, are omit-
ted due to their minimal significance.
5.3.2.3 Evaluation Metric
To evaluate the performance of a crawling algorithm, a ratio of discov-
ered peers is used as an evaluationmetric. This metric represents the
ratio of unique peers discovered dependent on the number of sent
request messages.
Meanwhile, to evaluate the efficiency of a crawling algorithm, the
local-ratio approximation ofminimumvertex cover presented byBar-
Yehuda et al. [BYE85] is utilized. This approximation provides a value
of the number ofminimumnodes to be crawled to obtain a snapshot
of the botnet graph, i.e., a vertex cover. The approximation ratio of
this algorithm is 2− 1k , where k is the smallest integer. The implemen-
tation of this approximation algorithm that is available in NetworkX
operates on undirected graphs. Hence, it has beenmodified to be ap-
plied todirectedgraphs. In the remainderof this evaluation, thismod-
ified algorithm is referred as Approximative Minimum Vertex Cover
(AMVC).
5.3.2.4 Research Questions and Expectations
LICA is a flexible crawling algorithm that requires a combination of
parameters to perform well. Depending on the choice of the param-
eters, an ongoing LICA-based crawl may terminate quickly or much
later. However, the process of selecting the best combination of pa-
rameters w, r, and t is not very intuitive. For that, the following re-
search question needs to be answered:
• What is thebest combinationofparameters for LICA inGameOver
Zeus and the Gnutella dataset?
DFS andBFS-basedcrawlingalgorithmsattempt todiscover all bots
in a greedy manner. However, not much have been discussed on the
performanceof thesealgorithms ina realworldbotnet scenarios. There-
fore, the following research question needs to be answered:
• How well do the different crawling algorithms perform on real
world datasets?
LICA is expected to perform better compared to the other algorithms
as it prioritizes backbonenodes and terminates as soon as the ratio of
discovery falls below the threshold value. BFS is expected to perform
better than DFS due to candidate prioritizing strategy adopted by this
algorithm, i.e., first comefirst serve, which discoversmore number of
new peers than its counterpart.
In addition, since the best results – relative to the goals of LICA – in
enumerating all bots in a botnet is to obtain aminimum vertex cover,
it is of interest to identify which crawling algorithm perform closest
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Parameter Selection Analysis on P2P Zeus Dataset (r=2)
w = 300, t = 0.1
w = 1000, t = 0.45
w = 2000, t = 0.8
95% Limit
(a) Analysis of LICA’s Parameter Selection
on P2P Zeus Dataset

























(b) P2P Zeus Restricted Crawl Analysis

























(c) Gnutella Restricted Crawl Analysis

























(d) P2P Zeus Unrestricted Crawl Analysis
Figure 8: Performance analysis of LICA, BFS, and DFS. (a) The performance
of LICA under different combination of parameters. The perfor-
mance of all observed crawling algorithms on (b) GameOver Zeus
and on (c) theGnutella dataset, measured in the ratio of nodes dis-
covered in dependence on the total number of requests sent. (d)
contains the results of all crawling algorithms on the GameOver
Zeus dataset without any NL restrictions, plotted by the ratio
of nodes discovered depending on the total number of nodes
crawled.
to the AMVC value. Therefore, the following research question needs
to be answered:
• Which crawling algorithm performs with the best efficiency?
LICA is once again expected to perform the best due to the presence of
a natural backbone that can be leveraged by the crawlers.Meanwhile,
BFS is expected to perform also slightly better thanDFS due to the can-
didate selection strategy that discoversmore number of uniquepeers
in the beginning.
5.3.2.5 Results
RATIONALE Existing crawling algorithms which are implemented
using BFS orDFSmethods to crawl botnets may not be efficient. The
node selection criterion used by both these algorithms is not based
uponanyother informationexcept theorder thenodesare storedand
processed. Therefore, a series of experiments is conducted to under-
stand the impact of the node selection criteria on the crawling perfor-
mance of LICA.
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BEST COMBINATION OF PARAMETERS FOR LICA First, it is inves-
tigated on when to terminate an ongoing crawling process to avoid
toomanyunnecessary crawling steps. For that, LICA contains a simple
mechanism that checks the gain after a windoww of crawling steps,
and that terminates when the gain drops below threshold t during
the crawl. As the algorithm utilizes a learning curve to terminate the
crawl, the algorithm is adjustable bymanipulating its parameters. For
example, to overcome theblacklistingmechanismofGameOver Zeus
4, the R value can be set to 11, i.e., maximumnumber of requests that
are allowed to be sent to a particular node. Alternatively, subsequent
full crawls can be delayed by 60 seconds. The value R is set to 2 in all
experiments because it is known from the GameOver Zeus datasets,
that all algorithms need to request the NLs from any node at most
twice, i.e., two chunks, to obtain the full NL.
Furthermore, by deciding combinations of values for the window
size w and threshold t, the resulting crawl can also be shaped. For
example, a user can specify a high threshold value, e.g., 1.0 in combi-
nation with a high window size, e.g., 3000 when they intend to crawl
mainly the backbone nodes. Similarly, when the intention is to crawl
as many nodes as possible, the threshold value can be set to a rela-
tively low value, e.g., 0.05 in combinationwith a lowwindow size, e.g.,
300. The values of the window size and threshold used in this work
were obtained through a parameter study with various pair of com-
binations. The effects of different combinations of promising values
are analyzed on the GameOver Zeus dataset with the value R = 2 as
presented in Figure 8a.
From the analysis, it is identified that when the threshold value t,
is low, e.g., 0.1, and with the window value w of 300, a full crawl re-
sults in about 94.7%of the entire dataset known justwith about 29,000
sent requests.Meanwhile, theparameter combinationof t= 0.45,w=
1000 obtained a lower coverage of 93.3% although with 17.4% fewer
requests than the previous combination. However, with an increased
threshold value, e.g., 0.8, andwindow valuew= 2000, LICA terminates
with a coverage of 93.9% despite requiring 1,800 requests more than
the previous combination. Therefore, it is decided that the combina-
tion, t= 0.8,w= 2000 ismore reasonable to crawl theGameOver Zeus
dataset efficiently. Unfortunately, the criteria for selecting the best
combination of parameters are not straightforward, i.e., the combi-
nation of parameters can only be selected based on the basis of a trial
and error. Although some general combination of values can be uti-
lized, based on the requirement of the crawl, LICA performs better if
fine-tuned with more appropriate parameters to improve the crawl-
ing efficiency, i.e., based on results from previous crawls.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF CRAWLING ALGORITHMS The re-
sults of the crawl performance analysis are presented in Figure 8b
and 8c. LICA was executed on the GameOver Zeus dataset using the
4 At the time of this work, GameOver Zeus allowed 12 requests to be received within
a sliding window of a minute. This value was later changed in a subsequent botnet
binary update to only 6 requests. (cf. Section 4.1.3)
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previously chosen parameter combination: r = 2, t = 0.8, and w =
2000. The crawl performance in Figure 8b indicates a much better
performance of LICA in comparison to the other methods. Note that
for the plot of LICA, the points in which there were results less than
16 individual experiments were omitted as a confidence interval can-
not be obtained from that. LICA required 25,780 requests to obtain a
93.86% coverage of the peers in the botnet. This is about 27% of the
total requests made by the BFS algorithm to obtain a 95.0% coverage.
DFS performedworst in this analysis by requiring additional 400% re-
quests than needed by LICA.
The convergence point between the BFS and DFS algorithm indi-
cates the point where all known nodes during the initial crawl have
been crawled. The growth that is observed after that point is from
newnodes discovered from re-requestingNLs frompreviously known
nodes, i.e., subsequent chunksof theirNL. This convergencebehavior
is not observed in LICA because it terminates the crawling when the
observed gain drops below the threshold, and the gain immediately
picks up in the subsequent crawl iteration.
It is worth mentioning that by reducing the size of the NLs or the
returned subset of the list, the effort to crawl the entire network in-
creases proportionally for all crawling algorithms. This is verified by
running another set of experiment with a returned NL of size 30 and
R = 3. The observed performance between the crawling algorithms
remain relatively similar to the results in Figure 8b.
The experiment is repeated on the Gnutella dataset using the fol-
lowing parameter combination: r= 2, w= 400, and t= 0.3. However,
the performance gain of LICA for Gnutella dataset in Figure 8c is not
as significant as in the GameOver Zeus dataset. Further investigation
revealed that this behavior is due to the diameter of this dataset being
very high, i.e., 31, with an average path length of 9.2. Moreover, nodes
in this dataset have a rather low average size of theNL, e.g., 2.4 entries.
Hence, due to the inherent network structure in this dataset which is
unlike the structure of most P2P botnets, the gain is much lower, as
all crawlers need to go through almost every available node to obtain
a full view. Nevertheless, the performance of LICA is better compared
to the other two algorithms as presented in Figure 8c. For example,
with 31,941 requests, LICA discovered 75.5% of nodes that is about 7%
more than the other algorithms.
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF CRAWLING ALGORITHMS For thispur-
pose, theperformanceof all the three crawlingalgorithmson theGameOver
Zeus dataset are compared with respect to the AMVC value in Figure
8d. For simplicity, the simulation settings were modified to allow all
available neighbors of a node to be returned in a single request and
disabled the crawl termination mechanism in LICA. As such, the pur-
pose of this particular analysis is to find out howmany nodes need to
be crawled to obtain the full view of the network.
Based on this analysis, it is demonstrated by heuristic that LICA out-
performsothermethods inperforming closer to the calculatedAMVC
value, 14,050 nodes. At the point of the AMVC, LICA discovered a total
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of 90.6% nodes in comparison with BFS that only discovered 54.1%
or DFS with 38.2% of nodes. This is interesting because it indicates
that by crawling and prioritizing the ’popular’ peers, the backbone
of the network is being leveraged and crawled. This corresponds to
the finding of Stutzbach et al. [SRS05] that reports the existence of bi-
ased connectivity with peers with higher uptime, i.e., popular nodes
in this work. This allowed LICA to exploit the feature and outperform
existing crawling algorithms.
In thiswork, the influenceof theNL restrictionmechanismofGameOver
Zeus is not studied. The main reason for this is the fact that crawling
algorithms discussed in this chapter do not address on the problem
of retrieving all neighbors of a particular bot. Instead, the algorithms
only focused on prioritizing bots to be crawledwith the aimof discov-
ering as many bots as possible with the least effort. Furthermore, the
ZEUSMILKER algorithm that was proposed in Section 5.1.1 can be im-
plemented in all crawling algorithms discussed in this chapter to cir-
cumvent the restriction mechanism. Therefore, the influence of the
restriction mechanism can be ignored in this work.
5.3.3 Evaluation of The BoobyTrap Mechanism
Theevaluationof theBoobyTrap (BT)mechanismsasproposed inSec-
tion 5.2.2 is outlined next, and the results have also beenpublished in
[Kar+16a]. First, the dataset utilized for evaluating BT is discussed in
Section 5.3.3.1. Then, Section 5.3.3.2 elaborates the setup for the ex-
periments. After that, the investigated research questions are listed
along with the expectations of the outcome in Section 5.3.3.3. Finally,
the results of the experiments are presented in Section 5.3.3.4.
5.3.3.1 Dataset
The datasets that were used for evaluationwere obtained using a real
deployment of BT nodes, i.e., sensors, in Sality Version 3 (cf. Section
4.2) and ZeroAccess Network 2 (port 16470) (cf. Section 4.3). Each BT
node was popularized for two weeks before the measurements were
obtained. After that, themeasurements were collected for a duration
ofoneweek ineachbotnet: Sality (23/09/201500:00:00CET to29/09/2015
23:59:99CET)andZeroAccess (02/10/201515:57:55CET to09/10/2015
15:57:54). Table 8 presents the summary of the datasets.
Table 8: Statistics of the collected data
Sality (Version 3) ZeroAccess (Port 16470)
Total IPs 735,443 25,236
Average IPs/day 162,804 7,128
Min IPs/day 155,957 5,905
Max IPs/day 177,267 7,864
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5.3.3.2 Experimental Setup
Theexperimentswere conductedwithBT-enhanced sensors thatwere
implemented in Python language for both botnets, i.e., Sality and Ze-
roAccess. All detection mechanisms were triggered by the type and
contents of the responses received (ormissing) fromanode.However,
only for the frequency-based detectionmechanisms, i.e., Abuse class,
a configurable sliding window-based detection mechanism was im-
plemented to help identify IPs aggressively contacting the BTs. This
detection mechanism takes two input parameters: length of the slid-
ing window t (in seconds) and the minimum number of messages
nmin to trigger the detectionmechanism. If a particular node from an
IP address sentmore thannmin messageswithin any observed sliding
window, a detection will be triggered.
Toevaluate theperformanceof theproposedmechanisms, theamount
of IP addresses that triggered theBTswere consideredandmanual ver-
ification was conducted on the log data to identify if the behavior of
a node behind an IPmatchedwith that of a possible crawler. Some of
the characteristics that are inspected and considered are listed in the
following:
• Rate of consecutive request messages along with the pattern of
utilized source ports (if any)




Since manual checking cannot always yield a binary answer, i.e., yes
or no, the IPs are classified on a best-effort basis using the follow-
ing classifications: 1)Highly Possible, 2) Possible, 3)Unknown, and 4)
False Positive. A node is classified asHighly Possible when there is sig-
nificant evidence that resembles a crawler’s behavior, e.g., avoiding to
exchange information. A node is classified as Possible when there is
evidence that (almost) equally resembles as both a possible crawler
and a bot. A node is classified as Unknown when the available evi-
dence is not helpful to make any conclusion. Finally, a node is classi-
fied as False Positive when logs only indicate the behaviors of a bot.
In such cases, an explanation of why those bots were initially flagged
is also provided. In some cases, it may also be possible to identify
the organizations behind the detected crawling activities. However,
in this work, identities of the parties responsible for crawling are not
disclosed to prevent targeted attacks from the botmasters.
For the evaluation, an analysis to identify the best threshold values
for theparameters t andnmin in the frequency-baseddetectionmech-
anisms, i.e., SAB-BurstTrap and ZAB-BurstTrap, is first done for both
botnets. These threshold values are important to minimize the false
positives that may occur due to bots behind NAT and proxy-like de-
vices. Then, the performance of the detectionmechanismsdescribed
inSection5.2.2 is evaluatedbasedon the researchquestionspresented
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in Section 5.3.3.3. Finally, the common characteristics exhibited by
the detected crawlers are discussed.
5.3.3.3 Research Questions and Expectations
As mentioned in the previous section, BT detection mechanisms as-
sume an IP address could only be associated to a single crawler or bot.
However, the threshold value to trigger a detection in the observed
slidingwindowcanbeconfigured in thedetectionmechanisms (when
applicable) to take into consideration influences of bots behind NAT
and proxies. Hence, the following research question needs to be an-
swered in the evaluation:
• What are the suitable threshold values to minimize false posi-
tives generated by bots behind NAT and proxies for frequency-
baseddetectionmechanisms, i.e., trapswithin the class of Abuse?
As explained in Section 5.2.2, a BT node can be deployed inmost of
existing (or known) botnets. However, the question remains on how
susceptible are current generation of crawlers against such crawler
detectionmechanisms.Therefore, the following researchquestionneeds
to be answered in the evaluation:
• Howsusceptible are current crawlers against theBTdetectionmech-
anisms?
Considering that not much work has been done in this aspect and
the fact that current and previous botnets have only implemented
simple crawler detection/preventionmechanisms, it is expected that
most of current crawlers are not anticipating such countermeasures.
As such, many of the crawlers are expected to be detected by the BT
detection mechanisms. However, it is also acknowledged that there
may be some crawlers that were left undetected by BT.
Implementation of a crawler can range anywhere from bare mini-
mum to full functionality support of a botnet’s protocol (cf. Section
3.3.2). Moreover, a crawler can also adopt various strategies to im-
prove its efficiency in crawling the botnets, e.g., multi-threading or
distributed crawling. However, very little is known about the char-
acteristics or design choice of the crawlers currently out in the wild.
Therefore, the following research question needs to be answered in
the evaluation:
• What are the common characteristics of existing crawlers in the
wild?
5.3.3.4 Results
This section is outlined as following. Firstly, the results of a parameter
study for obtaining the threshold values for the BTmechanisms is pre-
sented. Then, the evaluation results of the crawler detection mecha-
nisms adapted for Sality and ZeroAccess are presented. Finally, the
common characteristics exhibited by the detected crawlers are pre-
sented.
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PARAMETER STUDY OF SUITABLE THRESHOLD VALUES FOR t AND
nmin First, the best threshold values for the frequency-baseddetec-
tion mechanisms is investigated. For that, a parameter study of the
various combination of parameters of t and nmin is conducted. For
Sality, the sliding window interval was varied, i.e., 60 , 120 , . . . , 2400
seconds, and the experiments were repeated with different number
ofminimummessages required to trigger adetection, i.e., 10 , 20 , . . . , 100
requests. The study indicated that Sality’s BT performs best with the
parameters t = 120 and nmin = 30. The analysis was also repeated
in a similarmanner for ZeroAccess, and the results indicated that the
best parameters are t = 60 and nmin = 40. It is possible that the
higher number of messages required for ZeroAccess in comparison
to Sality to trigger a detection can be due to the shortMM-cycle inter-
val of this botnet, i.e., 256 seconds.
PERFORMANCE OF THE BOOBYTRAP MECHANISMS Next, theper-
formanceof all detectionmechanismsdeployed inbothbotnetswithin
themeasurement period is evaluated. The overall results of the detec-
tionmechanisms are presented in Table 9 according to the respective
classes of misbehaviors (cf. Section 5.2.2).
Defiance Abuse Avoidance
SD1 SD2 ZD SAB ZAB ZAV
Detected IPs 4,212 3 88 11 188 108
After Sanitization 966 - - - - -
Highly Possible 4 3 7 9 116 35
Possible - - 81 1 72 73
Unknown 962 - - - - -
False Positives 3,246 - - 1 - -
Table 9: Performance of our BoobyTrapmechanism
For the class of Defiance, two BTs were set up for Sality (SD1 and
SD2) and one for ZeroAccess (ZD). The SD2-BaitTrap for Sality was
least often triggered by crawlers. However, this particular trap is also
themost obvious indicator for a crawler as bots in Salitywould simply
ignore entries that are already knownand responsive, i.e., a botwould
ignore the entry of the BT’s secondary port as long as the entry with
primary port is still responsive. The SD1-IgnoreTrap was triggered by
4,212 IPs throughout the week, which seems abnormally high com-
pared to other traps. Detailed analysis of the results indicates that
many of the flagged IPs are behind ISPs that use multiple NAT IPs
or load balancing configurations. Since each request in Sality is sent
from a new port (cf. Section 4.2.2), NAT devices assume that a new
flow or connection is being established and may decide to route the
packetusingadifferentproxyorNAT IPasa loadbalancing technique.
As such, the BTnode recordedHellomessages fromadifferent IP than
the one received for theNLReq, thus triggering the trap. These cases
were identified and sanitized by correlating a Sality-specific identi-
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fier. As a result, we 77% of the detected IPs were identified to be false
positives. Out of the remaining 966 IPs, only four IPs exhibited strong
indication as crawlers. The remaining 962 IPs could not be reliably
classified as their identifiers were set to Sality’s default identifier, i.e.,
1 (cf. Section 4.2.2.1). Hence, they were classified asUnknown.
TheZD-NonComplianceTrapwas triggeredby 88 IPs. Sevenof those
IPs,whichwere detected on thefirst day, consistently respondedwith
a retL message containing a fixed flag, i.e., flag = 0. These IPs are
particularly interesting because they responded with exactly 65mes-
sages before they stopped to contact the BT node. It is suspected that
these are crawlers that implement a blacklistingmechanism to avoid
crawling or contacting other sensors. These IPswere also observed to
keep communicating with another instance of sensor node after the
BT sensorwas (presumably)blacklisted.The remaining IPs responded
with a flag value set to either 0 or 1 up to amaximumof five replies. As
possibility for suchbehavior isnotobserved in the reverse-engineered
malware variants (cf. Section 4.3), there is no other explanation other
than them being potential crawlers.
The evaluation on the BTswithin the class of Abuse was conducted
based on the frequency of receivedNL requestmessages for both bot-
nets. Theparameters of the BTswere set according to the results of the
previous parameter study: Sality (t= 120, nmin = 30) and ZeroAccess
(t = 60, nmin = 40). Evaluation results indicated 11 flagged IPs by the
SAB-BurstTrap. Out of the 11, nine IPs were classified asHighly Possi-
ble. A daily analysis of this particular BT as presented in Figure 9 indi-
cated that an average of four crawlers is successfully identified every
day. Meanwhile, the single false positive was identified to be caused
bymany bots behind a single shared IP coincidentally contacting our
BT node around the same time.

















Figure 9: Daily analysis of SAB-BurstTrap
The ZAB-BurstTrap flagged a total of 188 IP addresses throughout
the measurement period. After manual inspection, 116 IPs were clas-
sifiedas strongly exhibiting crawler-likebehaviors. The remaining IPs
that were classified as Possible exhibited similar behaviors to bots
that lack responsive neighbors in their NL during their initial boot-
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strapping phase. This speculation could especially be true consider-
ing that a large portion of the ZeroAccess botnet was sinkholed in
2013 [NG13]. As such, bots that experience lack of neighbors could
also have requestedNLs with a higher frequency.
TheZAV-IgnoreTrap, as anavoidance trap,within the class ofAvoid-
ance attempts to identify crawlers that are refusing to respond to the
crafted requests sent in the ZD-NonComplianceTrap. The evaluation
of this BT indicates 108 IPs in the ZeroAccess dataset that never re-
sponded to any of the request messages. More precisely, 35 IPs were
classified as Highly Possible crawlers because the BT node recorded
abnormally high number of received getL requests, i.e., between 10
and 14,800, but without any replies for any of the crafted requestmes-
sages. Seventy-three (73) IPswere classifiedasPossible crawlers. These
IPs seemed to be shared amongmany bots, i.e., identified by distinct
botnet-specific identifiers, but originate only from selected network
prefixes.Analternativehypothesis for this observationcanbeexplained
if there is anypacket-level filteringmechanismdeployedwithin those
networks that drops all inboundZeroAccess’ requests or replies. Such
a scenario could result in the BT node observing the behavior of bots
refusing to respond.
CHARACTERIZATION OF DETECTED CRAWLERS Finally, the var-
ious detected crawlers were analyzed to identify common character-
istics exhibited by them. These characteristics can be categorized as
the following:
• Blacklisting : Observations on the detected crawlers indicate
that someof themareusingblacklistingmechanisms to improve
the quality of their crawl data, i.e., ignore sensor nodes. Such
crawlers seemed to identify sensor nodes based on the type or
content of the responses received frombots/sensors (explained
next), e.g., empty or consistent duplicated NL replies.
• SanityChecking :Somecrawlers also seemed toperformsanity-
checkingon the results obtained frombots. Thedetectionmech-
anisms within the class of Defiance detected a smaller fraction
of crawlers than those within the class Abuse. For instance, the
SD2 detected only three crawlers whereas SAB detected nine in
total. Hence, it seems that there are crawlers that follow the im-
plementation of the botnet protocols very closely, e.g, in decid-
ing whether some entries need to be discarded (or not).
• Aggressiveand/orPersistentCrawling :Uponanalyzingcrawlers
detected via the frequency-basedmechanism, it is noticed that
only a minority of crawlers were observed to crawl the botnets
continuously, i.e., 24x7. Nevertheless, some of these persistent
crawlers communicated aggressively with the BTs with a high
frequency, i.e., in average 15 requests per minute in the case of
Sality.
• Crawling Redundancies : Some crawlers were observed to uti-
lize identical botnet-specific identifiers andportnumbers across
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different instances at the same time in a given botnet. This ob-
servationmay indicate identical crawlermechanisms deployed
for redundancies or for obtaining additional crawling vantage
points.Multiple vantage points for crawlingmay also help iden-
tify inconsistencies in crawl data that could be introduced by
network failure or other network-specific issues in one or more
crawlers. In such cases, results from a different crawler can be
used instead.
• EfficientCrawlerDesign :Crawlers are alsoobserved touseded-
icatedports toprocess incomingNL replies.Unlike regular bots,
each requestmessage thatwas sentby thecrawlersuses an iden-
tical source port number (cf. Section 4.3.2). This source port
number corresponds to the port expected by the crawler to re-
ceive the responsemessages. Suchacommunicationdesigncan
improve thecrawlingefficiencyas it allows theprocessing thread
to be independent of the thread that sends the requests. As a di-
rect consequence, such crawlers do not require a thread to wait
for a reply for each sent request message. Therefore, this sepa-
ration of duty between the two threads would allow the crawler
to crawl more bots in parallel.
• IdentityHiding :ByperformingWHOIS queries on thedetected
IP addresses, it is observed that only a few of the IP addresses
disclose information about the organization or individual that
is behind the crawling activities. In fact, quite some crawlers
have been seen sharing residential IP addresses with bots, i.e.,
behind ISPNATdevices. Inaddition, IPsof someof these crawlers
were also observed to constantly change due to dynamic IP ad-
dress reallocation by ISPs, i.e., IP address aliasing. Such scenar-
ios makes it more difficult to detect crawlers via any frequency-
based detection mechanisms.
• Neutral : Finally, based on the crawlers identified in this work,
it can be concluded that the detected crawlers are neutral. They
do not seem to aid the botnets in any manner, e.g., dissemina-
tion of botnet commands. Even in cases where neighbors are
being returned, these were either other sensors or invalid en-
tries.
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter presentedworks on advanced botnetmonitoring on the
basis of crawling P2P botnets and outlined threemajor contributions
as part of this dissertation. The first contribution presented a novel
crawling algorithm called ZEUSMILKER (see Section 5.1.1) that deter-
ministically spoofs keys to be used for requesting NL from bots to cir-
cumvent theGameOverZeus’NL restrictionmechanism.ZEUSMILKER
is, to the best of knowledge, the first and the only known solution to
provably retrieveallNLentriesof abot. Evaluation results of ZEUSMILKER
aspresented inSection5.3.1.5 also indicated that stateof theartmeth-
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ods are inferior to ZEUSMILKER. ZEUSMILKER is able to circumvent
theNL restrictionmechanismof GameOver Zeus by exploiting the de-
terministic neighbor selection mechanism (see Section 4.1.2.1) and
the fact that keys included in theNL requests canbe spoofed tomanip-
ulate the returned entries. Concluding, both above-mentioned fac-
tors have contributed jointly to the possibility of this anti-crawling
mechanism to be circumvented by ZEUSMILKER.
To anticipate the retaliationof thebotmasters againstZEUSMILKER,
Section 5.2.1 proposed several enhancements, i.e., RandomNode Re-
turn, Bit-XOR+, and Bit-AND, to the existing GameOver Zeus’ NL re-
striction mechanism. These proposed countermeasures address the
maindrawbackof theoriginalmechanism:not allowing the requester
to manipulate the returned entries completely. The evaluation of the
new proposals indicated that Bit-AND performs best compared to
the other two proposed mechanisms in impeding the performance
of crawlers. However, this countermeasure adversely affects the re-
sulting botnet overlay, so it is not likely to be used in future botnets.
Therefore, the Bit-XOR+ is most likely to be adopted by future bot-
nets. Both above-mentioned mechanisms can affect the ability of a
crawler to retrieve the (complete) NL of a bot, and therefore need ur-
gent attention of the researchers as future botnets can easily adopt
these mechanisms.
The second contribution in this chapter proposes a novel crawling
algorithmcalled LICA (cf. Section 5.1.2) that attempts to enumerate as
many bots as possible but by avoiding to crawl all bots exhaustively.
LICAattempts to approximate aminimumvertex cover that represents
the minimum set of bots that need to be crawled to discover all bots
in the botnet. By prioritizing popular bots that are returned by other
bots, this algorithm crawls the backbone of the botnet and can termi-
nate as soon as the ratio of newly discovered bots falls under a certain
threshold value. Evaluation results indicated that LICA outperforms
other state of the art crawling algorithms, in particular BFS and DFS-
based graph traversal techniques. Depending on the purpose of bot
enumeration, this algorithm can be utilized in crawling P2P botnets
in a more stealthy manner.
As the third contribution of this chapter, a lightweight crawler de-
tectionmechanismcalledBoobyTrap (BT) that exploitsbotnet-specific
protocol and design constraints were proposed. BT aims at detecting
crawlers in anautonomousmannerby analyzing the communication
of other bots with itself. Based on simple test-cases, a behavior of a
crawler can be distinguished from bots. Evaluation results in Section
5.3.3 indicated that many crawlers in Sality and ZeroAccess can al-
ready be detected by BT.
The findings of the differentwork presentedwithin this chapter im-
ply thatmore advancedmonitoringmechanismsareneeded to tackle
future P2P botnets. Such advancedmechanisms should focus on the
following:
• Larger pool of IP addresses : Sincemost of the existing and pro-
posed anti-crawlingmechanisms are based on the notion of an
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IP address representing a crawler, it is important to acquire a
larger pool of IP addresses that can be used for future crawling
activities. Most importantly, these IP addresses should not be
of a single contagious block or range of IP addresses to avoid
bots applying IP prefix-based blacklisting similar to that imple-
mented by GameOver Zeus. Even if some of the IP addresses
were blacklisted, additional IP addresses serve as redundancies
to continue botnet monitoring activities. Such non-contagious
block of IP addresses could also be obtained through the coop-
erationof several security organizationsor institutions thatmay
be interested in jointly monitoring the botnets.
• Distributed crawling :Moreover, future botnet monitoring ac-
tivities should also consider using distributed crawlers in com-
binationwitha largepoolof IPaddresses to circumvent IP-based
anti-crawlingmechanisms, e.g.,BTorNL restrictionmechanisms,
to capture the characteristics of bots accurately. Thisway, future
crawlers are able to circumvent any IP address or frequency-
based anti-crawling mechanisms through distributed crawling.
In the next chapter (Chapter 6), advanced botnetmonitoring using
sensor nodes is discussed. It also includes various novel countermea-
sures that will be proposed to detect deployed sensor nodes in the
botnet.
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Thedeploymentof sensornodes inP2Pbotnets enables anadditional
vantage point in monitoring bots. In particular, sensors are able to
enumerate bots that are otherwise not discoverable by crawlers due
to their inability to contact bots behind network devices like NAT and
stateful firewalls (see Section 3.3.2).
A sensor node is deployed in a botnet by announcing its presence
to other superpeers leveraging the node announcement mechanism
of thebotnet (see Section2.1.3). Sensor announcements areoften car-
ried out by crawlers that (in)directly announce the presence of the
sensorduring crawling. After beingwell-knownamongstmany super-
peers, the information of the sensor node will be frequently handed
out to non-superpeers that may request additional neighbors from
existing superpeers. Thereafter, a sensornode receives increasedcom-
munication requests from non-superpeers that have added the sen-
sor node as a candidate within their NL. As a consequence, an effec-
tive sensor is usually very popular amongst all bots in a botnet, i.e.,
known by many bots. Please note that although the BT mechanism
proposed in Section 5.2.2 can be generalized as a sensor, the mech-
anism is aimed at detecting crawlers in the botnet. Since a crawler
aims to discover as many bots as possible, a BT node does not need
to be very popular among other bots. In contrast, sensors aim to be
as popular as possible to increase their visibility to as many nodes as
possible.
By combining the monitoring data of both crawlers and sensors, a
more accurate enumeration of a botnet’s population can be obtained
for further analysis, i.e., informing affected stakeholders. In addition,
a sensor node is also often used as a sinkhole server in botnet take-
downattempts. Such sinkhole serverswouldusually aim to remain re-
sponsive to probingmessages of bots as outlined in Section 3.2. How-
ever, they would not disseminate any new botnet updates or com-
mands in order to prevent the bots from being able to be contacted
or instructed by the botmaster. Therefore, sensors do not only pose
as a threat to botnets due to its monitoring capabilities but also as a
tool or stepping stone to launch botnet takedown attacks. Neverthe-
less, not much work has been done in the area of preventing and/or
detecting sensors being deployed in P2P botnets.
Unlike the content organization of Chapter 5, due to the lack of
prior work, this chapter first starts from a perspective of a botmaster
in Section 6.1 to introduce three mechanisms to detect sensor nodes
deployed in botnets. Then, from the perspective of a defender, Sec-
tion6.2proposes countermeasures to circumvent thedetectionmech-
anisms. Finally, Section6.4 concludes this chapter. Takenote that some
passages in this chapter are quoted verbatim from the following pub-
lications [Böc+15; Kar+16b].
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6.1 DETECTING SENSOR NODES IN BOTNETS
As indicated by the lack of prior work, there are many challenges in
successfully detecting sensor nodes deployed in P2P botnets. In con-
trast, this section will show that it is indeed possible to detect sensor
nodes by relying upon graph-theoretic metrics of the botnet overlay.
The remainder part of this section is outlined as follows:
Section 6.1.1 presents a short introduction on the basics of a sen-
sor node and a discussion on the associated challenges in detecting
the sensor nodes. In addition, a set of assumptions for a sensor de-
tection mechanism is also derived and presented. Based on the out-
lined assumptions and the possible design choices of sensor nodes in
Section 6.1.1, Section 6.1.2 presents the first sensor detectionmecha-
nism called LCC. This mechanism attempts to identify sensors based
on themutual inter-connectivity of neighbors that arebeing returned
by a particular node.
Section 6.1.3 introduces the second detection mechanism called
SensorRanker. Thismechanism attempts to distinguish sensor nodes
from popular backbone bots using a variation of the PageRank al-
gorithm. Finally, Section 6.1.4 introduces the third detection mech-
anism called SensorBuster that discerns sensor nodes from regular
bots based on the availability of connected paths from a node into
the tightly connected backbone of the botnet overlay and back to the
node itself.
6.1.1 Introduction
This subsection provides some basic introduction on sensor nodes
as well as the related issues in detecting them from the perspective
of a botmaster. Particularly, Section 6.1.1.1 introduces and discusses
the most important feature of a sensor node: handling of botnet re-
quest messages. The handling of the botnet messages is important
to enable the sensor node to communicate with other bots and enu-
merate them at the same time. Section 6.1.1.2 briefly describes the
process of deploying the sensor node in a P2P botnet. Section 6.1.1.3
presents a set of assumptions for a sensornodedetectionmechanism
that were derived from the discussions of Section 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2
and own observations on sensor nodes deployed in existing botnets.
These assumptions are important and are the basis for the remaining
work presented in this chapter. Finally, Section 6.1.1.4 discusses the
challenges often faced in detecting sensor nodes.
6.1.1.1 Message Handling by a Sensor Node
The main functionality of a sensor node is the handling of botnet-
specific communicationmessages, i.e., responding requestmessages
with valid replies.Withouthandling themessages, a sensorwill not be
able to enumerate bots. However, a sensor node is only required to
handle some of the important and relevantmessages for the purpose
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of botnet monitoring. Some of the most common types of messages
and how they are often handled are detailed in the following:
1. (Responsiveness) Probe Messages : This type of message, i.e.,
probeMsg, is usually sent by bots to assert the responsiveness
of a particular bot (see Section 3.2). In the case of a sensor node,
bots send thismessage to check if the sensornode is still respon-
sive. If the sensor node fails to respond to these messages, the
botswill eventually flush the entry of the sensor node from their
NL. Therefore, a sensor node needs to always be able to handle
and respond to this type of message to ensure it remains in the
NL of the bots. Furthermore, by remaining in the NL of many
bots, the information about the sensor can be quickly propa-
gated by existing bots to newer bots thatmay require additional
neighbors.
2. NL Request Messages : This type of message, i.e., requestL, is
usually sent by crawlers and bots that require additional neigh-
bors (see Section 3.2). Although this message handling is often
not important for a sensor node, it does help the sensor toblend
in among other bots, i.e., remain under radar. For instance, a
sensor node that deliberately ignores handling or replying all
such messages may easily raise suspicions to an attentive bot-
master. Based on researcher’s observations, three approaches
were seen being adopted by sensor nodes in existing botnets.
There are some sensors that either do not respond at all to such
request messages, i.e., ignoring the messages, or respond with
just an empty but valid reply. The second approach of returning
empty replies can bemore suspicious although such replies are
also valid in some botnet protocols, e.g., GameOver Zeus and
Sality.
Some sensors are also observed to return information of other
sensor nodes in the replies. This approach is not only a more
stealthier technique, i.e., exhibiting similar behavior with reg-
ular bots, it also ensures that the sensor do not participate or
help the maintenance of the botnet overlay by returning valid
bots (Functional Requirement 4). Besides that, this approach
can also be leveraged to help popularize another sensor node
by frequently handing out information of other sensor nodes.
Another variation of this approach that was observed is to re-
turn invalid or non-existing entries as neighbors in the replies.
However, such an approachwill introduce a significant amount
of noise thatwouldnot only taintmonitoring data of others, but
could also cause harm to the normal maintenance activities of
the botnet overlay (Functional Requirement 4).
3. Botmaster Command Request Messages : This type of mes-
sage is sent by bots to query if there are any newer updates from
the botmaster that can be downloaded by the bots, e.g., Hello
message for Sality or VersionRequest for GameOver Zeus. How-
ever, all of the three analyzedbotnets integrate the functionality
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of thismessage alongwith the probeMsg described earlier. Bots
use sequence numbers to indicate the most current botmaster
command known to them. Whenever a bot shares the informa-
tion in its replies that it knows of a command with a higher se-
quence number, other bots will try to pull the latest update, i.e.,
command dissemination via bot-to-bot. As such, the probe for
the responsiveness of a bot also checks at the same time if its
neighbor has any new updates from the botmaster.
Most sensors observed in thewild for the three botnets (see Sec-
tion 4) try to avoid returning any new or valid update by report-
ing that they have an older update or lower sequence number
when being requested. This way, the sensors do not help out
in disseminating the command of the botmaster to other bots.
Similarly, although there were some sensor nodes that reported
having the newest update, they were observed to deliberately
not sharing the newer update when being requested.
6.1.1.2 Popularizing the Sensor Node
After the development of a sensor node, the next step is to deploy it
within the botnet (see Section 3.3.3). This is often done by leveraging
the node announcement mechanism of the botnet to popularize the
sensor node. Although it is usually sufficient for a sensor node to be
popularized only once in the botnet, some botnets may require con-
stant or more frequent popularization efforts to stay popular in the
botnet. One example of such a botnet is ZeroAccess (see Section 4.4)
due to the very short MM-interval that quickly flushes out entries in
the NL.
Popularization of a sensor node is usually performed in tandem
by a crawler. Therefore, aggressive popularization strategies such as
Popularity Boosting by Yan et al. [Yan+14b] can be easily detected by
crawler detection mechanisms such as the BT mechanism (see Sec-
tion 5.2.2). However, a slow and non-aggressive sensor node popular-
ization technique is sufficient to deploy the sensor node in most bot-
nets. The only drawback with a slow popularization technique is the
fact it takes longer before most bots get to know of the sensor node.
6.1.1.3 Assumptions for a Sensor Node Detection Mechanism
In the following, a set of assumptions for a sensor node detection
mechanism is presented based on the discussions in Section 6.1.1.1
and 6.1.1.2. Please note that these assumptions were derived from
own observations of the sensor nodes deployed in the wild as well
as from the necessity to adhere to legal requirements.
1. A sensor node is already deployed in the botnet. As explained
in Section 6.1.1.2, aggressive popularization strategies of a sen-
sornodecanbeeasilydetectedbyBT-likedetectionmechanisms.
However, the sensor node can still be popularized using amuch
slower and less aggressive strategy to evade detection of such
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mechanisms. Therefore, this assumption forces a sensor detec-
tion mechanism to focus on advanced sensors that are already
deployed in botnets; those that have evaded BT-like detection
mechanisms.
2. Thesensornodedoesnot returnanyvalidbotsasneighbors.A
sensor node should adhere to legal requirements ofmany coun-
trieswhereuponanybotnetmonitoringnode shouldnot actively
or knowingly aid the bots in the regularmaintenance of the bot-
net overlay or malicious activities of the botnet. Therefore, a
sensor node should not return any valid bots when being re-
quested for additional neighbors. For that, the node can either
ignore replying the NL request message, or return non-bot en-
tries, i.e., information of another sensor node or non-existing
entries.
3. The sensor node does not disseminate or exchange any valid
update or command from the botmasterwith other bots. Sim-
ilar to reasoning of the previous assumption, this too is relevant
in the context of adhering to legal requirements by not actively
participating in a botnet related maintenance or its malicious
activities. For that, a sensor node should avoid returning any
botmaster command or update that may benefit the botnet in
one way or another. This can be easily achieved by bluffing on
the latest command that is known to the sensor node or by ig-
noring the request for such updates.
4. The total number of sensor nodes under the control of any at-
tacker is lesser than the total number of bots. For simplicity,
an attacker, e.g., a researcher, is assumed to be able to deploy
only lesser number of (colluding) sensor nodes than the total
number of bots in the botnet, i.e., 50%. This assumption holds
because it usually does not requiremany sensor nodes to be de-
ployed to monitor a botnet. Furthermore, any party that might
have the control of more sensors than the total number of bots
would have already taintedmost of the botnetmonitoring data,
e.g., churnmeasurementsor crawling results, renderinganycol-
lected monitoring data almost useless.
6.1.1.4 Challenges in Detecting Sensor Nodes
Themain challenge in detecting a sensor node is the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing it from regular bots in the botnet [ARB15]. For instance,
sensor nodes are usually very popular among bots in the botnet over-
lay, i.e., high indegree. However, this observation is also true with su-
perpeers that have been responsive for a long period of time and be-
came a part of the backbone of the botnet.
In addition, a sensor node generates only minimal network traffic
as it only responds to incoming requests in comparison to crawlers
that actively generate requests athigh frequencies [ARB15].Moreover,
the passive nature of sensor nodes also makes them even more diffi-
cult to be distinguished from regular bots.
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In contrast, thework presented in Section 6.1.2–6.1.4will show that
graph-theoreticmetrics canbeused todistinguish sensornodes from
regular bots.
6.1.2 Local Clustering Coefficient (LCC)
Thisfirst sensordetectionmechanismattempts todetect sensornodes
based on the inter-connectivity relationship amongst neighbors be-
ing returnedby a particular node. This detectionmechanismexploits
the observation that in unstructured P2P botnets, nodes with high
uptime tend to establish neighborhood relationships among them-
selves and thus form a backbone. As these backbone nodes are also
popularly contained in the NLs of most bots in the botnet, there is a
high probability that an ordinary bot has multiple backbone bots in
its NL.
The degree of inter-connectivity of the neighbors of a bot can be
represented by the clustering coefficient (cc)metric. The clustering co-
efficient is often used to express the density of networks. In this work,
the Local Clustering Coefficient (LCC) introduced by Watts and Stro-
gatz [WS98] is used to express the connectivity of a node’s neighbors
by computing their degree of inter-connectivity. Extreme values of 0.0
and 1.0 indicate that the neighbors are eithernot connected amongst
each other at all or that they completelymesh.
Todetect sensors, snapshotsof thebotnetoverlay, i.e., network topol-
ogy, is required to be captured using a crawler (cf. Section 3.3.2). The
directed variant of the LCC is calculated using these snapshots for
each bot x, lcc+(x), to analyze the inter-connectivity of its neighbors
by using Eq. (3). E is the set of all edges in the network and NLx rep-
resents the NL of a bot x. Themechanism sets lcc+(x)=0.0 if |NLx|= 0
or 1 (the numerator will fast-evaluate to 0)
lcc+(x) =
|{(u,v)∈ E : u,v∈NLx,u 6=v}|
|NLx|× (|NLx|− 1) (3)
Figure 10 presents the analysis results of LCC on Sality V3 for a given
snapshot on the LCC values of nodes in dependence to their popular-
ity, i.e., indegree. From the results, it can be seen that bots exhibit a
similar degree of inter-connectivity in their neighborhood due to the
presence of common backbone nodes in their NLs, i.e., a majority of
the bots having 0.6= lcc+(x) 0.8. However, according to the assump-
tions laid out above, sensor nodes do not share or give away informa-
tion of legitimate botswhen they receive aNL request. Thus, their lcc+
will differ from that of bots.
Asdepicted inFigure11, a sensorhas threepossiblebehaviorsupon
receivingaNL-request as explained inSection6.1 if it is to followstrictly
the ethical standards of not contributing to the botnet overlay main-
tenance :
1. Return no neighbors or ignore the request. This behavior will
lead to lcc+(x)=0.0, e.g., Sensor A in Figure 11.
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Figure 10: LCC values of bots in Sality V3.
Figure 11: Extreme values of LCC can be used to identify sensors deployed
within a botnet overlay, i.e., lcc+(x) = 0.0 or 1.0.
2. Returnonly invalid neighbors. As invalidneighbors arenot inter-
connected or even contactable in the first place, again lcc+(x)=
0.0 holds, e.g., Sensor A in Figure 11.
3. Return only responsive sensors. If each of the returned sensors
return each other as their neighbors, lcc+(x)=1.0will hold since
the sensors are in a full mesh, e.g., Sensor B, C, or D in Figure
11. However, if the connectivity between the returned sensors
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is as in a directed cycle or not connected at all, it will lead to
lcc+(x)=0.0.
As stated earlier and depicted in Figure 10, due to the tendency of
having mutual backbone nodes in the NL, regular bots will not have
these extreme lcc+ values, i.e., 0.0 or 1.0. Therefore, nodes exhibiting
extreme values should be flagged as potential sensors by LCC.
6.1.3 SensorRanker
The second sensor detection mechanism is called SensorRanker. It
primarily uses the PageRank algorithm [Pag+99] to distinguish sen-
sors from bots. The PageRank algorithm was initially designed to de-
termine the importance, i.e., popularity, ofwebsitesbasedon thenum-
ber of pages referring to them via hyperlinks. Towards this a relation
of websites and hyperlinks is modeled as directed graphs with the
websites as nodes or vertices and the hyperlinks as edges. The simi-
larity to the formal model of botnet presented in Section 3.2 is ob-
vious. This model is extended in the following to describe PageRank
and SensorRanker in more detail.
EXTENDED BOTNET FORMAL MODEL Theneighborhood relation-
ship, i.e., NL, of a peer v ∈ V can be defined as the successors of v,
succv = NLv = {u|∀u ∈ V : (v,u) ∈ E,v 6= u} that contains the set of all
peers towhich vhas anoutgoing connection. TheNL canalsobemore
specifically expressed as NLtv to reflect the exact view, i.e., neighbor
entries, of the NL of peer v at time t. Consequently, the set of bots that
have bot v as their neighbors or incoming connections to v can be ex-
pressed by the set of predecessors predv = {u|∀u∈ V : (u,v)∈ E,v 6= u}.
The PageRank algorithm assigns values between 0.0 and 1.0, where
a higher value denotes higher rank or popularity of a node v, e.g.,
PRv = 1.0. The values are calculated based on a node’s predecessors
predv and their respective ranks. In each iteration of the algorithm,
the rank of a node is distributed equally among all its outgoing edges,
i.e., succv. The rank-value distributed over all edges of a node v is ex-
pressed as edgeweightv = PRv|succv| . The PageRank value of a node, in turn,
is the sum of the edge-weights of all of its predecessors.
The concept of ranks in PageRank is also directly comparable to the
popularity of bots in a P2P botnet, i.e., the rank of a bot increases pro-
portionallywith thenumber of bots having it in theirNL. Bots become
more widely known and popular in the botnet when they have been
available and responsive for a prolonged period. However, sensors
are also observed to be equally popular when they are widely known
amongstmany bots. As such, popularity alone is not sufficient nor ef-
fective to distinguish sensor nodes from popular bots [ARB15]. How-
ever, when taking PageRank into consideration, the edge-weights on
outgoing edges for sensor nodes differ greatly than popular bots be-
cause they have, either none or very few outgoing edges compared
to the popular bots, i.e., sensor nodes have significantly higher edge-
weights due to very few (if any) out going connections. This discrep-
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ancy canbe exploited todistinguish sensors frombots using the edge-
weight as a reliable metric.
Nevertheless, due to the churn dynamics in P2P botnets, using the
original PageRank algorithm as it ismay indicate unpopular bots, i.e.,
bots known only by a small fraction of superpeers, that have some
predecessors that are coincidentally with very high PageRank values,
to appear as having a very high edge-weight. The edge-weight of a
node v is normalized to address this drawback bymultiplying it by its
popularity ratio, i.e., ratio of predecessors over the size of the botnet
population. This adapted PageRank algorithm is the proposed Sen-
sorRank value and is defined as:




Although the SensorRank values for sensors would be significantly
higher than those of bots, a means to automate the detection of sen-
sors is still needed from the perspective of a botmaster. For this, clus-
tering algorithms from the domain of machine learning are utilized
to assist in further distinguishing sensor nodes frombots. The details
of the clustering algorithms are elaborated later in Section 6.3.2.
6.1.4 SensorBuster
The third proposed mechanism is called SensorBuster. It utilizes the
SCC connectivity metric introduced by Robert Tarjan [Tar72] to iden-
tify sensor nodes. An SCC of a directed graph G is defined as a maxi-
mum set of vertices C⊆ V with a directed path between each pair of
nodes (u,v)∈C, i.e., u→ v and v→ u.
Considering that P2P botnets rely heavily on the inter-connectivity
between bots to prevent segmentation or partitioning of the overlay,
bots B⊆ V often form a single SCC where there is a path to and from
one bot to another. From here onward, such an SCC is referred to as
themain SCC. Please note that from the fourth assumption presented
in Section 6.1.1.3, the largest SCC can be safely assumed as the main
SCC, i.e., the SCC formed by bots are larger than those formed by sen-
sor nodes. Without the main SCC, any new command disseminated
in a botnet would require amuch longer period to reach all bots. Due
to the assumptions about sensor nodes presented in Section 6.1.1.3,
a sensor would not be part of this main SCC, since a sensor node will
not have any bot as its successor, i.e., no paths from the sensor node
into the main SCC.
Therefore, sensors will either form their SCC consisting of either
only a single sensor or multiple colluding sensors. As such, all nodes
that are not included in the main SCC are most likely sensors that are
deployed in the botnet.
6.2 CIRCUMVENTING SENSOR DETECTION MECHANISMS
The previous section proposed three detection mechanisms to de-
tect sensor nodes deployed in botnets. In this section, from the per-
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Figure 12: Sensornodes that donot return validbots asneighborswouldnot
be part of themain SCC.
spective of a defender, e.g., security researcher, methods to circum-
vent the sensor detection mechanisms proposed in Section 6.1 are
proposed. All proposed methods in this section require a set of col-
luding sensors to circumvent the detectionmechanisms. Specifically,
sensors utilize a distributed sensor deployment strategy called Dis-
tributed Sensor Injection (DSI). In this strategy, sensors controlled by
a user, e.g., a researcher, are used tomanipulate the observed connec-
tivity metrics of the sensors by intelligently distributing loads among
multiple colluding sensors.
The DSI strategy assumes the following:
1. At least four colluding sensors are available for the usage of the
user, i.e., |S|> 4.
2. Colluding sensors communicatewith theuserusingout-of-band
communication channels.
3. The user can instruct the sensors to ignore communications
from selected bots or attempt to inject or announce themselves
into the NL of other bots.
The remainder of this section is outlined as follows: Section 6.2.1 in-
troducesamethod tomanipulate LCC.Meanwhile, Section6.2.2presents
a method to circumvent SensorRank. Finally, Section 6.2.3 discusses
methods to evade SensorBuster.
6.2.1 Circumventing LCC
LCC calculates the clustering coefficient of each bot v and identifies
sensor nodes that have extreme values of lcc+(v) = 0.0 or lcc+(v) =
1.0. Such values indicate that neighbors of a bot v are not connected
at all or connected in a full mesh respectively. As the majority of bots
havecommonneighbors in the formof reliablebackbonenodes [Böc+15],
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it is unlikely that abot couldhaveneighbors that arenot inter-connected
at all, i.e., lcc+(v) = 0.0. Therefore, it could only be of sensors that
refuse to share anyneighborsor those that sharednon-existentneigh-
bors.
Moreover, due to largeNL sizes in botnets such as Sality andZeroAc-
cess, i.e., |NL|> 256, it is alsounlikely that all neighbors seen inNLhave
exactly each other in their NL. Nodes having each other in their NL is
more likely the case of a group of sensors attempting to popularize




Figure 13: A simple example of colluding sensors evading the LCC mecha-
nism
However, since this detectionmechanismonly detects extreme val-
ues, LCC can be easily circumvented by having sensors not exhibiting
these extreme values. Inmore detail, by using aminimumof four sen-
sors that are connected among themselves as depicted in Figure 13,
each sensor can yield a clustering coefficient of lcc+(Si) = 0.5. The
main idea is to avoid having a fullmesh connectivity between the sen-
sors but at the same time having some common connectivity with
other sensors, i.e., lcc+(v) 6= 0.0 and lcc+(v) 6= 1.0. Therefore, for a
group of N sensors where N 3, a user needs to connect each sensor
Si, i ∈ [0,N] to all other sensors except Si−1 modN and to the sensor
itself, i.e., to avoid self-loop.
6.2.2 Evading SensorRanker
While itwas sufficient just to introducea few interconnectionsamong
colluding sensors to circumvent the LCCmechanism, theSensorRanker
mechanism requires a more sophisticated mechanism to evade de-
tection. SensorRank focuses on the popularity of nodes; that is de-
fined by their indegree. As such, themore popular a bot is, the higher
theSensorRankvalue is. Therefore, to circumvent thisdetectionmech-
anism, it is important that sensors avoid being abnormally popular.
Moreover, having sufficient outgoing edges, i.e., neighbors, helps to
reduce the SensorRank value of a particular node.
By connecting colluding sensors in the DSI strategy as mentioned
above, a user can distribute the popularity of his sensors among the
set of sensors in an optimal manner, i.e., distributed evenly with no
redundant information. For instance, to obtain the full enumeration
of the botnet’s population |V |, one could distributeN sensors to have
|V |
N predecessors. Please note that it is also important that the set of
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
98 DEPLOYMENT OF SENSOR NODES IN BOTNETS
predecessors of a sensor Si be distributed evenly among all sensors
based on the edge-weight of the bots that would also influence the
SensorRanker detection mechanism (cf. Section 6.1.3). Such a distri-
butionof sensors couldnotonly reduce thepopularityor theSensorRank
value of each sensor significantly but the increased number of inter-
connections with other sensors also further reduces the SensorRank
value of a sensor.
For the purpose of circumventing the SensorRankmechanism, one
additional assumption is adopted: SensorRanker can be evaded if the
SensorRank value of a sensor Si is lower than or equal to the average
value of all bots, i.e., SR(Si)6Avg(SR(V − S). As such, theminimum
amount of sensors needed to circumvent SensorRank, i.e.,Nmin = |S|,






6Avg(SR(V − S)) (5)
In more details, this equation calculates the SensorRank value of
a sensor Si depending on the number of outgoing edges, i.e., other
sensors, to satisfy the condition of being lesser or equal to the aver-
age value of all bots. However, depending on a botnet’s NL size, this
method could be resource-intensive or costly regarding the numbers
of sensorsneeded toevade thismechanism.Detailedanalysis through
a simulation studyon the feasibility of circumventing theSensorRanker
mechanism is presented in Section 6.3.4.
6.2.3 Evading SensorBuster
The DSI strategies proposed above will remain detected by Sensor-
Buster as the colluding sensors create their own SCC with no connec-
tion back to any botswithin the botnet overlay. Evading SensorBuster
requires, at least, one connection fromanyof the sensors to (andback
from) the main SCC. However, to the best of knowledge, there are no
possible strategies to evade this mechanism, unless an assumption
that is presented in Section 6.1.1.3 is ignored, i.e., handing out bots
as neighbors when being requested.
Therefore, for the sake of completeness, this assumption is ignored
in the context of evading SensorBuster although the decision to re-
turn bots is debatable regarding this action’s legality. By ignoring the
assumption, theproposedDSI strategies not only can circumvent Sen-
sorBuster but also all other detection mechanisms, i.e., LCC and Sen-
sorRanker. For that, thatparticular assumption is relieved so thathand-
ing out legitimate neighbors would be permitted for sensors.
The following method circumvents the detection mechanisms by
not only returning bots but also ensuring that the botnet receives
only minimal benefits from the neighbors returned by the sensors.
Stutzbach and Rejaie reported that nodes in P2P networks which al-
ready exhibit a long uptime would most likely continue to remain
available [SR06]. In contrast, nodes that are newly seen have a higher
probability of leaving the network immediately or soon. Since their
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observation can also be generalized or P2P botnets due to similar
nature of both networks, the observation is leveraged to only return
neighbors that newly joined as such bots have higher tendency to be
less useful, i.e., most likely to go oﬄine soon. One could also argue
that well-known bots should be returned instead of newbies. How-
ever, well-known or reliable bots that usually form the backbone of a
botnet overlay are very important to the maintenance of the botnet
overlay. In contrast, returningnewbies allows the SensorBustermech-
anism to be circumvented with only minimum assistance offered to
the botnet.
For this, each sensorwouldbe required to keep trackof timestamps
of the first and last point of contact of each superpeer, i.e., firstSeen
and lastSeen respectively. Then, sensors may choose to alternate be-
tween returningother sensors andsometimes return legitimateneigh-
bors by picking bots with themost recent firstSeen. By returning bots,
sensor(s) would no longer form an isolated strongly connected com-
ponent but merge with that of the whole botnet itself since there is a
path to and back from the botnet’s main component. Therefore, this
method can effectively circumvent the SensorBuster detectionmech-
anismwhileminimizing the benefits offered to the botnet’s overlay or
activities.
6.3 EVALUATION
This section presents the evaluation results and analysis of themech-
anisms proposed in Section 6.1 and 6.2 as outlined in the following.
Section 6.3.1 describes the datasets utilized for evaluating the sen-
sor detection mechanisms. Then, Section 6.3.2 elaborates the setup
for the experiments. Section 6.3.3 discusses the investigated research
questionsaswell as theexpectedoutcomes. Finally, Section6.3.4presents
the results of the experiments. Please note that some of the results
presented in this section have been published in the following publi-
cation [Böc+15].
6.3.1 Datasets
The datasets were obtained by continuously crawling the Sality (Ver-
sion 3) and ZeroAccess botnets for a duration of one week, respec-
tively. Salitywas crawled from08/10/201500:00:00UTCto14/10/2015
23:59:59UTC.Due to theneighborlist returnmechanism inSality that
returns only one entry when requested (cf. Section 4.2.2), a multi-
session crawling that sends 30 simultaneous requests to each bot for
every crawl sessionwas conducted. Please note that for Sality, aHello
request message is additionally sent to each bot before crawling the
bot for every crawl session. A response to the sentmessage allows the
crawler to assert the responsiveness of a bot before crawling it.Mean-
while, the ZeroAccess botnet was crawled in a similar manner from
07/11/2015 00:00:00 UTC to 13/10/2015 23:59:59 UTC with a single
request message that returns 16 neighbors for every crawl session.
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From the initial 32,693 bots discovered in the Sality botnet, 4,131
bots have been pruned because they have never responded to any
Hellomessages, i.e., suspected artifacts resulting frombots that went
oﬄine. This resulted in only 9,306,998 out of 9,416,427 edges retained
in the resulting dataset. Similarly, out of 95,668 bots discovered in
the ZeroAccess botnet, 93,632 bots have been removed, because they
never responded to requests, i.e., suspected artifacts resulting from
bots that went oﬄine and an ongoing active pollution attack. Con-
sequently, only 343,314 out of 2,413,223 edges were retained in that
dataset. The summarized details of both sanitized datasets are pre-
sented in Table 10.
Table 10: Summary of the sanitized datasets
Sality (Version 3) ZeroAccess
Total Bots 28,562 2,306
Hourly Avg. (Bots) 1,479 105
Max. Neighbors 656 134
Min. Neighbors 0 0
Avg. Neighbors 318 86
Median Neighbors 369 93
6.3.2 Experimental Setup
The performance evaluation experiments utilizedPython scripts that
werebuilt upon theNetworkX [HSC08] and scikit-learn [Ped+11]mod-
ules to implement all three sensor detection mechanisms, i.e., LCC,
SensorRanker, and SensorBuster. The detectionmechanisms require
the crawl data, i.e., snapshots, of the botnet’s overlay topology as an
input to detect sensors on the basis of connectivity characteristics
that are distinguishable from bots. However, several potential issues
will surface in both using the snapshots and to accurately detecting
sensor nodes. The following subsection addresses these concerns:
As it is often difficult to capture the ’complete’ state of a bot’s NL
at a given point in time, Section 6.3.2.1 suggests a method to split
crawl sessions into smaller chunks and use them as a representation
of a bot’s NL instead. Section 6.3.2.2 discusses how auxiliary data ob-
tained during crawling can be used to help to assert a detection of a
sensor node or to identify false positives. Meanwhile, Section 6.3.2.3
presents amechanism to identify and remove artifacts within the ob-
tained snapshots that couldotherwiseadversely affect theperformance
of the detection mechanism.
6.3.2.1 Splitting crawl data into snapshots
Since theNL-reply mechanism that is adopted by both Sality and Ze-
roAccess prevents a crawler from capturing the complete NLtv of a
bot v at time t, an approximation or a near-complete representation
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is required as a replacement. Therefore, the results from themultiple
crawl sessions are aggregated into hourly snapshots to represent as
the near-complete NL of bots at any given hour t∈ [1,24].
Each snapshot in the Sality dataset has an average of 81 crawl ses-
sions, which corresponds up to about 2,430 requests sent to each bot
within an hour. As for ZeroAccess, each snapshot in the dataset has
an average of 299.7 crawl sessions. For simplicity, each of these snap-
shots is considered as a ”complete”botnet topology at the givenpoint
of time, i.e., hours. Please note that any distortion in the captured
snapshots does not adversely affect the ability to detect true sensor
nodes.
In addition, only one snapshot per day is chosen and selected ac-
cording to the onewith the lowest number of bots seen in a day. Since
sensors always attempt to be responsive (cf. Section 6.1), it is inher-
ently assumed that a sensor would be responsive throughout every
hour of a given day. Therefore, it is sufficient to execute the detec-
tionmechanisms on the snapshot with the least nodes. Furthermore,
such a snapshot with a lower number of bots also reduces the proba-
bility of increased false positives (if applicable). From the analysis of
the hourly snapshotswithin the datasets, the 5th snapshot of any day,
i.e., 04:00:00 - 04:59:59, is the lowest for Sality. In comparison, it was
the 7th snapshot of any day for the ZeroAccess botnet. Details of the
seven selected snapshots for each botnet is presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Summary of the selected snapshots
Sality (Version 3) ZeroAccess
Total Bots 3,975 325
Hourly Avg. (Bots) 1,061 91
Max. Neighbors 564 111
Min. Neighbors 0 0
Avg. Neighbors 340 72
Median Neighbors 434 77
These snapshots are then utilized as inputs for each of the detec-
tion mechanisms. For simplicity, these selected snapshots are here-
after referred to as the respective botnet’s dataset itself. After running
the detection mechanisms on the input datasets, each mechanism
will generate a list of IPs that are flagged as potential sensors.
6.3.2.2 Using auxiliary data to help in making decisions
Although the sensor detection mechanisms can flag potential sen-
sors, it would be important for a botmaster to inspect the flagged
nodes further before deciding if they are indeed true positives or false
positives. For that, allmetadataandpayloadcontentsof each received
response should be logged by the crawler.
STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE Asdescribed inSection4.2.2, bots
in Sality that receive a Hello message with an older URLPack would
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respond by attaching the latest URLPack known to them. Hence, by
transmitting an older sequence number of the URLPack within the
sentHellomessagesbefore crawlingabot, the corresponding response
should consist of an attached URLPack from the bots. Similarly, all
getL messages that are sent to a ZeroAccess bot should also be re-
sponded with a retL message that would consist of all plugins that
are available for download from the responding bot. The details of
whichURLPack or plugin is missing within the responses are logged
aspart of the auxiliary data. In addition, the correspondingneighbors
returned by bots in Sality for each receivedNLRep is logged. Similarly,
the neighbors within the received retL messages for bots in ZeroAc-
cess is also logged.
Based on auxiliary data, it is possible to strengthen the confidence
of accurately flagging a sensor node by inspecting if there were any
logged misbehavior, e.g., missing URLPack or plugins. Please note
that although the usage of the auxiliary data itself can be used as a
technique to identify sensors, there are an arbitrary number of rea-
sons that can skew the results of such as detection technique, i.e.,
network-specific anomalies. For instance, Andriesse et al. reported
that they were not able to observe any node that refused to exchange
the URLPack in Sality [ARB15]. In contrast, a more current analysis
conducted within the scope of this work indicated that there were
indeed nodes that are refusing to exchange their URLPack when re-
quested. Hence, the collected data is only used as a reference to fur-
ther strengthen the confidence of any detection flagged by the pro-
posed detection mechanisms.
IDENTIFYING FALSE POSITIVES It is alsopossible to identify false
positives that could have been triggered by detection mechanisms
due to temporal network issues experienced by bots based on histor-
ical data. For instance, all neighbors of a bot could coincidentally be
oﬄine at the same time and forced the bot to exhibit the behavior of
not having any valid neighbors to share. However, by looking at past
or future historical records of the particular bot, it is possible to iden-
tify such a scenario and mark the detection as a false positive corre-
spondingly.
CLASSIFYING FLAGGED NODES By relying on the collected auxil-
iary data, nodes flagged by the detection mechanisms can be classi-
fied into the following categories:
1. Sensor : Nodes exhibiting characteristics that correspond to the
assumptions in Section 6.1
2. FalsePositive: Nodes exhibiting characteristics that conform to
the botnet protocol
3. Unknown: Nodes that are not able to be classified as either Sen-
sor or Bot due to lack of information
Therefore, a node is classified as a sensor node if there are anymisbe-
havior or anomalies observed within the auxiliary data, e.g., refusal
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to exchange neighborlists or botnet-specific commands. Meanwhile,
a node is classified as a false positive if there are no misbehavior or
anomalies observed and all behavior of the node conforms to the bot-
net protocol. Finally, a node is classified as unknown if it is not able
to be classified due to lack of information.
6.3.2.3 Handling of Churn Artifacts
Since thedetectionmechanismsheavilydependonconnectivity-specific
metrics, artifacts introduced during crawling may skew the accuracy
of thedetectionmechanisms. Twodifferent strategies canbe adopted
to remove such artifacts from the datasets. The first strategy is to re-
move bots that have no neighbors at all, i.e., these bots have been
returned as neighbors by other bots, but never responded to any NL-
request messages. However, this strategy is not recommended as it
would also remove sensors that are designed not to respond to such
messages.
The second strategy is to measure and utilize the responsiveness of
a bot to identify and remove artifacts. The responsiveness of a bot v at
time t can be expressed as the ratio of the number of received replies










The responsiveness forbots inSality ismeasuredbasedon thenum-
ber of received Hello replies while ZeroAccess simply uses the num-
ber of received retL messages. By specifying the minimum ratio of
responsiveness that is required for any bot within a given snapshot,
poorly responsive bots can be identified as artifacts or churn affected
nodes. For instance, a value of R = 0.4 represents all bots that have
been responsive at least 40% of the wholemonitoring period, i.e., the
total number of crawl sessions within that particular snapshot. Take
note that a value of R = 0.0 is used to represent bots that have re-
sponded at least once to the probe requests. Sensors usually do not
get flagged as artifacts as theywould aim to be responsive to the prob-
ing messages as much as possible unless they are experiencing poor
network connectivity. Please note that these identified artifacts are
not directly removed from the dataset, but only being flagged as such.
Removing artifacts from the dataset may lead to cascading changes
and/or alter connectivity metrics of other bots within the snapshot
that could adversely affect the performance of the detection mecha-
nisms.Therefore, all detectionmechanismwould simply ignorenodes
without a minimum responsiveness threshold value from their final
classification.
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6.3.3 Research Questions and Expectations
In the following, research questions that focus on the evaluation of
the sensor detection mechanisms are presented along with investi-
gated parameters.
An important aspect of any detection mechanism is the need to
specify the baseline or ground truth. Hence, the following research
question needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• How to establish ground truth on the total number of sensors
present in the datasets?
Since it is difficult to establish such ground truth in botnets, the
SensorBuster mechanism is used to provide a baseline information
on themaximumnumber of sensors present in the datasets. The sim-
plistic design of SensorBuster allows it to detect sensor nodes that
adhere to the assumptions presented in Section 6.1.1.3. Since sensor
nodesare assumed tonot returnabot as aneighbor, sensorswouldes-
tablish isolated strongly connected component(s)which will not have
any bots inside them.Hence, all IPs flagged by thismechanismneeds
tobe inspected, and the total numberof sensorsdetectedby thismech-
anism is to be assumed as being themaximumnumber of sensors (or
True Positives) present in the datasets. Therefore, False Positives of
any other detectionmechanism corresponds to an action of acciden-
tally flagging an IP as a sensor that does not belong to the set of valid
sensors found by the SensorBuster mechanism. Similarly, False Neg-
atives are the inability of any other detection mechanism to detect
a sensor flagged by the SensorBuster within the dataset.In the inves-
tigation to answer this research question, each snapshot within the
datasets is evaluated using SensorBuster with varied responsiveness
threshold R from 0.0 to 0.9.
Next, since the SensorRankermechanism relies upon clustering al-
gorithms to help distinguishing sensors from bots, the following re-
search question needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• Which clustering algorithm is suitable in distinguishing sensors
from bots when applied to the results of the SensorRank mecha-
nism?
For that, theeffectivenessoffiveclusteringalgorithms,namelyK-Means,
DBSCAN, Gaussian Mixture Models, SpectralClustering, and Agglom-
erative Clustering from the scikit-learn module is investigated to be
used in SensorRanker to classify sensors accurately. These algorithms
were chosen to be investigated due to their simplicity (in operation)
as they easily create two clusters from a given set of data, i.e., dis-
tinguishing between bots and sensors. Unlike other clustering algo-
rithms, thesealgorithmsonly require an inputparameterofhowmany
clusters needed, i.e., two, besides the SensorRanker data. The effec-
tiveness of a clustering algorithm is evaluated by the highest num-
ber of classified sensors, i.e., True Positives, in combination with the
lowest number of generated False Positives. This experiment is con-
ducted to the responsiveness threshold of R = 0.0 for each snapshot
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
6.3 EVALUATION 105
within both datasets. Based on the results of the experiment, the best
algorithm is then chosen and used for subsequent analysis.
As artifacts present in datasets can highly influence the accuracy of
the detection mechanisms, the following research question needs to
be answered in the evaluation:
• How influential are the artifacts which are present in datasets
towards the accuracy of the detection mechanisms?
All three detection mechanisms are evaluated for each snapshot in
both datasets with varying responsiveness threshold R from 0.0 to 0.9
to answer this question. It is expected that with a higher value of R,
the number of artifacts or false positives decreases accordingly (if ap-
plicable).
It would be of interest to identify and evaluate the strengths of each
of the proposed detection mechanisms. Therefore, the following re-
search question needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• Whichmechanismperforms best amongst the three sensor detec-
tion mechanisms?
For this, the performance of all three mechanisms is evaluated and
compared on both datasets. This evaluation is performed by select-
ing the appropriate clustering algorithm for SensorRanker and best
values of R to eliminate the influence of artifacts within the datasets
by answering the previous research questions.
Finally, the feasibility of the methods proposed to circumvent the
detection mechanism in Section 6.2 need to be analyzed. Hence, the
following research question needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• How feasible are the proposedDSI strategies in circumventing the
three detection mechanism?
Ananalysis is conductedon theSalitydataset as a case study todemon-
strate the feasibility or applicability of the proposed method to cir-
cumvent SensorRanker. In addition, a short analysis on the feasibil-
ity of the DSI strategies proposed for circumventing LCC and Sensor-
Buster is conducted and presented.
6.3.4 Results
In answer to the research questions presented in Section 6.3.3, the
evaluation results are presented.
ESTABLISHING BASELINE INFORMATION TheSensorBustermech-
anism is evaluated using both datasets with varying values of respon-
siveness threshold R between 0.0 and 0.9 (see Section 6.3.2.3) to es-
tablish the baseline information on themaximumnumber of sensors
present in the datasets.
Analysis of the Sality dataset indicateda combined total of 61nodes
wereflaggedby theSensorBustermechanismwith theminimumvalue
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Minimum Responsiveness Threshold, R>
Day 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 7 7
2 11 11 11 11 10 10 9 9 8 8
3 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 9
4 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 12: Maximum sensors present on a particular day dependent on R in
the Sality dataset
of R= 0.0, i.e., all bots that have responded to at least one probing re-
quest. Out of these 61 nodes, 11 nodes were verified to be Sensor and
seven of them were classified as Unknown based on manual analy-
sis using the auxiliary data (see Section 6.3.2.2). However, all nodes
initially classified asUnknownwere later identified and flagged as ar-
tifacts for all values of R 0.0. The remaining 43 nodes were false posi-
tives in the form of artifacts present within the snapshots, i.e., churn
affected nodes that were present for only a short period. Detailed re-
sults of the total number of sensors present in the different snapshots
areprovided inTable 12 independenceon thevarious valuesofR. The
column in the table represents the minimum responsiveness thresh-
old values that are required for a particular sensor to be considered.
Whereas, the rows represents a particular day or snapshot within the
dataset. As such, a value within the table should be interpreted as the
total number of sensors thatwere present on a particular day or snap-
shot with a responsiveness ratio of at least R.
Minimum Responsiveness Threshold, R>
Day 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 13: Maximum sensors present on a particular day dependent on R in
the ZeroAccess dataset
Meanwhile, the analysis on the ZeroAccess dataset indicated only
a total of four nodes flagged by the SensorBustermechanismwith the
minimum value of R= 0.0. Out of these nodes, three nodes were ver-
ified to be Sensor and one was a false positive. The analysis of total
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number of sensors present in the different snapshots is presented in
Table 13 in dependence to the various values of R.
The information from Table 12 and Table 13 are then assumed as
theground truth for the total numberof sensorspresent in thedataset
for a particular responsiveness threshold value of R. This data is then
used throughout the remaining evaluations in this paper. Please note
that the nature of the SensorBuster mechanism itself ensures that all
sensors that follow the assumptions presented in Section 6.1 are al-
ready detected and represented in Table 12 and Table 13. As such,
SensorBuster can be leveraged to establish the ground truth for all
sensors that are present in both datasets or at least for the scope of
evaluating the proposed mechanisms.





























Figure 14: Effectiveness of different clustering algorithmswithR= 0.0 on ac-
curately classifying sensors in the Sality dataset
SUITABLE CLUSTERING ALGORITHM FOR SENSORRANKER To in-
vestigate the effectiveness of different clustering algorithms in classi-
fying sensors based on the SensorRank values that were generated by
the SensorRanker mechanism, the evaluation was repeated on both
datasetswith the responsiveness threshold set toR> 0.0, i.e., bots that
responded at least once during the monitoring period. In the eval-
uation, the performance of K-Means, Gaussian Mixture Models, and
SpectralClustering were identical regarding the number of detected
sensors and false positives. Therefore, these algorithms are grouped
and referred to as All Others for simplicity. Figure 14 presents the per-
formance of DBSCAN, Agglomerative Clustering, and All Others de-
pending on theday of themeasurementwithin the Sality dataset. The
individual markers represent the number of accurately detected sen-
sors, and the bar plots indicate the number of false positives gen-
erated by the algorithm for a given day. Evaluation results indicate
that all algorithms except DBSCAN incurred exactly one false nega-
tive.DBSCAN incurred two falsepositives throughout thewholeweek.
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Also, there were no false positives generated by all detection mecha-
nisms between day three and six.
Upon further investigation, it is discovered that all algorithmsmissed
a particular node that had a very low popularity. This node which
had only one incoming connection, was a BT node that was deployed
within Sality (see. Section 5.2.2). However, since the characteristics
and nature of this BT node satisfy all assumptions of a sensor node
(see Section 6.1.1.3), this node should have also been detected as a
sensor. DBSCAN is observed to perform inferior to the other algo-
rithms as it generated far more false positives compared to the other
algorithms.
This evaluation is repeated on the ZeroAccess dataset and all algo-
rithm were able to successfully detect three sensors throughout the
week with no false positives or false negatives. After considering the
analysis results of both datasets, the Agglomerative Clustering algo-
rithm was decided to be used as the choice of clustering algorithm
in SensorRanker for the rest of the analysis, including on the ZeroAc-
cess dataset, due to its simplicity with regards to tuning parameters
and improved performance particularly on Day 2 within the Sality
dataset.
INFLUENCE OF ARTIFACTS PRESENT WITHIN DATASETS As ar-
tifacts could adversely affect the performance of the detectionmech-
anisms, their influence was investigated with varying values of R, i.e.,
between 0.0 and 0.9, on all three detection mechanisms using both
datasets. From the results that were aggregated over the whole week
for the Sality dataset, very high number of false positives were ob-
served forbothSensorBuster and LCCwhenR= 0.0. Bothmechanisms
managed to detect all existing sensors, i.e., 11, at the expense of 43
and 70 false positives respectively. Since these extreme values of false
positives distort the overall representation of the results, the analy-
sis of the Sality dataset is presented in Figure 15 only for values of R
between 0.1 and 0.9. This figure represents the number of nodes clas-
sified as Sensor by the respective detection mechanisms along with
the corresponding false positives dependent on varying values of R.
The results of this analysis met the initial expectation presented in
Section 6.3.3 that with increasing R, false positives can be reduced
considerably. The observation of reduced false positives is particu-
larly true for LCC thatwas able to reduce 90% of its false positives from
the initial 70 to only seven false positives when R is set from 0.0 to 0.5.
Although, similar observations were seen for SensorBuster, this was
only true for values of R6 0.5. Interestingly, SensorRanker was found
to be least affected by the different values of R. Although there was
only one false positive for all values of R 0.9 for SensorRanker, it also
incurred one false negative. Nevertheless, take note that with a high
threshold value of R> 0.8, some of the sensors are flagged as artifacts
and ignored by the detection mechanisms in some of the days, e.g.,
Day 3.
Similar observations were also seen in the evaluation using the Ze-
roAccess dataset. In this evaluation, all detection mechanism were
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Figure 15: Analysis of the influence of artifacts to the detectionmechanisms
with varying values of R between 0.1 to 0.9 on the Sality dataset
able to detect all present sensors, i.e., three sensors. However, Sen-
sorRanker did not generate any false positives regardless of different
values of R. Meanwhile, both SensorBuster and LCC eliminated their
only false positive with threshold values of R> 0.1 and R> 0.2 respec-
tively.
In conclusion, aspresented inTable 14, onlySensorRankerwas found
to be minimally affected (if any) by the different values of R. Hence,
theywouldperform the same regardless of thepresence of artifacts in
the used dataset. Furthermore, it is also observed that LCC is heavily
influenced by the presence of artifacts compared to the SensorBuster
mechanism. As such, aminimumresponsiveness threshold ofR> 0.6
is found to be a conservative value for all detectionmechanismswith-
out accidentally ignoring sensors with poor responsiveness within
the Sality dataset. Similarly, a threshold of R > 0.2 is observed to be
appropriate for all detection mechanisms on the ZeroAccess dataset.
The disparity between the threshold values of the Sality and ZeroAc-
cess dataset can also be argued as directly influenced by the MM in-
terval of the respectivebotnets. Sality,whichhas a longerMMinterval
compared to ZeroAccess, has a higher probability of introducing arti-
facts from churn affected nodes in theirNLs. In contrast, the shorter
MM interval of ZeroAccess reduces the probability for its bots to have
unresponsive bots or artifacts present in theirNLs.
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF ALL DETECTION MECHANISM
After obtaining the appropriate threshold parameters, a comparison
analysis of the performance of all three detectionmechanisms is per-
formedonbothdatasetswith responsiveness threshold ofR= 0.6 and
R= 0.2 respectively. Figure16presents the results on theSalitydataset
whereby the accuracy of each detection mechanism in dependence
on the day of the snapshot is plotted. Meanwhile, Table 14 provides a
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brief summary of the performance comparison among the three de-
tection mechanisms.
Table 14: Performance comparison of all three sensor detection mecha-
nisms
LCC SensorRanker SensorBuster
True Positives High Medium High
False Positives High Low Low
Sensitivity to Artifacts High Low Medium





























Figure 16: Performance comparison of all detection mechanism with R =
0.6 on the Sality dataset
Analysis results in Figure 16 indicate that both SensorRanker and
LCC were able to detect all available sensors on each day, i.e., up to
11 sensors. SensorRanker, although had one false negative compared
to the other mechanisms, has the least false positive throughout the
wholeweek, i.e., one falsepositive. In comparison, LCCperformsworst
compared to all other mechanisms in terms of the number of pro-
duced falsepositives.Meanwhile, theanalysis of theZeroAccessdataset
indicated that all algorithmswere able to detect exactly three sensors
with no false positives or false negatives.
FEASIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING LCC As discussed in Section
6.2.1, LCC can be easily circumvented using the DSI strategy with a
minimum of four colluding sensor nodes. In fact, as long as the DSI
strategy is able to obtain any non-extreme value, i.e., lcc+ {0.0,1.0},
LCC can be circumvented. However, if the LCC-values of the sensors
are significantly different thanmost of the bots in the botnet, cluster-
ing algorithms can be used to identify such anomalies in the values
as used in the SensorRanker detection mechanism. Therefore, addi-
tional effort may be required to first identify the average value of the
botnet, and the sensor nodes should try to approximate this value us-
ing the DSI strategy in order to avoid being detected through the us-
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age of clustering algorithms in amore advanced LCC detectionmech-
anism.
FEASIBILITY OF EVADING SENSORRANKER To investigate the fea-
sibility of evadingSensorRanker, ananalysiswas conducted toattempt
toprovide a lowerboundestimationof thenumber of sensors needed
to comfortably evade detection based on the Sality dataset. For this,
the sensors are assumed to evade detection if their SensorRank value
is lower than or equal to the average value of all bots. As such, the
minimum number of sensors Nmin = |S| that are required to satisfy
Equation 5 needed to be calculated to evade the mechanism.
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Figure 17: Classification of PR values by range of total predecessors in Day 1
of the Sality dataset
However, it is not easy to calculate the PR values of a sensor Si, as it
is not only influenced by its predecessors but also by the rank or pop-
ularity of all of its predecessors. As such, the distribution of existing
PR values for bots on Day 1 in the Sality Dataset is referred. Figure 17
represents the maximum, minimum and average PR values with re-
spect to the range of total predecessors in the investigated snapshot.
As expected, the classification results indicate a linear increase in PR-
values relative to increasing range of total predecessors, i.e., higher
popularity yields higher ranks. Moreover, some ranges are also ob-
served to have extreme PR values compared to their next ranges, e.g.,
comparisonbetween the range of (225,250] and (250,275]. This behav-
ior is due to one or more predecessors of some bots within the range
(225,250] having abnormally high rank, hence increasing the max PR
of the bot(s) within this range compared to those in range (250,275].
Based on the distribution of PR values in Figure 17, all possible Sen-
sorRankvalues is calculatedby considering scenarios of deployingup
to 20 colluding sensorswithin the Sality botnet as presented in Figure
18 with respect to the number of colluding sensors. The values plot-
ted in this figure are the correspondingmaximum,minimum and av-
erage SR values considering the possible range of total predecessors
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Figure 18: Estimation of SensorRank values for Si in dependence on num-
ber of colluding sensors
each of the sensors would have. As the average SR value for thewhole
dataset is 2.5145× 10−6, themaximumSR value of each colluding sen-
sor needed to be lesser than it. Therefore, at least 14 colluding sensors
are needed to evade the SensorRank detection mechanism based on
the utilized snapshot.
However, the estimation shown in Figure 18 does not resemble the
worst case scenario,whereoneof the sensorshas the |V |N highest ranked
nodes as predecessors. Hence, the estimation provides only a best-
case scenario, but in reality requires additional efforts to distribute
thePR values intelligently ormore sensors to reliably evade this detec-
tion mechanism. In conclusion, SensorRanker can be circumvented
provided sufficient resources be available at disposal to deploy addi-
tional sensors.
FEASIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING SENSORBUSTER Asdiscussed
in Section 6.2.3, to the best of knowledge, SensorBuster can only be
circumvented if sensor nodes return valid botswhenbeing requested
for additionalneighbors. Insteadof returninganybot in theNL replies,
a less useful bot is suggested to be returned instead, i.e., newly joined
bots. From the perspective of a sensor node, this strategy incurs only
minimal overhead to keep track of the timestamps of bots recently
joined and known to the sensor. However, considering the fact that
newly joined bots have the tendency to leave the botnet overlay im-
mediately, the returned bot may not be responsive, i.e., oﬄine, when
a crawler captures the snapshot for SensorBuster analysis. As a conse-
quence, the sensornodes canonceagainbedetectedbySensorBuster
due to the missing path into the main SCC of the botnet. Therefore, it
is advisable to return more than one of such newly joined bots, i.e.,
redundancies, to ensure there is at least one path into the main SCC
always.
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6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter focused on advanced monitoring on the basis of using
sensor nodes in P2P botnets and outlined another major contribu-
tion as part of this dissertation. In particular, contrary to the reports
of other researchers, works presented in Section 6.1 clearly indicated
that it is indeedpossible to identify deployed sensor nodes in P2Pbot-
nets and distinguish them frompopular backbone nodes. Evaluation
results of the LCC, SensorRanker, and SensorBuster suggest thatmany
existing sensor nodes are currently susceptible to theproposeddetec-
tion mechanisms.
DETECTING SENSOR NODES In particular, LCC and SensorBuster
are able to detect sensor nodes deployed in Sality and ZeroAccess.
However, LCC is more prone to false positives resulting from artifacts
present in the datasets than SensorBuster. Meanwhile, SensorRanker
is able to perform reasonably well in detecting sensors and is only
minimally influenced by artifacts, i.e., low number of false positives,
within the evaluated datasets. Therefore, a future botmaster would
potentially deploy the SensorBustermechanism if he is concernedon
detecting all sensors that are present in the botnet and is tolerant for
some false positives. However, this mechanism requires additional
responsiveness information of the bots in addition to the connectiv-
ity information. In the absence of such information or if accurately
identifying sensors is the only concern, the botmaster should utilize
SensorRank instead.
CIRCUMVENTING THE DETECTION MECHANISMS This chapter
also introducedmethods to circumvent theproposeddetectionmech-
anisms using a set of colluding sensor nodes, i.e., DSI. While it is rel-
atively easy to circumvent LCC and SensorRanker, it is more compli-
cated to circumvent SensorBuster. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, it re-
quires a sensor node to return bots when being requested for neigh-
bors to evade the detection of SensorBuster. As a result, such actions
may have some legal implications as it would contradict with cyber-
lawsofmany countries. In viewof this,moreworkneeds tobedone to
investigate the extent of which an organization or individual should
be allowed to go in future botnet monitoring. This is especially im-
portant in anticipating future anti-monitoring countermeasures that
could enforce strategies that require all bots, including sensor nodes
or crawlers, to participate in regular botnet maintenance activities
before they can retrieve any information, e.g., additional neighbors.
Next, the churn dynamics of Sality and ZeroAccess is investigated
and a thorough churn analysis is presented in Chapter 7 as the fi-
nal contribution of this dissertation. In order to obtain higher qual-
ity churnmeasurements, the SensorBustermechanism introduced in
this chapter is applied in thework to detect and remove sensor nodes
from the final measurements.
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7UNDERSTANDING THE CHURN DYNAMICS IN P2P
BOTNETS
Churndynamics inP2Pbotnets play an important rolewhen it comes
to understanding the botnet itself and sometimes also when prepar-
ing for a botnet takedown.Without understanding them, data gained
by measurements may be misinterpreted and lead to false conclu-
sions or assumptions. For instance, a botnet takedown attempt may
require to target newly joining bots first. For that, the information on
the rate of new bots joining the overlay will be helpful in allocating or
predicting the required resources to launch such an attack.
Moreover, the understanding of the churn dynamics is also help-
ful in modelling churn using mathematical distributions [SR06] to
be used in botnet simulations. Such churn models enable more re-
alistic botnet simulations which in turn lead to a better understand-
ing of the botnet phenomenon. However, capturing or characteriz-
ing churn is a difficult task due to the highly dynamic nature of P2P
botnets as explained in Section 3.4.1. Existingworks in characterizing
churn in P2Pbotnets have only presentedmeasurementswith coarse
granularity thatmaynotbe accurate enough for churnmodellingpur-
poses.Moreover, the presence of unknown third partymonitoring ac-
tivities may also introduce bias in the resulting monitoring data.
This chapter presents an analysis of the churn dynamics observed
inSality andZeroAccessusinga self-developedhigh-frequencycrawler
calledStrobo-Crawler. Besidesobtainingfine-grainedmeasurements
for the superpeers of both botnets, this crawler is also able to charac-
terize churn of non-superpeers in ZeroAccess by leveraging the de-
sign of this botnet to perform UDP hole-punching (see Section 4.3.2).
Unfortunately, it was not possible to characterize churn inGameOver
Zeus since the bots have already been sinkholed in 2013 [Ros+13]. To
ensure the churn measurements are not tainted by presence of sen-
sor nodes in the botnets, sensor detection techniques as presented in
Section 6.1 are also applied to identify and remove sensors from the
resulting data.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, Section
7.1 proposes the design of a high-frequency crawler called Strobo-
Crawler. This section also includes a short description on how the
crawler can be adapted to crawl Sality and ZeroAccess. Second, Sec-
tion 7.2 presents the measurements and the derived churn model
using Strobo-Crawler. Finally, Section 7.3 summarizes this chapter.
Please take note that some passages in this chapter are quoted verba-
tim from the following publication [Haa+16].
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7.1 ACCURATELY CAPTURING CHURN DYNAMICS IN P2P BOTNETS
Crawlers are commonly used as an important tool in characterizing
churn in P2P botnets. Snapshots generated by crawlers (cf. Section
3.3.2) are used to discover bots and their interconnectivity. Further-
more, these snapshots help to assert the responsiveness of bots dur-
ing the crawl period. However, a botnet overlay changes frequently
with new bots joining and leaving the overlay throughout a measure-
ment duration. Therefore, depending on the crawler configuration,
e.g., crawling frequency or algorithm, resulting snapshots could be
distorted due to a bias introduced by slow or inefficient crawlers, i.e.,
causing undiscovered or introducing non-existing nodes and edges
in the snapshot.Correlating suchdistorted snapshots isnotwell suited
to obtain fine-grained churn measurement. The impact of such dis-
torted snapshotsbecomesmoreevidentwithpresenceof anti-monitoring
mechanisms deployed by the bots. This requires an efficient moni-
toring solution that is fast enough for obtaining fine-grained churn
measurements within large botnets.
In the following, Section7.1.1 introducesa crawling frameworkcalled
Strobo-Crawler that is specifically designed to capture snapshots of
P2P botnets at a high frequency. These snapshots are then utilized to
characterize churn in botnets. Section 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 presents adap-
tation of this crawler for Sality and ZeroAccess respectively.
7.1.1 Strobo-Crawler
In this subsection, the botnet formal model proposed in Section 3.2
is first extended to describe Strobo-Crawler. After that, the design
of Strobo-Crawler is elaborated using the extended botnet formal
model.
EXTENDED BOTNET FORMAL MODEL The twomajor requirements
for an accurate data collection for churn modeling are (1) enumerat-
ing all nodes and (2) reliably determining their online status. How-
ever, the exact set of all online bots V in a botnet G is often difficult
to discover by crawling. Therefore, the set V is approximated by the
set ofmonitored nodes VM, that is the set of bots discovered by the
crawler. This set consists of online bots as well as artifacts of bots that
already went oﬄine. For instance, if a neighbor v ∈ V of node u ∈ V
goes oﬄine, v is removed from u’s NL at least after the next MM-cycle
of the bot.Until the information on thedeparture of vhas propagated
to all nodes, v is still known to other bots and thus this oﬄine node is
part of the real-world graphG, i.e., v∈ V . AsV and thusVMmight con-
tain oﬄine nodes or artifacts, the set VO ⊆ VM is introduced, which
contains all nodes that have been verified to be online.
DESIGN OF STROBO-CRAWLER Strobo-Crawler checks all nodes
regularly for their online status. Using the extended formal model as
presented above, the design of the Strobo-Crawler as depicted in Fig-
ure 19 is described in the following. The Prober Module (PM ) main-
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Figure 19: Strobo-CrawlerDesign Overview
tains the set of knownnodesVM (initially a bootstrap list) andprobes
each of them periodically at a fixed frequency fc to determine their
online status and to discover more nodes. Any incoming messagem,
including the response to a probe, is processed by the Receiver Mod-
ule (RM ) that validates the receivedmessage. It reports the sender v∈
V of the messagem and the shared nodes Dm ⊆ V included inm (if
any) to the PM. After that, v and all entries withinDm can bemerged
with VO and VM respectively. v being the sender of the receivedmes-
sagem, is merged into VO as receiving the message also verifies the
online status of v. The entries within Dm are merged with VM be-
cause they are now discovered, but their online status has not been
verified. Therefore, the entries that are not already in VO are consid-
ered in the next probing iterations. Meanwhile, the Session Module
(SM ) summarizes the online duration of a node as a session that in-
cludes the first and last point of contact. The start time is set to the
time when the presence of the node was verified, i.e., the time when
a response message was received from the node. Similarly, the end
time is set to the time of the last message received, i.e., the last com-
munication before a node goes oﬄine.
Transitioning of Different Phases Within Strobo-Crawler
The sequence diagram in Figure 20 depicts the three different phases
within the Strobo-Crawler framework of a node v ∈ V . The initial
phase starts with a previously unknown node, i.e., v VM, that was
newly discovered from a messagem, i.e., the NL reply message. Now
that v is known v ∈ VM, the PM executes the Session Initation phase
and periodically probes v. As soon as one out of the first η requests
sent to v is answered, a session is created and v is marked online,
i.e., v∈ VO. To compensate temporary network or host failures, each
known node v ∈ VM has a counter Cv ∈ N0 that is increased with
each probe message sent to v. The counter is reset upon every re-
ceived reply from v and indicates a timeout if it reaches η.
A valid response received for a new session also creates a transi-
tion for the node to the Session Looping phase. In this phase, v is pe-
riodically probed and any subsequent valid response keeps its ses-
sion active.When η consecutive requests are unanswered, the node v
transits into the Session Closure phase. The node is considered to be
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Figure 20: Sequence Diagram for the Strobo-Crawler Framework
oﬄine, its session is closed, and v is removed from the set of known
nodes VM to end probing.
Steps in Handling Sessions
To ensure proper session handling, the events representing either an
incoming message, shared node, or outgoing probe have to be sched-
uled for processing at the time of reception, sharing, or sending re-
spectively. Step by step, each scheduled event e is processed by Al-
gorithm 7 appropriately. This algorithm requires three input param-
eters depending on the event that is taking place: the node v, event
type ID e, and theevent’s time t. In addition, twoadditionalmeasurement-
specific parameters can also be used to fine tune the crawler: crawl-
ing frequency fc andmaximum retries value η. These parameters can
be used either to evade botnet rate-limiting countermeasures (see
Section 3.4.3) or to throttle the probing rate of the bots. The latter is
usually done to select the suitable probing frequency for a particular
botnet, and to reduce the generated communication overhead. The
crawling frequency fc influences the accuracy of the measured start
and end time of a session.Meanwhile, η is used to tolerate temporary
networkproblems like jitter andpacket loss in theprocess of verifying
a node’s online status. The counterCv for each node v∈ VM provides
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a mechanism to deploy a session timeout that is effectively defined
by δ= ηfc . Algorithm 7 is detailed in the following.
Algorithm 7 : processEvent(v,e,t,fc,η)
1 // node v, event e, time t, freq. fc, & max. retries η
2 if v VM then
3 VM = VM + v
4 probeNode(v)
5 Cv = 1
6 scheduleEvent(v,outgoing probe,t+ 1/fc)
7 switch e do
8 case outgoing probe do
9 if Cv = η then
10 VO = VO − v
11 VM = VM − v
12 else
13 probeNode(v)
14 Cv =Cv + 1
15 scheduleEvent(v,outgoing probe,t+ 1/fc)
16 case incoming message do
17 Cv = 0
18 VO = VO + v
19 case shared node do
20 if v VO then
21 Cv = 0
First, if the corresponding node vwas previously unknown (Line 2),
it is immediately probed and the Session Initiation phase is initiated
with a counter value of 1. The next probingmessage is also scheduled
to be sent according to the crawling frequency fc. In contrast, if v is
already known, further processing of e depends on the type of the
event (Line 7).
For scheduled probing events (Line 8), a probe is sent to v (Line 12)
and the next probe is scheduled, or a timeout is reached if η requests
have been sent without receiving any valid reply (Line 9). In case the
event represents an incoming responsemessage (Line 16), the node’s
counter is reset and the node is marked online. Meanwhile, shared
nodes are continued to be probed as long as they are shared by other
bots, even if they have not been verified online. However, the counter
for shared nodes (Line 19) is only reset, if the node is currently not
marked online to avoid manipulation of the session timeout mecha-
nism during the Session Looping.
7.1.2 Adaptation for Sality
The Strobo-Crawler framework can be adapted to measure only the
arrival anddeparture of superpeers in the Sality botnet. Following the
paradigm of a crawler (cf. Section 3.3.2), this framework allows to ac-
tively contact and discover nodes. The non-superpeers are omitted
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in the measurements since they are not directly contactable by the
Strobo-Crawler (see Section 2.2), i.e., devices behind NAT such as
notebooks, residential machines, and smartphones. Moreover, using
sensor nodes for monitoring only provides coarse-grained measure-
ments. Sensor nodes are only able to obtain measurements that cor-
responds to theMM interval of the bots, i.e., interval of approximately
40 minutes (cf. Section 4.2). Hence, only superpeers are considered
in the fine-grained churn measurements for Sality.
The PM is implemented to sendNL requestsNLReq (cf. Section 4.2)
to verify a superpeer’s online status and to retrieve shared nodes at
the same time. Although bots in Sality send a Hello message before
sending a NLReq message, this can be omitted for doing churn mea-
surements and does not have any negative side-effects. In fact, omit-
ting the Hello messages minimizes the overhead of generated mes-
sages by the Strobo-Crawler.
7.1.3 Adaptation for ZeroAccess
In contrast to Sality, Strobo-Crawler can be adapted for ZeroAccess
to characterize both superpeer and non-superpeers. Since ZeroAc-
cess uses dedicated sockets for its communication, i.e., server and
client sockets, and processes messages received on both sockets in
the same way (cf. Section 4.3.2), UDP hole-punching [FSK05] can be
performed tocrawlbotsbehindNATas reportedbyRossowet al. [Ros+13].
In ZeroAccess, UDP hole-punching can be performed by injecting a
sensor into the botnet (cf. Section 3.3.3) to allow all nodes (including
non-superpeers) to contact it. Once a bot behind NAT contacts the
sensor, the responsiveness of this bot can be verified as long as the
NAT tunnel remains open. For this, messages need to be sent periodi-
cally to ensure the established tunnel does not time out.
The design flaw of the malware is exploited by Strobo-Crawler to
crawl all ZeroAccess bots. TheRM is extendedwith a sensor function-
ality to additionally process incoming requests fromnon-superpeers.
This corresponds to the Session Initiation in Figure 20 without the
optional request message. The RM reports the sender v ∈ V of a re-
quest message m to the PM, so that the node transits into the Ses-
sion Looping phase. Having both crawler and sensor functionality,
this new design allows the Strobo-Crawler to actively discover new
superpeers by requesting nodes to share neighbors and to passively
discover newnon-superpeers byprocessing incoming requests.How-
ever, the measurement technique of Strobo-Crawler for ZeroAccess
could also initiate two distinct measurement sessions for superpeers
in the botnet, i.e., one session for messages received from the server
socket and another for the client socket. To avoid suchduplicated ses-
sions, whenever such a scenario occurs, Strobo-Crawler prioritizes
the server sockets, i.e., identified by the botnet-specific source ports,
andmerges the sessions originating from the client socket. From that
point onward, only the session associated with the server socket is
maintained.
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To ensure that non-superpeers in ZeroAccess are discovered and
probed, Strobo-Crawler leverages the node announcement mecha-
nism of ZeroAccess by sending getL messages to superpeers and re-
spond to the subsequently received getL+messages. By responding to
the getL+message, Strobo-Crawler gets inserted or shifted to the top
of the bots’NLs (see Section 4.3.2.1) andwill be frequently included in
the responsemessages to other requesting non-superpeers. As a con-
sequence, Strobo-Crawler is able to discover new bots quickly. Re-
garding non-superpeers, Strobo-Crawler only sends getL+messages
to probe the responsiveness of non-superpeers. This is done to avoid
generating additional overhead during themeasurements.Moreover,
it is not important to stayat the topof theprimaryNLof anon-superpeer
as the NL is not shared to other bots, i.e., only superpeers play a role
in propagating information of a node to other bots.
7.2 EVALUATION
This section presents themeasurement results and the derived churn
model from the analysis conducted in Section 7.1. Section 7.2.1 de-
scribes the obtained datasets. Section 7.2.2 elaborates the setup for
the measurements and analysis. Then, Section 7.2.3 discusses the in-
vestigated research questions as well as the expected outcomes. Fi-
nally, Section 7.2.4 presents themeasurement results and the derived
churn model of the analyzed botnets.
7.2.1 Datasets
Table 15: Dataset Statistics
Botnet Start (CET) Unique Addrs Sessions Superpeers
ZA_16464 10.12.2015, 6pm 5,343 / h 611,134 5.9%
ZA_16465 11.12.2015, 5pm 1,454 / h 349,401 2.3%
ZA_16470 11.12.2015, 9pm 2,172 / h 560,700 1.9%
ZA_16471 13.12.2015, 7pm 2,535 / h 350,963 6.4%
Sality_V3 09.10.2015, 12am 1,581 / h 53,147 100%
Sality_V4 22.12.2015, 7am 189 / h 17,952 100%
Thedatasetsused forderiving thechurnmodelshavebeenobtained
using the Strobo-Crawler framework as described in Section 7.1.1.
Both Sality and ZeroAccess were crawled for a duration of two weeks.
The summary of the dataset is presented in Table 15.
Sality_VN denotes the specific version N of Sality and ZA_N iden-
tifies the specific ZeroAccess network with the fixed port number N.
The table presents the average number of unique bots seen per hour,
i.e. combination of IP address and port number, as well as the to-
tal number of observed sessions during the measurements. In addi-
tion, the percentage of unique superpeers that were observed within
the measurements are also depicted in the last column. Please note
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Figure 21: Distribution of online bots discovered during the measurement
that only superpeers were available for characterizing churn in Sal-
ity, hence the 100% for the right-most column in the table. Figure 21a
andFigure 21bdepict thedistributionof onlinenodesdiscoveredand
probed by Strobo-Crawler in Sality_V4 and ZA_16464 respectively in
dependence on the time of discovery.
7.2.2 Experimental Setup
Theexperimentswere conductedbyan implementationof Strobo-Crawler
inPython. All communication toand fromStrobo-Crawlerwas logged
using aMySQL database. To ensure heavy network traffic does not in-
fluence the ongoingmeasurements, each botnet was assigned a ded-
icated Strobo-Crawler, i.e., a machine, that was each located in the
network of different ISPs.
A crawling frequency of 30s was chosen as a conservative value to
providefine-grainedchurnmeasurements forbothbotnets. Although
the frequencycanbe further increased, itwill incur significantlyhigher
communication overhead for the Strobo-Crawler. The author argues
that a frequency of 30s is already sufficient for the purpose of fine-
grained churn measurements. However, due to the restricted NL re-
turn size in Sality (cf. Section 4.2.2) five requests were sent every 30s
to ensurenewbots arequickly discoveredby the crawler.Moreover, to
take network jitter and packet loss into consideration, a timeout was
assumed for a session if no valid response received within µ = 120s.
This timeout also corresponds to effectively η= 24 unresponsive sent
requests for Sality and η = 4 for ZeroAccess. Then, a two-week long
measurement was obtained based on the specified parameters using
Strobo-Crawler.
7.2.3 Research Questions and Expectations
In the following, research questions that were focused on the charac-
terizationof churn inP2Pbotnets aswell as the influenceof unknown
third party monitoring is presented along with investigated parame-
ters.
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Considering there have been quite a number of churn studies con-
ducted on regular P2P networks, e.g., file sharing networks, it is in-
teresting to see if the observed characteristics in those networks are
identical to that of P2P botnets. Hence, the following research ques-
tion needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• What are the similarities in churn characteristics of P2P botnets
compared to conventional P2P file sharing networks?
For that reason, thisworkuses the churn-relatedmetrics presented
by Stutzbach and Rejaie [SR06]. Although the authors listed metrics
for the two types of classificationsmentioned above: group-level and
peer-level, only group-level characterizationsareobserved in thiswork.
This is due to the reasons explained before, more precisely to the ab-
sence of reboot-persistent botnet UIDs that could otherwise be used
to reliably characterize the peer-level characteristics. It is expected
that the churn behavior of P2P botnets and regular file sharing net-
works are similar due to the presence of diurnal patterns, the fact that
both run on end-user machines, and the usage of common network
infrastructures that result to similar issues like address aliasing.
It is not always possible to conduct experiments or analysis in real-
world botnets. As alternative, simulations can be used to provide a
controlled environment to investigate any aspect of botnets. For that,
realistic simulationswithaccurate churnmodels are required. Stutzbach
and Rejaie have reported that churn behavior in P2P networks can be
modeled using aWeibull distribution [SR06]. However, it is unknown
if the observation is also valid for P2P botnets. Therefore, the follow-
ing research question needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• Is Weibull distribution applicable to model churn in P2P bot-
nets? If yes, what are the parameters to model them?
To answer this question, a parametric distribution-fitting analysis
of the churnmeasurements needs to be done to fit the observedmea-
surements with a Weibull distribution.
Next, thepresenceofhighly responsive sensors inP2Pbotnets could
influence the final churn measurements in P2P botnets. Hence, the
following research question needs to be answered in the evaluation:
• Does the presence of highly responsive sensors affect the churn
characteristics of P2P botnets?
To answer this question, sensor detection mechanisms as presented
in Section 6.1 needs to be applied on the obtained snapshots of
Strobo-Crawler. Then, an analysis is conducted to identify if remov-
ing sessions of the detected sensors changes the measurement re-
sults significantly. It is expected that highly responsive sensors bias
the measurements, in terms of average session length especially.
7.2.4 Results
First, the churnmeasurementsof Sality andZeroAccess arepresented
in Section 7.2.4.1. Second, a churnmodel is derived and presented in
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Section 7.2.4.2 based on a Weibull distribution fitting using the ob-
tained measurements.
7.2.4.1 Churn Measurements
In the following, churn metrics presented in Section 2.3 are used to
characterize churn in the two botnets.
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Figure 22: Churn distributions for Sality and ZeroAccess
INTER-ARRIVAL TIME Toobtain the inter-arrival timedistribution,
the interval between twonodes joining thenetwork is calculated. The
distributions of these inter-arrival times in Sality_V4, ZA_16464 and
ZA_16471 are plotted in Figure 22a–22c as a Complementary Cumu-
lative Distribution Function (CCDF) in log-linear scale. Please note
that in the ZeroAccess botnets, both superpeers and non-superpeers
are distinguished using two different x-axes, i.e., in green (top) and
red (bottom), due to the differences in the scale/magnitude of the
results. There is a common pattern in all botnets when looking at
the distribution of inter-arrival times. However, the differences in the
results of superpeers and non-superpeers in ZeroAccess are particu-
larly interesting. The overall results for ZeroAccess indicate that non-
superpeers have significantly shorter inter-arrival times than super-
peers in ZeroAccess.
There are two possible explanations for these results. First, the set
of superpeers is much smaller than the set of non-superpeers. Sec-
ond,non-superpeers experienceheaviernodechurn thansuperpeers.
However, as depicted in Figure 22c, both types of nodes in ZA_16471
share a similar shape of the graph and differ mainly on the x-scaling.
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This further strengthens the argumentation that the differences be-
tween the observed distributions comes from different number of
bots in between the two different classes of bots, i.e., superpeers and
non-superpeers.
However, other ZeroAccess botnets exhibit different distribution
shapes in comparison to ZA_16471, e.g., ZA_16464 in Figure 22b. In
particular, several extreme long inter-arrival times in the ZA_16470
botnet were observed for the non-superpeers but not for superpeers.
As the initial argument on the non-proportional size in between the
twodifferentbot classes cannot explain thedifferencesbetween these
distributions, the joining behavior of bots in ZA_16470 is concluded
tobenon-comparable to theotherbotnets forunknownreasons.How-
ever, the author acknowledges that this observationcouldalsobepos-
sible due to the different node types in the botnets, i.e., router/server
vs Smartphone/Desktops. Infected machines that reside in produc-
tion networksmay have shorter inter-arrival times due to the reliabil-
ity of the network operators. In contrast, machines that are switching
connectionbetween residential andpublic networksmayhave signif-
icantly longer inter-arrival times.
In summary, there seems to be no perfect correlation of the inter-
arrival behavior for superpeers and non-superpeers within the same
botnet. However, the biggest differences in the distributions between
both types of nodes (in log-linear transformation of the CCDF) are
usually only caused by the longest 1% of recorded inter-arrival times.
Although this percentage may seem to be insignificant, the longest
records are important for extrapolating data such as sub-exponential
distribution. Furthermore, no correlation is observed between super-
peers in Sality and ZeroAccess that would allow a generalization for
superpeers across different botnets. However, all distributions seem
to have a higher tendency for smaller inter-arrival times.
SESSION LENGTH Any long-lived session in the measurements
could have been artificially limited or prematurely terminated by the
end of the measurement, i.e., after two weeks (τ). This problem can
have high impact on the session length distribution because longer
sessionsare rare as reportedbyStutzbachet al. [SR06]. Their approach
to this problemdivides thewhole timewindow into twohalves and to
evaluate the sessions of the first half only. This approach is adopted
in this work and for the remainder of the evaluation, the first half is
referred to as the analysis window. All sessions that have a length ex-
ceeding τ2 are pruned and set to a maximum length of τ2 , i.e., one
week, for all analysis (unlessmentionedotherwise) tousea fractionof
the time interval as ananalysiswindow.This allows for anon-distorted
distribution fitting as suggested by Stutzbach et al..
The session length of bots can be analyzed from several perspec-
tives. First, the joint session length estimates the session length for
the next node joining the network. Second, the current session length
refers to only active sessions at any point in time and describes how
the session length is distributed among online nodes. There is also
a third perspective on the session length where peer-level measure-
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Figure 23: Joint session length distributions for Sality and ZeroAccess
ments (see Section 2.3) can be considered using reboot-persistent
identifiers (if available). In such a peer-level measurement, it would
be possible to calculate the session length distribution for multiple
sessionsof the samepeer. Yanet al. [Yan+14b],whoconductedachurn
measurement on Sality and ZeroAccess for more than 6 months by
doing such peer-level measurements. However, since there are no re-
liable botnet UIDs, it is not clear how the authors could have con-
ducted this measurement except by associating each unique IP ad-
dress to be a unique bot. The peer-level measurement is omitted in
this work as such IP-based association can lead to high bias due to
IP address aliasing. In addition, results reported by Yan et al. indicate
that no sessions have been observed with a length longer than a day,
i.e., 24 hours. In contrast, measurements conducted in the context
of this work have observed some sessions that are longer than seven
days.
In the following, the measurement results for joint session length
and current session length fromtheperspectiveof thegroup-level char-
acterization is presented.
Joint Session Length
Figure 23presents thedistributionof the joint session length asCCDF
in log-linear plot for Sality_V4 and ZA_16464 respectively. Plots for
the other networks are omitted as the results are comparable to those
presented in Figure 23. Specifically, the comparison of distributions
in between the two bot classes in all ZeroAccess botnets indicated
that they are very much similar. They vary from superpeers with ses-
sion length slightly shifted towards smaller ones (ZA_16464 in Figure
23b) to superpeerswith longer session length (ZA_16465andZA_16470).
Only in one network (ZA_16471), both node types have a similar dis-
tribution.
Especially the graph for ZeroAccess non-superpeers (but also for
the Sality superpeers), shows that there is a high number of sessions
that are closed after around 24 hours. It can only be speculated that
this is causedby thedaily re-establishing of Internet connections that
ISPs enforce in their networks.
[ June 20, 2016 at 11:21 – classicthesis ]
7.2 EVALUATION 127
Current Session Length












Figure 24: Session Length Distributions of ZA_16464
Current Session Length
The distribution of the current session length is obtained by summa-
rizing the length of all active sessions in a given snapshot. However,
it is necessary to identify the actual start time of a session as a ses-
sion might have started earlier than the start of the measurements.
To overcome this problem, the timewindow is divided into three sub-
windows and the second window is chosen as the analysis window.
This allows to identify sessions that are already active in the first τ3
window or remain active after the second window. Hence, the maxi-
mum current session length is restricted to τ3 .
Yao et al. [Yao+06] report that the influence of long sessions on the
current session length is muchmore significant than the influence on
the joint session length. In other words, it is more likely to observe a
long session when selecting any active session than when selecting
a recorded session. This is also true for the analysis presented in Fig-
ure 24 that illustrates the differences between the distributions of the
joint and the current session length using ZA_16464 as an exemplary
network. Here, the probability that the current session length is four
days or more is 19%. The probability for a joint session length of at
least the same duration is only 0.3%. Please note that the longest cur-
rent session lengthobserved is limited to τ3 and therefore shorter than
the longest observed joint session length. Furtherwhen lookingat the
distributions for superpeers and non-superpeers, it reveals that if the
joint session length distribution tends to observe superpeers exhibit-
ing longer sessions, then the current session length distribution also
shows the same trend.
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PEER AGE / REMAINING UPTIME As for thecalculationof thepeer
ageand remaininguptime,differentparts of theanalysiswindowhave
to be analyzed. The overlapping sessions in the first half of the time
windowneed tobeanalyzed toobtain the remaininguptimeandover-
lapping sessionswithin the second half of the timewindow is needed
to obtain the peer age. For both metrics, the age, and the remain-
ing uptime respectively, is limited to τ2 . The comparison of bothmet-
rics indicates that their distributions are similar within the same net-
work, except for small differences that could be attributed to mea-
surement in precision. However, Figure 24 presents the current peer
age distribution that is also representative for the remaining uptime
that seems to be close to the current session length time distribution.
Please take note of the logarithmic CCDF scale (y-axis) that scales the
values accordingly.
The shapeof thedistributions (group-level parameters) for the ana-
lyzedbotnets are found tobe similar to that of regularP2Pfile-sharing
networks as reported by Stutzbach and Rejaie. Therefore, churn char-
acteristics of both P2P botnets and regular P2P file-sharing networks
canbe concluded to be comparable to each other andmeet the initial
expectation. The similarities for both networks can be further specu-
lated to result from similar set of users, i.e., regular home and office
PCs, and their distribution throughout the globe, i.e., in regards with
influence of diurnal effects.
7.2.4.2 Modelling ChurnWith Weibull Distribution
On the basis of the obtainedmeasurement results, the churnmetrics
for each botnet were found to be able to be modeled using a Weibull
distribution (see Section 2.3) as proposed by Stutzbach andRejaie for
P2P file-sharing networks. The distribution fitting results of the mea-
surements for the respective churnmetrics are presented in Table 16
and Figure 25. The results of distribution fitting was done using the
nonlinear least-squares estimation for theWeibull parameters shape
k and scale 1a in a log-linear scale. The timeunit for allmetrics is repre-
sented in seconds. Similarly, the CCDF plots for themetrics in Figure
25 is presented in a log-linear scale for clarity.
For the inter-arrival timemetric, the shapeparameterkof theWeibull
distribution indicates that in some botnets, e.g., ZA_16465 and
ZA_16471, the distributions for superpeers and non-superpeers can
be transformed by a scaling factor for the inter-arrival times. In these
cases, k is close to 1, which results in an almost straight line in the log-
linear plot and allows the inter-arrival time to be approximated by an
exponential distribution. The Weibull distributions for inter-arrival
time in different botnets canhave different shape parameters. The fit-
ting results partially show some similarities with those presented by
Stutzbach and Rejaie. The shape parameter of k= 0.62 for their mea-
surement in the FlatOut network is similar to the results for Sality su-
perpeers and for all peers inZA_16464andZA_16471. TheWeibull dis-
tributionmodels the inter-arrival time very tightly for both Sality net-
works, and for the ZeroAccess networks ZA_16465 and ZA_16471. Al-
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Table 16: Weibull Parameters; Tuples as (shape, 1/scale)
Node Type: All Non-Superpeers Superpeers
ZeroAccess 16464
Inter-Arrival (0.65, 1.35e+00) (0.66, 1.23e+00) (1.01, 3.88e-02)
Joint Length (0.22, 8.41e-03) (0.22, 8.10e-03) (0.21, 1.81e-02)
Current Length (0.37, 1.31e-05) (0.38, 1.30e-05) (0.32, 1.53e-05)
Peer Age (0.35, 2.72e-05) (0.35, 2.70e-05) (0.35, 3.00e-05)
ZeroAccess 16465
Inter-Arrival (1.04, 2.63e-01) (0.97, 2.90e-01) (1.02, 6.24e-03)
Joint Length (0.18, 8.19e-02) (0.19, 7.51e-02) (0.17, 5.91e-02)
Current Length (0.34, 1.39e-05) (0.34, 1.52e-05) (0.33, 2.78e-06)
Peer Age (0.32, 3.03e-05) (0.34, 3.20e-05) (0.26, 5.46e-06)
ZeroAccess 16470
Inter-Arrival (0.63, 1.47e+00) (0.64, 1.40+e00) (0.84, 1.08e-02)
Joint Length (0.19, 7.53e-02) (0.19, 7.29e-02) (0.20, 1.49e-02)
Current Length (0.36, 1.40e-05) (0.37, 1.47e-05) (0.33, 5.91e-06)
Peer Age (0.35, 3.38e-05) (0.36, 3.43e-05) (0.27, 1.65e-05)
ZeroAccess 16471
Inter-Arrival (0.95, 3.25e-01) (0.87, 3.63e-01) (0.91, 2.28e-02)
Joint Length (0.21, 1.30e-02) (0.21, 1.29e-02) (0.20, 1.58e-02)
Current Length (0.39, 7.16e-06) (0.40, 7.05e-06) (0.34, 8.96e-06)
Peer Age (0.37, 1.66e-05) (0.37, 1.61e-05) (0.26, 2.70e-05)
Sality Version 3
Inter-Arrival - - (0.66, 1.72e-01)
Joint Length - - (0.28, 8.38e-04)
Current Length - - (0.47, 8.94e-06)
Peer Age - - (0.32, 2.20e-05)
Sality Version 4
Inter-Arrival - - (0.61, 2.97e-02)
Joint Length - - (0.22, 5.58e-03)
Current Length - - (0.39, 9.85e-06)
Peer Age - - (0.37, 1.88e-05)
thoughZA_16464canbemodeledwithWeibull,modeling forZA_16470
is not successful due to several extreme long inter-arrival time mea-
surements for the non-superpeers.
Most of the botnets also share a common shape parameter of k ≈
0.2 for the joint session length distribution. This means that they dif-
fer only in their length scale. However, the botnet fitting results dif-
fer from the results of regular P2P file-sharing networks reported in
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(b) ZA_16471 Peer Age
Figure 25: Distribution Fitting in ZA_16471
[SR06], where the scale factor is between 0.34 and 0.59. Figure 25a
presents a comparison of the empirical data of joint session length
for all peers in ZA_16471with the estimatedWeibull distribution. The
probabilitydistributionunderestimates themajorityof all lengths (here
in 93%of the cases), which is consistently seen for all networkswithin
Sality andZeroAccess. This observation also applies to the current ses-
sion length but the model still provides a decent fit for both metrics.
The Weibull distributions for the peer age and remaining uptime are
able tomodel the empirical data very tightly asdepicted inFigure 25b,
which is an example for all peers in ZA_16471 but representative for
all networks of the two botnets.
The combination of the different Weibull parameters presented in
Table 16 can be used to apply accurate churn models in simulations.
A user can not only choose to apply a generic churn model for both
types of nodes, i.e., superpeers and non-superpeers, but also apply
specific churnmodels for each type of nodes (if applicable). Accurate
churnmodels enables amore realistic scenario for analysis and inves-
tigations of existing and future botnets. Moreover, since it is often dif-
ficult to conduct live botnet investigations, a simulation-based study
using realistic churn models could be an alternative to understand
and tackle the botnet phenomenon.
7.2.4.3 Influence of Third Party Monitoring Activities
Sensor nodes that may have been present in the datasets could have
influenced the resulting measurements or the derived churn mod-
els. Therefore the SensorBuster mechanism, which was presented in
Section 6.1.4, is applied to detect and remove the sensors from the
datasets. After removing the sensors, the analysis performed in Sec-
tion 7.2.4.1 and 7.2.4.2 were repeated to compare the results of with
andwithout the sensors in thedatasets. The analysis results indicated
that although therewere a small number of detected sensors, i.e., less
than ten sensors, in each botnet, the removal of the sensors were not
influential enough to distort the overall churn measurements of the
botnets. The results in the form of table and plots were omitted from
being presented in this dissertation due to their insignificance.
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The results from this analysis did not meet the initial expectation
on the influence of third party monitoring as discussed in Section
7.2.3. This can be attributed by the low number of sensor nodes in
comparison to the total number of available bots. Therefore, it can be
concluded that churn measurements obtained in current Sality and
ZeroAccess botnets, can ignore sensor nodes present within botnets.
7.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapterpresentedchurnmeasurements anda representative churn
model for two real-world botnets: Sality and ZeroAccess. In contrast
to churn studies conducted by others, the presented work uses high-
frequency crawling to obtain fine-grained measurements of the bot-
nets. Such high-frequency crawling can reduce the amount of net-
work bias or noise introduced in the final measurements in compari-
son to slower crawlers (see Section 3.4.1). In addition, this work also
takes into consideration the influence of third partymonitoring activ-
ities, i.e., sensors, on the resulting measurements through the appli-
cation of the SensorBuster mechanism as proposed in Section 6.1.4.
However, sensor nodes detected in the existing botnets are found to
have no influence towards the overall botnet churn characteristics
due to the small number of total sensor nodes currently deployed in
the botnets.
From the evaluation results presented in Section 7.2.4, the research
questions posed in Section 7.2.3 can be answered.
• What are the similarities in churn characteristics of P2P botnets
compared to conventional P2P file sharing networks? Most of
the churnmeasurements of Sality and ZeroAccess are observed
to be similar in pattern across the duration of themeasurement.
The shape of their distributions also corresponds to those re-
portedbyStutzbachandRejaie [SR06] for regularP2Pfile-sharing
networks. The similarities across these twodifferentP2Pdomains
is not surprising, considering that users of both domains usu-
ally experience similar IP address aliasing issues anddiurnal be-
havior.
However, if abotnet consists of anevenmorediverseormobility-
enabled set ofusers, e.g., smartphonedevicesor Internet-enabled
personal gadgets, the similarities with regular P2P file-sharing
networksmayneed tobeanalyzedagain.This ismainlybecause
the botnets analyzed in this work (see Section 4) aremore static
when deployed in residential and production networks. How-
ever,withan increasingnumberofmobile andwearabledevices
in botnets, node churn may even be heavier. This in turn may
cause the churn characteristics of suchbotnets not to be similar
anymore with regular P2P file-sharing networks.
• Is theWeibull distribution applicable tomodel churn in P2P bot-
nets? If yes, what are the parameters to model them? To answer
this research question, the churnmeasurements of the two ana-
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lyzedbotnetswerefittedwithaWeibull distribution.Thepremise
for this decision is the fact that the shape of the distribution
of the botnet churn measurements is similar to that of regular
P2P file-sharing networks [SR06]. Moreover, the Stutzbach and
Rejaie reported that churn measurements of P2P networks are
more accurately modeled by a Weibull distribution than other
distributions suchasheavy-tailedorPareto. Findingsof thiswork
indicate that the results of [SR06] are also applicable to P2P bot-
nets. Therefore, it is indeed possible to model the churn in P2P
botnets using a Weibull distribution.
The derived Weibull parameters presented in Table 16 can be
used to studybotnets ina simulation settingusing realistic churn
models. Moreover, the results could also be helpful for analyz-
ing the success or effort of a botnet takedownplan, e.g., the time
needed for a sinkholing attack.
• Does the presence of highly responsive sensors affect the churn
characteristics of P2P botnets? In contrast to the initial expecta-
tions that sensors adversely influence the churnmeasurements
due to their extremely high uptime, analysis on the two botnet
families indicated that their influence was negligible. This was
primarily due to the very few sensors deployed in this botnets.
However, this observation is only applicable for the evaluated
botnets within the measurement period. If these or other up-
coming botnets gain popularity in the near future, chances are,
more sensorsmay be deployed tomonitor them. Therefore, suf-
ficient attention needs to be given to ensure the resulting churn
data isnot affectedbynoise fromthepresenceof increasednum-
ber of sensor nodes.
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Over the course of the previous chapters, issues relevant to advanced
P2Pbotnetmonitoringwere visited. Particularly, existingbotnetmon-
itoringmechanismsareanalyzed regarding thechallengesoften faced
by them: the dynamic nature of P2P botnets and the various anti-
monitoring mechanisms implemented to impede existing monitor-
ing mechanisms. Based on that, this work proposed several counter-
measures to circumvent existing anti-monitoringmechanisms. In ad-
dition, several new and advanced anti-monitoringmechanisms have
been introduced to anticipate the next steps of the botmasters. This
chapter summarizes the main contributions and findings of this dis-
sertation and presents an outlook.
8.1 CONCLUSION
The adoption of a P2P-based architecture by recent botnets made
their monitoring more difficult. Specifically, specialized monitoring
mechanisms such as crawlers and sensors are required to monitor
them.However, realizing the threats posedby suchmonitoringmech-
anisms, somebotmastershaveequipped their botnetswithadditional
anti-monitoringmechanisms that impede botnetmonitoring. Exam-
ples of suchadvancedbotnets areGameOverZeus, Sality, andZeroAc-
cess. In addition, the dynamic nature of P2P botnets represents as a
hurdle to perform an efficient or effective botnet monitoring.
In this dissertation, requirements for an advanced botnet monitor-
ingmechanismwas derived to serve as a guideline for a discussion of
the current state of the art in Chapter 3. The proposed requirements
are not only aimed at producing high-quality monitoring data, but
also to stay undetected from botmasters. This discussion revealed
that many of the existing botnet monitoring mechanisms only par-
tially fulfill thenon-functional requirements thatwereoutlined inSec-
tion 3.1.2. Suchmonitoringmechanismsmay produce biased results,
and introduce additional noise that affect the monitoring results of
others. Moreover, anti-monitoring mechanisms of existing botnets
also cause thebotnetmonitoringmechanisms fail in fulfilling theStealth-
iness orAccuracy requirements.One exampleof suchamechanism is
theNL restrictionandautomatedblacklistingmechanismofGameOver
Zeus that targets crawlers.
This dissertation analyzed and proposed a countermeasure called
ZEUSMILKER to circumvent thisNL restrictionmechanismofGameOver
Zeus that provably retrieves all neighbors of a bot. Then, to address
the issueof evading theautomatedblacklistingmechanismofGameOver
Zeus or to efficiently crawl any botnet, a novel crawling algorithm
calledLess InvasiveCrawlingAlgorithm(LICA) is proposedwhichmin-
133
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imizes the number of bots that needs to be crawled to discover most
of the bots in the botnet.
In addition, this dissertationalso introduced thedesignof a generic
high-speed crawler called Strobo-Crawler. It can be configured to
crawl a botnet at high-speed, but also be used to rate-limit the crawl-
ing frequency accordingly to evade blacklisting mechanisms such as
thatofGameOverZeus.Moreover, thehigh-speedcrawlingof Strobo-Crawler
minimizes the noise introduced in the resulting snapshots. As it pro-
vides a snapshot in less time, it reduces the noise noise being intro-
duced in the resulting snapshots. Inaddition, thedesignof this crawler,
whichdifferentiate responsivebots fromnewlydiscoveredbots, helps
to prevent noise from being introduced in the resulting monitoring
data, i.e., artifacts in the form of non-existing or oﬄine bots. All in
all, ZEUSMILKER, LICA, and Strobo-Crawler help to improve the effi-
ciency and accuracy of crawling while being harder to detect by bot-
masters.
However, it is just a matter of time before the botmasters come up
with newmechanism to impedemonitoring. For this reason, this dis-
sertation also introduces several anti-monitoring countermeasures
fromtheperspectiveof abotmaster to raise the stake in this arms race.
In particular, some lightweight crawler detection mechanism called
BoobyTraps (BTs) areproposed that leveragesdesign constraints of ex-
isting botnets. Evaluation results of these mechanisms on Sality and
ZeroAccess indicates thatmanycrawlers are susceptible to them.This
is indeedworrying, since the idea of BT is relatively simple and can be
easily implemented in existing botnets .
Prior to the works done in this dissertation, some researchers have
claimed that sensor nodes are a more stealthy monitoring mecha-
nism as they are difficult to be distinguished from regular bots. How-
ever, as another major contribution of this dissertation, three sensor
detection mechanisms were proposed by leveraging graph-theoretic
metrics to discern sensor nodes from regular bots. Evaluation results
of these mechanisms in Sality and ZeroAccess indicates that quite a
numberof sensornodes are susceptible to theproposedmechanisms.
Particularly, the SensorBuster mechanism is able to accurately detect
independent and colluding sensor nodes deployed in a botnet. To
give the upper hand back to the defenders, the dissertation also dis-
cussed strategies that should be adopted by future sensor nodes to
remain undetected by the proposed sensor detection mechanisms.
One major problem that can be foreseen with the advancement
of botnet monitoring mechanisms is that most of these mechanisms
would eventually tend to bemore stealthier than they are now.While
being stealthymayhelp toperformmonitoringwithoutbeingdetected,
this may also introduce adverse effects to the monitoring data. For
instance, the stealthy monitoring footprint of an individual or orga-
nization will be assumed to be those of the botnet itself. This in turn
would affect the accuracy and quality of the monitoring data.
To investigate if such a problem already exists in current botnets,
this dissertation also investigates if the presence of highly-responsive
sensor nodes may affect churn measurements of botnets. Based on
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fine-grained churn measurements conducted in Sality and ZeroAc-
cess, theSensorBustermechanismwasapplied to identify sensornodes
in the botnets. However, due to a small number of sensor nodes de-
ployed in the botnets, the presence of sensor nodeswithin the botnet
overlay was found do not influence the overall churn measurements
of thebots.However, the author believes thatwith an increasingmon-
itoring activity in a botnet, there will be a more significant influence
of sensor nodes on the overall churn measurements.
Concluding, the works presented in this dissertation indicate that
the existing anti-monitoring mechanisms implemented by botnets
orproposedby researchers are still in their infancy. They caneither be
circumvented or toleratedwith sufficient computing resources at dis-
posal. However, botmasters are expected to improve and introduce
more advanced anti-monitoring mechanisms. For that, the defend-
ers need to be prepared to face such advancements. This can be done
bypreempting thepossible advancements frombotmasters, i.e., propos-
ing advanced anti-monitoring mechanisms, and attempt to devise
countermeasures against them.
8.2 OUTLOOK
This dissertation primarily focused on proposing countermeasures
to circumvent or tolerate the anti-monitoring mechanisms of exist-
ing botnets. However, it would definitely be interesting to identify to
which extent botnetmonitoring can always be performed. To answer
this question, an in-depth investigation and analysis is required start-
ing with the set of assumptions that are applied on both the botnets
and the monitoring mechanisms themselves. For instance, usage of
a honeypot to monitor a botnet usually allows defenders to obtain
monitoring data from at least the view of a single bot. However, this
is only possible if the malware is not able to detect the virtualization
environment of the honeypot itself. Furthermore, crawling is able to
enumerate bots by leveraging the MM protocols of the botnets. If a
future botnet can be designed in a manner that does not require ex-
change of neighbors between bots to maintain connectivity with the
overlay, crawling mechanisms are not usable in such botnets. There-
fore, understanding the possible extents of botnet monitoring will
helpdefenders toprioritize and focus indevelopingnewcountermea-
sures and efficient monitoring mechanisms.
In addition, the monitoring data collected in the context of this
work also requires additional analysis. For instance, while the pres-
ence of sensor nodes are found to be negligible in the context of influ-
encing churn measurements, this may not be the case when the net-
workproperties of thebotnet overlay are analyzed. Adetailed analysis
needs to be done to understand the impact of unknown third party
monitoring activities on other aspects of botnet monitoring analysis,
e.g., static network properties like average path length.
Another interesting research direction would be to detect the bot-
masters managing the botnet. While this is usually difficult, as bot-
mastersmay usemultiple chains of proxies to hide their identity, con-
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tinuoushigh-speed snapshotsof abotnetoverlay capturedusing Strobo-Crawler
canbeused to trace commanddissemination/update frombot tobot.
These snapshots, can be used to identify a subset of bots that could
have been used to propagate a new update to the botnet.
In developing a countermeasure for the SensorBuster mechanism
(see Section 6.2.3), regular bots are required to be returned by sensor
nodes to remain undetected by the mechanism. However, the action
of returning valid bots may be deemed illegal from the perspective
of cyber laws of a country. Therefore, it is also important to revisit ex-
isting cyber laws to provide possibilities of conducting stealthy mon-
itoring activities in presence of advance countermeasures similar to
those presented in this dissertation.
Inaddition, thepresenceof existing IP-basedanti-monitoringmech-
anisms like those of GameOver Zeus requires a defender to possess
a large pool of IP addresses that can be used for botnet monitoring.
However, this is not always possible due to the scarcity of IPv4 ad-
dresses and/or organizational restrictions, i.e., limited allocation of
IP addresses. Therefore, future work should focus into developing a
botnet monitoring ecosystem that can utilize a large pool of shared
IP addresses for botnet monitoring. This ecosystem can also be en-
visioned as a community-based botnet monitoring platform. Users
interested in contributing to the ecosystem can voluntarily install a
client-side application that allows the IP address of their Internet-
enabled computing devices, e.g., smartphones, PCs, or servers, to be
shared. For instance, distributedcrawling canbeachievedby relaying
request messages using different IP addresses of volunteering clients
to contact the bots. From the perspective of a bot, the distributed
crawling would appear as though the requests are originating from
manydifferentbots. Thisway, IP-basedanti-monitoringmechanisms
canbe easily circumventedusing this community-basedbotnetmon-
itoring platform.
Moreover, such a monitoring platform also enables collaboration
opportunities for organizations or defenders that are interested in
monitoring the botnets. By contributing resources, e.g., IP addresses
or servers, for themonitoringplatform, theobtainedmonitoringdata
can be shared among the collaborators. This can not only ensure a
higher quality of monitoring data, i.e., lesser noise due to fewer in-
dependentmonitoring activities, but also helps to spur additional re-
search collaborations between different third parties that are inter-
ested in botnet monitoring.
Finally, anti-monitoringmechanisms thatwereanalyzed in thiswork
can be either circumvented or tolerated with sufficient computing
andnetwork resources. Therefore, to anticipate further advancements
from the botmasters, more work from the perspective of a botmaster
needs to be carried out. Particularly, the author believes that future
botnets may attempt to restrict further the botnet information that
are shared among bots to impede botnet monitoring. However, this
exchange of information among bots are important for the manage-
ment of the botnet overlay itself. Therefore, it is also interesting to
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investigate the impact of such restriction mechanisms to the robust-
ness and resilience of the constructed botnet overlay.
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AZEUSMILKER APPENDIX
A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1.3
Proof. The keys idj in L are enumerated such that idj idj+1 for j =
0. . .n− 2. For 1 6 j 6 n− 1, denote the common prefix of idj−1 and
idj by cpj = cp(idj, idj+1). Let s0 = 0(b) and sj = cpj||1||0(b− |cpj|− 1)
be the smallest key in I(idj, idj+1 modn) that is closer to idj than to
idj−1 modn with regard to the XOR distance (see Eq. 1 for more de-
tailed explanation on why this is the case). In the following, the sets
Fj− = I(idj−1 modn,sj) and Fj+ = I(sj − 1, idj) is considered for j =
0. . .n− 1 and an elaboration that at least one spoofed key has to be
chosen in Fj− and Fj+ each for all j is provided. First note that by con-
struction, the 2n sets Fj− ∪ Fj+ for j = 0. . .n− 1 are all disjunct. For
non-empty Fj∗ with 06 j6n− 1 and ∗ ∈ {+,−}, consider an arbitrary
key x ∈ Fj∗. If x is the first element in a neighbor list L ′ = L ∪ {x}, it
is only returned if a spoofed key s with XOR(s,x) XOR(idi,x) for all
06 i6 n− 1 is used. However, by the construction of the sets Fj∗, all
such keys are contained in Fj∗. Thus, at least one query is required
for each non-empty set Fj∗. Hence, for all neighbor lists L with only
non-empty Fj∗, 2n queries are required. Such lists exists: an exam-
ple for such a neighbor list is given by idj = j · 16 + 1, i.e. the first
n hexadecimal numbers ending in 1. Then Fj+ = {j · 16} and Fj− =
{j · 16+ 2, . . . , id(j+1) modn} for all j. So, a lower bound on the worst-
case complexity of an algorithm for guaranteed retrieval of neighbor
lists is indeed 2n.
A.2 PROBABILITY OF NON-OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE
Figure 26 gives an upper bound on the probability that a neighbor list
in a network ofm bots is not retrieved by ZEUSMILKER at the optimal
cost form6 1,000,000. The probability is computed based on Eq. 2.
A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1.4
Proof. In this proof,P(A) is used to denote the probability of an event
A, P(A|B) for the probability of A conditioned on B, and ∅ to denote
the empty set. The proof of Proposition 5.1.3 gives a precise descrip-
tionofneighbor lists requiring 2n spoofedkeys, stating that thebound
holds if all sets Fj− and Fj+ are non-empty. Now an upper bound is
given on the likelihood that an empty Fj− or Fj+ exists. Because the
distribution of keys in a neighbor list is unknown, an upper bound
is obtained on the probability that for any pair (x,y) of keys in the
network where y x, the set I(x,y) of keys between them is empty.
139
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Figure 26: Quantity in Eq. 2 for b=160 bits
Consider any two keys x and y: Recall that I(x,y) denotes the set
of keys between x and y. Let F− and F+ be the keys in I(x,y) closer
to x and y with regard to the XOR, respectively. If |I(x,y)| 6 1, either
F− or F+ is empty. Otherwise, there are |I(x,y)| + 1 possibilities that
the keys in I(x,y) could be divided between F− and F+, and only for
two of them F− or F+ is empty, namely if either x = cp(x,y)||0||1(b−
|cp(x,y)|− 1) or y = cp(x,y||1||0(b− |cp(x,y)|− 1). Hence F− or F+ is
empty with probability 2
|I(x,y)|+1 . Let D denote the random variable
giving |I(x,y)|+ 1 for two uniformly chosen keys. The probability that
D attains the value d is






16 d6 2b−1 − 1,
so that F− or F+ is empty with probability
P(F− = ∅ ∪ F+ = ∅) =
2b−1∑
d=0














(3+ 4(b− 1) ln2) .
The last step followsbecause for theharmonic series∑md=1 1d ≈ lnm+
ρ for theEuler-Mascheroni constantρ= 0.577. . .. Note that the keys in
a neighbor list are not distributed uniformly, but are usually close to
the node’s own key. However, the keys of them nodes in the network
are selecteduniformlyat random.Therefore, theprobability thatnone
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of the set of keys closer to any of them(m− 1)/2pairs of keys is empty,
is considered. An upper bound on the desired probability is obtained








(3+ 4(b− 1) ln2) .
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